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DENOMINATIONALISM IN THE U.S.: SCHISMS AND MERGERS 
This study investigates why people affiliate and disaffiliate 
with the various religions of the United States. The practice of 
religion in the western nations is distinct from religion in the east, 
Sasaki and Suzuki (1987) note that the main difference is that western 
religions are more congregational than individualistic, stressing the 
importance of gathering together as believers to worship. The 
denominational differences which exist in the United States represent 
a variety of approaches to how best to worship God. Yet any analysis 
of changes in how people worship necessarily incorporates an 
artificially static approach to U.S. denominational ism. This is 
because denominational distinctions must be drawn before one can 
analyze people's denominational affiliations. Nonetheless, religious 
denominations are dynamic, with new denominations continuously being 
formed via schisms and mergers. 
This chapter pays tribute to the fluid nature of 
denominational ism in the United States. It will serve as a 
springboard for the delineation of (static) types of denominations 
constructed and applied in subsequent chapters. The first section of 
the chapter reviews Niebuhr's (1957[1929]) classic work on the social 
sources of denominational ism, applying his ideas on church schisms and 
foundings to the origins of specific U.S. denominations. In the 
second section post-1950 mergers among Protestant denominations are 
discussed. The main focus is on why some denominations merged at 
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specific points in time, rather than earlier or later. Use of 
materials from the committees that helped create the new churches, as 
well as other accounts from secondary sources, provide the background 
for a third section. This third section addresses "why mergers occur" 
on the basis of generalizations gleaned from the case studies in 
section two. 
The final section addresses the possibility of continued 
reunification of denominations in America. Evidence is provided on 
both sides of the issue, that unification will continue or that 
denominational ism will be maintained. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of two models of change in denominational membership, 
dealing with how the needs of the American population have changed 
(and are changing) and how these changing needs have impacted (and 
will impact) denominational growth. 
Social Sources of Denominational ism 
H. Richard Niebuhr (1957[1929]) presents an in-depth analysis of 
denominationalism in America. It is his contention that denominations 
represent the accommodation of religion to the social system. In 
particular, he feels there are four sources of denominationalism to be 
found in American society: social class, ethnicity ("nationalism"), 
region ("sectionalism"), and race. The first two relate best to the 
founding of original groups, while the latter are useful in explaining 
most of the schisms which occurred during the late eighteenth through 
mid-nineteenth centuries. 
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Social class and denominational ism 
The reason that denominations have arisen is partially explained 
by the inability of Protestant churches to deal effectively with 
social class differences. Niebuhr (1957[1929]) notes, for instance, 
that during the late 1800s and early 1900s the religious ideologies 
which focused on the "other world" or heaven offered little 
consolation to the lower classes (the "disinherited") who experienced 
great suffering in the present world. The theologies of a number of 
church groups (especially those of Methodists and Pietists) "had 
substituted for the concept of the kingdom the symbol of heaven; they 
had been concerned with the redemption of men from the hell beyond the 
grave alone and had held out little promise of salvation from the 
various mundane hells in which the poor suffer for other sins besides 
their own" (Niebuhr, 1957:74[1929]). Sects (those churches which 
split from established denominations) arose out of this situation 
because the religious ideologies of the middle classes were unable to 
meet the needs and desires of lower class members. Theirs was a 
"religion of a bourgeoisie whose conflicts are over and which has 
passed into the quiet waters of assured income and established social 
standing" (Niebuhr, 1957:105[1929]). As a result, the lower class 
members left the church to form new religious groups. 
In contrast to Niebuhr (1957 [1929]), whose focus is on the 
church and the way in which social class can cause schisms, others 
have indicated a different way that class works which is not church-
related. Roof and McKinney (1987) argue that this movement is now 
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occurring at the individual level, such that the individual's choice 
of denominational preference is influenced by his/her social status. 
According to this argument, the old distinction between working class 
and middle class is less important to the issue of denominational ism 
today than the split within the middle class between the more 
traditional entrepreneurs, who are likely to hold to a Protestant work 
ethic, and the new middle class, who are more inclined to favor more 
financial support for social programs. In addition, the Roof and 
McKinney (1987) argument implies that social class has become less of 
a factor in causing new denominations to form. Instead, its impact 
today is at the individual level where it effects denominational 
preference. 
Ethnicity and denominational ism 
Niebuhr (1957[1929]) points out that the role of ethnicity or 
national origin in creating a diversity of denominations was evident 
from the names of such denominations as German Seventh Day Baptist, 
Armenian Apostolic, Norwegian Lutheran, etc. In addition, there are 
many ethnically homogenous churches which do not have names suggestive 
of homogeneity (e.g., the predominantly Dutch and German Reformed 
churches, the primarily British Episcopal church, etc.) Immigrants to 
the new world found it comforting to worship with others who spoke 
their own language and shared their customs. Ethnically homogenous 
denominations have thrived among Americans desiring to socialize with 
others of a similar background. Typically, these ethnic divisions 
have not corresponded to great differences in theology. 
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Among Protestants, the Lutherans have, in the past, exhibited the 
greatest amount of diversity in the formation of ethnic denominations. 
In addition to the Norwegian Lutheran Church mentioned above, the 
following also existed at the time Niebuhr (1957[1929]) wrote: the 
United Danish Evangelical Lutheran, the Danish Evangelical Lutheran, 
the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran National, the United Lutheran Church 
(German), and the Lutheran Synod of Buffalo (also German). The main 
reason for this diversity was not theological, but was a result of the 
desire of recent immigrants to worship in their native tongue. As 
will be discussed later, this diversity no longer exists in the 
Lutheran group, due to the large number of recent mergers among 
Lutheran denominations (see Figure 1.) 
Roof and McKinney (1987) have argued that ethnicity is no longer 
an important factor in the continued existence of these denominations. 
They point out that the use of foreign languages in worship services 
has all but disappeared. In addition, many second and third 
generation offspring of immigrants have less of an identification with 
their ethnic origins and are less likely to belong to (or be members 
of) an ethnic church as a result. Although some churches still are 
predominantly represented by a single ethnic heritage, most are 
showing a greater diversity in the ethnic makeup of their membership. 
Roof and McKinney conclude that "for Americans of European descent, 
ethnicity has declined significantly as a decisive influence on 
religious life. ... A more assimilated culture and society mean that 
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many churches no longer have as strong an ethnic-based support 
structure as in the past" (1987:125). 
Region and denominational ism 
Niebuhr (1957[1929]) posits two regional causes for the increase 
in the number of U.S. denominations. One cause is the animosity 
between those living in the North and South regions which arose during 
the time before and during the Civil War. This animosity was not 
simply the result of disagreement over the issue of slavery, but was 
further exacerbated by cultural and economic differences. The slavery 
issue provided a symbolic context within which these differences could 
be expressed. 
The time lines in Figures 2 and 3 indicate four denominations 
(the Christian Church, the Presbyterian Church in the USA, the 
Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church, and the Methodist Episcopal 
Church) that were effected by regionalistic schisms during the 1800s. 
Niebuhr (1957[1929]) indicates that to attribute these schisms to 
slavery alone is an over-simplification of a complex set of factors. 
The split between Northern and Southern Baptist churches provides 
an example of how these schisms occurred (Goen, 1985). While it is 
true that the Baptists did not form denominations as such (thus, no 
time line is presented for this group), they did have cooperative 
efforts in missionary societies and in a tract society, and thus were 
also effected by regional differences. The essential conflict which 
resulted in the creation of the Southern Baptist Convention was 
between proslavery Baptists of the south and antislavery Baptists of 
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the north. The conflict intensified during the early 1840s, with each 
side attempting to have the General Missionary Convention support 
their point of view. As late as April 1844 the General Convention 
made every attempt to remain neutral, neither supporting nor 
condemning slavery. 
The "final straw" occurred in November 1844, when Alabama 
Baptists, suspicious of the commitment of the General Convention to 
neutrality, addressed a resolution to the Acting Board of the General 
Convention (the executive committee which oversaw the work between the 
triennial meetings). They demanded that the Board explicitly avow 
that slaveholders were equally eligible and entitled to be appointed 
as missionaries. While the Board attempted to evade the issue, they 
were finally forced to declare: "If, however, any one should offer 
himself as a missionary, having slaves, and should insist on retaining 
them as his property, we could not appoint him. One thing is certain, 
we can never be a party to any arrangement which would imply 
approbation of slavery" (Goen, 1985:95). 
Proslavery Baptists met in Augusta, Georgia on May 8, 1945. They 
had hoped to have members present from the entire country, but no one 
from north of Baltimore or west of New Orleans was in attendance 
(Goen, 1985). The vote of the 293 delegates was nearly unanimous in 
favor of separation. The result was the formation of the Southern 
Baptist Convention. Ironically, the meeting was closed with the 
delegate joining hands and singing "Blest Be the Tie That Binds" 
(Goen, 1985). 
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While denominational schisms formed between northern and southern 
branches of certain denominations, a second set of regional 
differences arose between denominations in the eastern and western 
parts of the United States. "The advancing Western frontier brought 
forth a typical culture of its own, which not only profoundly affected 
the whole civilization of the United States but also came into 
frequent conflict with the established society of the mercantile East" 
(Niebuhr, 1957[1929]:136). The West had a culture characterized by 
individualism and by a commonly recognized struggle for mutual 
existence. In contrast, the East housed a culture characterized by 
affluence, with very little emphasis on survival. 
The effect of the East/West factor did not create schisms within 
denominations as much as it led to the founding of denominations which 
were unique to the Western culture. "These followed partly in the 
tradition of the European churches of the poor, but were, 
nevertheless, truly indigenous outgrowths of the American environment. 
The East, upon the other hand, clung fast to the established forms of 
European religious life and found itself unable to maintain unity with 
the frontier" (Niebuhr, 1957[1929]:137). Some denominational groups 
fit in well with the frontier way of life. Niebuhr cites such 
examples as the Baptists and Methodists as having had a large impact 
in the West, perhaps because these groups reject the Calvinist notion 
of election, which those of the West found to be inconsistent with an 
individualistic, egalitarian way of life. The effect was to create an 
east/west split, with certain denominations being found predominantly 
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in the East (e.g., Episcopal), while others were able to move into the 
West with relative ease. 
Unlike social class and ethnicity, the effect of regional culture 
on denominational ism has not diminished. Roof and McKinney (1987) 
believe that this is due in great part to a reciprocal relation 
between them. On the one hand, religion has had a large role in 
molding and maintaining the distinctive outlook and ethos of various 
regions of the United States. On the other hand, regional culture 
still exerts a great deal of influence in the maintenance of 
denominational variety rather than the creation of new denominations. 
Most religious groups are still heavily concentrated in their regions 
of origin (e.g., Baptists in the South, Mormons in Utah, Catholics in 
the Northeast, Lutherans in the Midwest, etc.). 
Race and denominational ism 
The separation of church groups into denominations based on skin 
color is a fact of life in American Christianity (Niebuhr, 
1957[1929]). Niebuhr notes the presence in the 1920s of the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church and the Methodist Episcopal Church. These 
two churches split in 1816 not because of heresy or doctrinal dispute, 
but because of racial problems (see Figure 3). During the time before 
the split, blacks were treated as second-class members, who were often 
required to sit in the balcony--apart from the white members, who sat 
below. Niebuhr argued that such a situation could exist in the church 
because "race discrimination is so respectable an attitude in America 
that it could be accepted by the church without subterfuge of any 
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sort" (1957:236[1929]). That is, in the 1920s church leaders were 
unaware of any inconsistency between this segregation and their 
theologies. In the contemporary U.S. (where racial discrimination is 
now less respectable), only a few groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, 
Aryan Nation, etc.) have acknowledged their racial biases by 
incorporating racist tenets into a modified "Christian" theology, 
according to which the "inferior" black race should be kept separate 
from "superior" whites. 
Niebuhr noted in 1929 that there were four major denominations 
which were purely black in racial composition: the National Baptist 
Convention, the African Methodist Episcopal, the African Methodist 
Episcopal Zion, and the Colored Methodist Episcopal churches. These 
denominations, along with a number of smaller all-black groups, 
accounted for 87.3% of black church members. In addition, of the 
12.7% of blacks who were members of racially-mixed denominations, most 
were worshipping in local churches which were 100% black. 
Segregation of U.S. congregations has remained stable for over 
three generations. Using data from the 1970s and 1980s, Roof and 
McKinney (1987) found approximately 85% of all black Protestants to be 
members of entirely black denominations. Compared to Niebuhr's 
(1957[1929]) figure of 87.3% for the 1920s, this demonstrates a 
long-term continuity in racial segregation among U.S. churches. Even 
among those denominations which have the highest proportions of black 
members, the American Baptists and the Seventh Day Adventists (each 
having about 27 percent black adherents), the familiar situation of 
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separate congregations for blacks and whites is still the rule. Roof 
and McKinney conclude that "the extent of racial integration in the 
'white' churches, whether Protestant or Catholic, is still small, 
hardly enough to refute the charge that the church remains among the 
most segregated major institutions in the society" (1987:143). 
Conclusions regarding denominational ism 
The four factors which Niebuhr (1957[1929]) cited as sources of 
denominational ism in American Protestantism no longer influence the 
creation of new denominations through schism. They do, however, still 
have a role in the maintenance of the old divisions. Of the four 
factors, race and region continue to play a major role in maintaining 
denominational distinctions, while the role of social class and ethnic 
heritage have diminished substantially. An examination of some recent 
denominational mergers provides some evidence of the decline in 
denominational ism. 
Recent Mergers in American Religion 
While many denominational divisions may still be maintained as a 
result of Niebuhr's (1957[1929]) social sources, the time lines in 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate nonetheless that there have been eleven 
major denominational mergers since the 1920s. This section will deal 
with those mergers in Figures 1-3 that occurred since 1960. During 
the last three decades the following new denominations were formed: 
the United Church of Christ (1961), the United Methodist Church 
(1968), the Presbyterian Church-USA (1983), the American Lutheran 
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Church (1960), the Lutheran Church in America (1962), and the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (1988). The focus of 
discussion is on why these mergers occurred. Particular emphasis will 
be placed on reasons which indicate social or economic reasons for 
mergers, although theological reasons will also be addressed. 
The United Church of Christ 
The United Church of Christ was organized in 1961 by merging of 
the Congregational and Christian Churches with the Evangelical and 
Reformed Church (see Figure 2). Each of these denominations had 
formed in the 1930s by a merger of two groups: the Congregational 
Church with the Christian Church in 1931, and the Evangelical Synod of 
North America with the Reformed Church in the United States in 1934. 
The preamble of the UÇÇ Basis of Union states: 
We, the regularly constituted representatives of the 
Congregational Christian Churches and of the Evangelical and 
Reformed Church, moved by the conviction that we are united 
in spirit and purpose and are in agreement on the substance 
of the Christian faith and the essential character of 
Christian life; .... 
Confronting the divisions and hostilities of our world, 
and hearing with a deepened sense of responsibility the 
prayer of our Lord 'that they all may be one'; 
Do now declare ourselves to be one body . . ." 
(Gunnemann, 1977:207). 
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The main reasons for merger indicated in the preamble are: 1) a 
unity of spirit and purpose, 2) an agreement on doctrines, 3) an 
agreement on the character of Christian life, and 4) following the 
wishes of the Lord. The first reason is most compelling in explaining 
why the merger occurred when it did, since the latter three reasons 
should have resulted in an earlier merger. Gunnemann (1977) notes 
that if there was a single event which began the merger movement, it 
was the formation of a study group of ministers from the two 
denominations in St. Louis in 1937. Their meetings "led to the 
recognition of common bonds and responsibilities" (Gunnemann, 
1977:21). It is perhaps these "common responsibilities" which made 
the merger not only feasible, but necessary to enhance the mission of 
the churches and to achieve their common purpose. 
The United Methodist Church 
The United Methodist Church was organized in 1968 by the merging 
of the Methodist Church (1939-1968) and the Evangelical United 
Brethren. Each of these churches was also the product of a merger 
during the late 1930s and mid-1940s (see Figure 3). The Methodist 
Church was basically a "reunion" of the three main schismatic groups 
from the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Evangelical United Brethren 
was formed from two denominations (the United Brethren in Christ and 
the Evangelical Church) which had their origins in Pennsylvania where 
they had originated in the early 1800s. 
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Paul Washburn (1984) was a participant in the unity talks. He 
indicates that the Commissions on Church Union first met jointly in 
1958, and that they: 
. . . listed nine reasons why union should be pursued: 1) 
union is God's will for the churches; 2) theological 
positions are quite alike; 3) emphasis on human dignity and 
social action is similar; 4) histories run along parallel 
lines; 5) common terminology is used in polity; 6) more 
effective ministerial education programs could be conducted; 
7) petitions for union with the Methodist Church were 
submitted by Evangelical United Brethren Conferences in 
Illinois and Kansas; 8) there are potential economies in 
administrative costs; and 9) there could be a possible 
strengthening of witness and mission (Washburn, 1984:64-65). 
Of these nine reasons, several are more compelling in explaining why 
this merger occurred when it did, rather than much sooner. Most of 
these issues are economic in nature (e.g., #6, #8), or reflect a 
common purpose (e.g., #3, #9). Others, such as four and five, are 
more related to the structural feasibility of a new church. Thus, it 
would appear that the formation of the United Methodist Church was 
justified not only in terms of following God's will, but also 
according to more "practical" reasons. 
The Presbyterian Church fUSA) 
The Presbyterian Church (USA) was organized in 1983 by the 
merging of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS) with 
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the United Presbyterian Church in the USA (UPC). The merger was, in a 
sense, a reunion of a split caused by regional differences during the 
Civil War era (see Figure 2). In addition to reuniting the two 
branches of the Presbyterian Church in the USA, it also included 
(through a prior merger) the United Presbyterian Church of North 
America. 
The primary reason speculated for the merger of these two 
denominations was an easing of potential tensions between the southern 
group (PCUS) and the northern group (UPC). Lyles (1983) interviewed 
Vic Jameson, then UPC press officer, who believed "that union has 
become achievable because both churches have shifted positions since 
the failed union effort of the '50s, becoming more alike: the 
'conservative' PCUS has become more liberal, and the 'liberal' UPC has 
moved to the right" (pp. 235-236). Loetscher (1983) presents a 
similar argument, noting that "in the twentieth century, the South 
moved increasingly into the mainstream of American national life and 
power, and was swept by the same forces of theological and social 
innovation, [and as a result] differences between Northern and 
Southern churches noticeably decreased" (p. 123). For the 
Presbyterians to unite, they had to wait until the regional 
differences between North and South had softened. The merger came 
about when these differences were no longer great enough to warrant 
two separate denominations. 
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The Lutheran mergers of the 1960s 
The American Lutheran Church (ALC) was organized in 1960 by the 
merging of three groups: the United Evangelical Lutheran Church, the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the American Lutheran Church. Each 
of these churches had formed based on nationality and geographical 
area during the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
The Lutheran Church in America (LCA) was established in 1962 by 
the merging of four denominations: the Augustana Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, the American Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Finnish 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the United Lutheran Church in 
America. As with the churches which formed the ALC, these 
denominations had formed based on nationality (ethnic heritage). 
The obvious explanation for these two mergers is that the ethnic 
differences no longer held importance as a divisive factor. Lutherans 
"discovered that old differences of nationality, chronology, and 
geography were not so divisive among a people increasingly at home in 
America" (Nichol, 1986:19). The ethnic churches had formed because of 
the desire of immigrants to worship in their native tongues. Thus, as 
noted in the previous discussion on Niebuhr {1957[1929]), there was a 
wide variety of Lutheran groups. As these immigrants were assimilated 
into American culture, their differences reduced. With English as a 
common language, the language barrier which had prevented these 
churches from merging was removed, and their common theological and 
doctrinal roots made the merging of the Lutheran denominations 
relatively simple. 
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The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 
The U.S. Protestant denomination most recently formed by merger 
is the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA). In 1988 the 
ELCA was formed from three groups: the American Lutheran Church, the 
Lutheran Church in America, and the Association of Evangelical 
Lutheran Churches (AELC). The first two were discussed above, while 
the third (the AELC) was formed in 1976 as a liberal schismatic group 
from the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. 
The ALC and LCA mergers (mentioned in the previous section) were 
enabled as ethnic differences diminished between the merging 
denominations. These mergers eliminated ethnicity a' a barrier to 
their union with each other and with the AELC. Some reasons for this 
union can be found in writings at the time. For example, the faculty 
of Trinity Lutheran Seminary endorsed a statement favoring the merger 
which included the following: "We Lutherans must become--if we are 
not already-'painfully aware of the negative witness which we 
constantly give because of our organizational disunity...We expend 
inordinate time and energy in coordinating enterprises which ought to 
be one . . . some form of maximal organizational unity is imperative 
just as soon as it can be effected" (Trinity Lutheran Seminary, 
1981:23). Dr. James R. Crumley, Jr. concurs when he states: 
. . .  t h e  c h u r c h  n e e d s  t o  k e e p  i t s  p r i o r i t i e s  s t r a i g h t .  T o  
serve the world and maintain the faith of its people, 
worship, evangelism, teaching, serving and stewardship will 
continue to be of the highest importance for the 
21 
church . . . Maintaining our separate organizations could 
serve as a detriment to our task of strengthening each other 
and serving our fellow human beings . . . For the sake of 
God's mission and to carry out our ministry in the world, it 
seems clear to me that a united church would be a far more 
appropriate instrument than one that is divided" (Crumley, 
1981:23). 
What these two quotes imply is an economic motive for merger, not 
necessarily an economy of money, but an "economy of scale." The 
implication is that a merged church, because of its greater size, will 
have more resources at its disposal. In addition, one church can more 
efficiently deal with tasks of world service and evangelism than the 
three separate churches. By joining together into one church, these 
tasks could be better coordinated and jointly financed, resulting in a 
more effective ministry. 
Summary 
The factors which led to the merging of the various denominations 
in the case studies can be placed into five categories: 1) a desire 
to create a unified church which follows God's will; 2) a desire to 
economize, both monetarily and in terms of church ministry; 3) a 
recognition of common goals (somewhat related to #2); 4) a shifting of 
theological and social positions bringing denominations closer 
together; and 5) a reduction in the influence of ethnic heritage. Of 
these reasons, the first is the least compelling, since the desire for 
unity should have prevented denominational ism in the first place. The 
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other four categories are of more use in discussing why denominational 
mergers occur when they do. The following section examines these and 
other issues as they relate to church unity. 
The Unification of American Churches 
Both Lee (1960) and Wuthnow (1988) present arguments regarding 
church unity which center around a reduction of the differences noted 
by Niebuhr (1957[1929]). Their basic premise is that American society 
as a whole has experienced a reduction of these differences, and this 
reduction has led to a greater likelihood of denominational mergers. 
Lee (1960) notes that in 1960 churches still were largely divided 
on racial lines. Yet he argues that racial differences in American 
society were being reduced by such actions as increased educational 
opportunity for blacks, the passage of civil rights legislation in 
1957, and the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, mandating school 
desegregation. These, along with changes noted in attitudes and 
beliefs, are presented as evidence of a reduction of racial 
differences in America. Nearly three decades later, however, Wuthnow 
(1988) indicates that race is still a significant factor in 
denominational ism. 
Lee (1960) also posits a change in the American class structure. 
For instance, he notes a change in the distribution of income 
resulting in a larger middle income group and a smaller lower income 
group. In addition, he finds a growing number of professional and 
semi-professional occupations becoming available, with a concurrent 
drop in the need for unskilled labor. Assuming that Individuals who 
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are upwardly mobile remain in their original church, he sees this 
trend as bringing denominations closer together. Wuthnow (1988) 
indicates that the effect of social class is still somewhat noticeable 
within U.S. cnurches. He observes that recent studies have shown 
Episcopalians to have retained their distinction both as being the 
wealthiest Protestant denomination and as having a higher percentage 
of professionals than other denominations. In addition, Presbyterians 
still showed above-average income, while Baptists were consistently 
below the national average. In contrast, Wuthnow (1988) does see some 
changes occurring in occupation and education, with denominations that 
previously had below-average proportions of professionals/managers, or 
below-average educational levels, moving closer to the average. 
Regional differences still exist, although both Lee (1960) and 
Wuthnow (1988) see these being modified. Wuthnow (1988) notes such 
examples as the 1939 merger of the northern and southern branches of 
Methodism (see Figure 3), and the 1988 merger of northeastern and 
Midwestern branches of Lutheranism (see Figure 1). For Wuthnow, these 
all indicate a lessening of regional tensions. In addition, he 
presents evidence of a shifting of regional concentration, with 
denominations previously concentrated in a particular region branching 
out into other regions. As these denominations spread out, they "may 
embody greater internal diversity and, on the whole, resemble more 
closely the cultural diversity in the society at large" (Wuthnow, 
1988:85). 
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Perhaps the most noticeable decline in significance is that of 
national or ethnic heritage. Lee (1960) sees this decline as a result 
of the "melting-pot" of American culture. He states that "however 
tenacious our ethnic ties, over the course of several generations, 
they tend to erode and flow into the mainstream of American culture. 
Even the newcomer seeks to adopt the behavior patterns of the third 
generation and tries to shed or conceal the badges of his own 
tradition" (Lee, 1960:43). This assimilation of the immigrant into 
American culture is evident in the churches. Lee (1960) notes the 
decreasing number of American churches which hold non-English speaking 
worship services. He cites as an example the Congregational and 
Christian denomination, which had 577 non-English-speaking churches in 
1930 and 294 non-English-speaking churches in 1955. Learning to 
speak, read, and write in English is part of the assimilation process. 
And as English becomes more commonly used by immigrants, the ethnic 
barrier which separated denominations loses significance. As was 
noted in the previous section, both the American Lutheran Church and 
the Lutheran Church in America mergers were influenced by the 
reduction of ethnicity. 
In addition to the reduction of race, class, region, and 
ethnicity as factors in maintaining divisions, Lee (1960) also notes 
other "signs of growing cultural unity" (p. 49). These include; 1) 
mass communications, 2) common values, 3) styles of life, 4) mutual 
dependence, 5) organizational revolution, and 6) symbols of national 
unity. The first three are tied together, with mass media (e.g., TV, 
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radio, etc.) providing information on values and lifestyles, making 
the former a necessary step in the socialization of the latter. It is 
Lee's contention that changes in these areas reduce cultural and 
social differences between the variety of groups present in American 
society. The mutual dependence of people in American society 
increases the likelihood of contact and unity, since "the work of one 
man--or team--seeks completion in that of another" (Lee, 1960:63). He 
also holds that the wide variety of organizations, which have contacts 
at regional and national levels, foster communication among their 
members. Finally, symbols of national unity (e.g., the flag, the 
Constitution, national anthem, etc.) create a sense that, despite 
differences among the people, all are Americans. As a result of this 
growing cultural unity, "the churches are hard-pressed to prove that 
continuing divisions are due to the divided state of the social order" 
(Lee, 1960:74). 
Bellah (1968) relates this cultural unity to what he terms the 
"American civil religion." He notes that 
. . . although matters of personal religious belief, 
worship, and association are considered to be strictly 
private affairs, there are, at the same time, certain common 
elements of religious orientation that the great majority of 
Americans share. These have played a crucial role in the 
development of American institutions and still provide a 
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, 
including the political sphere. This public religious 
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dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and 
rituals . . . (Bellah, 1968:5-6). 
The beliefs associated with this "civil religion" include the 
existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the 
punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance. 
Symbols of the "civil religion" could include the flag, but also 
encompasses such "martyrs of the faith" as Abraham Lincoln and John F. 
Kennedy. And the rituals include the inauguration ceremony, Memorial 
Day observances, and the annual declaration of a day of thanksgiving. 
While these are just a few examples, the general theme is of a common 
faith. Bellah notes that civil religion "has neither been so general 
that it has lacked incisive relevance to the American scene nor so 
particular that it has placed American society above universal human 
values" (Bellah, 1968:14). 
This "American civil religion" has had a profound impact on 
church religion in the United States. Bellah (1968) indicates that 
religion in America "has been predominantly activist, moralistic, and 
social rather than contemplative, theological, or innerly spiritual" 
(p. 14). He argues that the relation between religion and politics 
has been smooth because religion has acted to maintain the democratic 
republic. He notes that this is due in large part to the fact that 
much of colonial America was peopled by those who were escaping the 
religious authority of European religion. These people brought a form 
of Christianity which was democratic in polity, and which, as a 
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result, offered little opposition to the establishment of a democratic 
America. 
Lee (1960) also notes the emergence of what he called a "common-
core Protestantism." Its five components are: 1) doctrinal 
consensus, or a broad sharing of faith in basic convictions; 2) 
interchangeable membership; 3) interchangeable ministry or clergy; 4) 
increasing similarity of episcopalian, presbyterian, and 
congregational forms of church polity; and 5) a "common ethos" 
centered on activism, humanitarian concern, etc. The first and last 
components relate well to what Bell ah (1968) cites as parts of, or 
effects of, American civil religion. The other three, if true, 
indicate that the denominations of American Protestantism are becoming 
more alike, and as a result members (and clergy) feel less inhibited 
about changing affiliation. 
The mergers mentioned in this chapter, as well as others that 
occurred during the late 1800s and the early 1900s, indicate a move 
toward church unity. But they are not the only evidence that the 
various denominations are coming together. Lee (1960) and Wuthnow 
(1988) both report on the growth of interdenominational organizations, 
such as the National Council of Churches, and on numerous Christian 
special interest groups that are non-denominational (e.g., the 
American Bible Society, the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, the 
Christian Legal Society, etc.). These organizations all serve to 
facilitate contact and communication between persons of varying 
denominational backgrounds, causing them to realize their many common 
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goals, purposes, and beliefs. While they do not show a 
structural/organizational unity, they do indicate a spirit of unity, a 
willingness to work together. 
The continuation of denominational ism 
The above discussion provides substantial evidence that American 
churches are moving toward greater unity—both in purpose and 
institutionally. However, in two recent articles one research team 
has presented an alternative argument, that denominational ism has not 
been substantially reduced in recent years (Liebman, Sutton and 
Wuthnow, 1988; Sutton, Wuthnow and Liebman, 1988). Both of these 
papers focus on schisms (or founding rate), examining what factors 
lead to a rise or decline in the founding rate. 
In the papers, founding rate was measured as the number of schisms 
occurring in the decade prior to a schism. Thus, if a schism was 
noted in 1922, the founding rate was the number of schisms which 
occurred from 1912-1921 (Sutton et al., 1988). Their sample consisted 
of all denominations meeting the following criteria: 1) they existed 
in the United States at any time between 1890 and 1980; 2) they were 
in either the Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, or Presbyterian/Reformed 
families; and 3) they had at least 1000 members at some time in their 
history. The unit of analysis is the individual denomination, with a 
sample of 175 denominations. Among these denominations there were 55 
schisms. 
Liebman et al. (1988) focus their attention on two sets of 
variables which are denomination specific: the degree to which power 
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is centralized within a denomination and whether the denomination has 
resource linkages to other religious organizations. Centralization of 
power was measured in three ways: 1) polity type (episcopal, 
Presbyterian, and congregational); 2) whether clergy are appointed at 
the level of the synod or local parish; and 3) control over 
ideological resources as indicated by the presence or absence of a 
denominational seminary. Resource linkages were measured by 
determining whether the denomination was part of denominational 
federation (e.g., the National Council of Churches) and whether that 
federation was considered conservative or liberal. In addition, they 
also consider the age of the denomination and its size (number of 
churches and number of members). They found that "the most powerful 
single predictor of schism is size as measured by denominational 
membership: the larger the denomination, the greater the tendency to 
schism" (Liebman et al., 1988:351). They also found that, after 
controlling for denominational size, those denominations that were 
linked to a liberal denominational federation had lower founding 
rates. They offer two potential explanations for this finding. The 
first is that only liberal churches would belong to a liberal 
federation and that, therefore, those denominations which allow more 
ideological freedom are better able to deal with dissent than more 
rigid denominations. On the other hand, belonging to a federation may 
confer a "sense of legitimacy and collective significance on the 
member denomination" (Liebman et al., 1988:351). 
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The work of Sutton et al. (1988) expands on the previous study. 
Using the same data set as Liebman et al. (1988), they focus on prior 
schisms and prior mergers and their effect on founding rate. The 
hypothesized relationships were based on population ecology models and 
focus on availability of resources and level of competition. Based on 
findings from a study of American labor unions, Sutton et al. (1988) 
hypothesized that the relationship between prior foundings (number of 
denominational schisms reported in the previous 10 years) and founding 
rates would exhibit an inverted U-shaped association. In other words, 
an increasing number of schisms in one decade would increase the 
founding rate in the following decade until the increased competition 
among denominations would drive the founding rate down. The opposite 
relationship was hypothesized for prior mergers and the founding rate. 
It was expected that increasing numbers of prior mergers would lower 
the founding rate to a point at which the lower number of competitors 
would increase the probability of schisms. 
Their results indicate that these relationships were directly 
opposite to what was hypothesized (Sutton et al., 1988). Prior 
schisms had a U-shaped association with founding rates, while prior 
mergers showed the inverted U-shape. They conclude that: 
Schisms are the product of intradenominational conflict; 
they may, in addition, reflect tensions that affect groups 
or networks of denominations, or perhaps all Protestant 
denominations at once. The occurrence of a few schisms 
might ameliorate these tensions, allowing grievances to be 
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articulated and inviting members to sort themselves out 
among new organizations. At some point, however, perhaps 
due to exogenous historical events, the tendency to schism 
might become contagious, leading to a large-scale 
reorganization of the institutional terrain (Sutton et al., 
1988:12). 
They argue further that the Protestant Reformation was an early 
example of this type of phenomenon, that the schisms resulting in the 
various Protestant denominations took part in an era of 
reorganization. A similar explanation is used with regard to mergers: 
within denominations, mergers are likely to create pockets of 
discontent among members suffering the loss of a familiar 
denominational identity. Across denominations, a wave of mergers 
would reduce the number of relocation options available to 
discontented members, and might thereby increase the likelihood that 
insurgent groups will strike out on their own and establish new 
organizational structures. The subsequent decline in the effect of 
prior mergers suggests that at some point the founding of new 
denominations meets the demand for relocation options (Sutton et al., 
1988:13). 
What these findings indicate is that the current decline of 
denominational ism may be temporary. Wuthnow (1988) notes that even 
with the recent mergers, there has been little decline in the number 
of Protestant denominations from 1950 to 1980. And the findings 
presented by Sutton et al. (1988) indicate that an increase in the 
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number of mergers may result in an increase in denominational 
foundings as a result of dissension within the merged churches. An 
example may be found in the 1939 merger which formed The Methodist 
Church. Five years before the union took place, some churches of the 
Methodist Episcopal-South denomination, that were opposed to the 
merger, broke away to form the Southern Methodist denomination (see 
Figure 3). It remains to be seen whether dissenting churches from 
recent mergers will also form new denominations. 
What the findings of Wuthnow (1988), Liebman et al. (1988), and 
Sutton et al. (1988) seem to indicate is that there is some "critical 
number" of denominations that must exist. This critical number may 
represent the minimum number of denominations necessary to meet the 
spiritual, emotional, and social needs of a diverse population. The 
continued influence of race and region (and to a lesser degree social 
class) as sources of denominational ism may also reflect this need. It 
may be impossible for mergers to yield less than a minimal "critical 
number" of denominations, beyond which a smaller number of mega-
denominations would be unable to meet the needs of all their members 
and churches. 
Models of Denominational Shifts 
If it is true that a "critical number" of denominations is 
necessary to satisfy the needs of a diverse population, then the 
natures of these basic needs must be considered. Further, as the 
needs of the population (or given parts of that population) change, it 
can be assumed that certain denominations may experience growth or 
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decline depending on whether the needs they satisfy gain or lose 
significance. Thus, changes between denominations in their relative 
ability to attract members may be considered as primarily a function 
of the changing needs of the population being targeted. As needs 
change, some denominations will benefit, while others will decline. 
The long-term significance of these changes has been a matter of much 
debate in recent years. 
Greeley (1989) posits several models of how changes between 
denominations may occur. The primary focus of the research to follow 
will be an attempt to determine which of the two most commonly 
proposed models regarding the process of secularization is supported 
by long-term trends. These two models, the developmental model 
(Greeley's "secularization model") and the cyclic model, are described 
in detail below. 
The developmental model 
The developmental model appears to be the most commonly accepted 
among those who study religion (Greeley, 1989). The assumption is 
that the influence of religion in Western industrial societies is 
declining. Much of the evidence for this comes from the study of 
religion in Europe, which presumably has been in the process of 
secularization for a longer period (Berger, 1967). Berger (1967) 
notes that indicators of secularization, particularly those associated 
with church-related religiosity, have shown little change in American 
society. He argues that this does not indicate a lack of 
secularization. Rather, it is indicative of the trend among American 
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religious groups to secularize from within. It is Berger's contention 
that Christianity, and especially Protestantism, has become 
increasingly secularized. By eliminating the "mystery, miracle, and 
magic" aspects of religion, Protestants effectively separated the 
sacred and the secular, God and the world. This argument is similar 
to that of Kelley (1977, 1978), who argues that conservative 
Protestant churches are growing precisely because they maintain the 
connection between God and the world. 
While the developmental model has been (and is still) a widely 
held view, few have attempted to explain just what the process of 
developmental secularization might be. A notable exception is the 
theory developed by Fenn (1978). Fenn posits five steps in the 
process of secularization. He notes that the process is complex, 
since many of the changes associated with the five steps occur 
simultaneously rather than in the order given. He also indicates that 
the process is reversible, something which other proponents of 
secularization seem unwilling or unable to envision. 
The first step of the developmental secularization process 
involves the separation of distinct religious institutions (Fenn, 
1978). This step is conceived of as a continuing process rather than 
a single event in time. It involves the emergence of institutions 
that exist for religious purposes alone (e.g., the priesthood). In 
essence the change reflects a shift from personal religion to 
corporate religion, from religion that is a desire of the individual 
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to relate in some way to a higher power, to religion that focuses on 
common experiences and common needs of a number of people. 
In step two, there is a demand for a clarification of the 
boundary between religious and secular issues (Fenn, 1978). This is 
essentially a need to separate church and state, to discover what 
areas of life should and should not be impacted by the values of the 
state. This appears as a conflict between the religious orientation 
of society as a whole versus the religious orientation of smaller 
groups within the society. This conflict may result in a continuous 
process of separating legal issues from religious rules, values, and 
organizations. It can also, however, lead to the third step. 
The third step involves "the development of generalized beliefs 
and values that transcend the potential conflict between the larger 
society and its component parts" (Fenn, 1978:33). This corresponds to 
Bellah's (1968) concept of civil religion, discussed earlier in this 
chapter. What emerges is a general set of beliefs and values to which 
all religious groups in the society can agree. (Note the contrast 
here with speculations about a "critical number" of denominations 
needed to satisfy the various needs of a pluralistic society.) 
In the fourth step, pluralism is accommodated as religious 
minority groups demand that the state define its authority in secular 
terms while recognizing the right of these groups to engage in 
religious practices which may not fit the civil religion. In a sense 
this fourth step is a continuation of the second, although Fenn notes 
the existence of two new conditions. First is the development of the 
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national ideology (viz., Bellah's "civil religion"). Second is that 
during this fourth stage there are more religious beliefs, and a 
greater proportion of the population practicing beliefs that are 
contrary to the beliefs of the religious mainstream. What occurs is 
an ongoing process of negotiation between deviant religious groups and 
the government regarding the existence and extent of state authority. 
Step five involves "the separation of individual from corporate 
life" (Fenn, 1978:38). People begin to act in one way in society, 
based on the values held by that society, which may be distinct from 
their personal values. There is variation in the extent to which 
religious groups emphasize personal values that are congruent with the 
corporate values of society. The Catholic Church and mainline 
Protestant denominations endorse honesty, love-of-neighbor, and other 
values that may be difficult to differentiate from values 
characteristic of American society in general. Evangelical 
Protestants, on the other hand, emphasize personal values 
(particularly involving individuals' demeanor) that may be clearly 
distinct from extradenorainational corporate values. 
Once again the position of Kelley (1977, 1978) is pertinent, 
since it appears from this theory that certain churches become more 
secularized than others. When members of a denomination can no longer 
differentiate personal from corporate values, they are likely to begin 
questioning the value of their membership in the denomination. 
Furthermore, the draw of conservative churches may be their greater 
focus on personal values. 
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Bruce (1990) gives an opposing viewpoint. He theorizes that when 
people realize that their churches are not providing any unique 
contribution to their lives, that they will "drop out" of religion and 
have their needs met in the secular realm. 
The cyclic model 
In contrast to the secularization model, which predicts the 
eventual demise of religion, proponents of the cyclic model point to 
the "ebbs and flows in religion, great cyclic movements of rise and 
fall, of secularization and, to use a word of which Peter Berger is 
fond, 'resacralization'" (Greeley, 1989:6). The focus is on the ways 
in which the influence of religion in American life declines during 
certain periods of time and subsequently rebounds during the next time 
period. 
Berger (1977) documents the cyclic nature of religion from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. He notes that the 1950s are seen by many 
as a period of "religious revival" during which all statistical 
indicators of organized religion showed an increase in the influence 
of religion. Church membership reached record numbers, attendance was 
up, and financial contributions increased. Churches were actively 
engaged in building projects, both expansion of old buildings as well 
as new "church plants." The mergers of a variety of denominations 
(previously documented in this chapter) are also cited as evidence of 
this revival. Yet by the mid-1960s the revival was over, most notably 
among mainstream Protestantism (Berger, 1977). All the statistical 
indicators were down or decreasing. But Berger sees some reason to 
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expect a new "revival," especially in looking at the resurgence of 
religion among college-age children of the baby-boom generation. He 
concludes that "many observers of the religious scene (myself among 
them) have overestimated both the degree and irreversibility of 
secularization ... it seems increasingly likely to me that there are 
limits to secularization" (Berger, 1977:160). 
Stark and Bainbridge (1985) note the mechanism through which the 
cycle of religiosity occurs. They agree with Berger (1977) that 
secularization is self-limiting, generating two countervailing 
processes. The first of these is revival. They see this revival as 
occurring through the breaking away of sect movements. As a 
denomination becomes increasingly more secular, a substantial number 
of its members become disenchanted, desiring a less worldly religion. 
These members form protest groups which split from the denomination. 
The second process is religious innovation. Not only does 
secularization lead to sectarian groups which desire to revive the old 
religious traditions, but it also prompts the formation of new 
religious traditions (cults). Stark and Bainbridge (1985) assert that 
"to assess the future of religion, one must always pay close attention 
to the fringes of religious economies" (p. 2). 
Summary 
What these two models present are two alternatives on how people 
may shift from one denomination to another. If the secularization 
model is correct, then one would expect that people would move toward 
increasingly more liberal (or secular) denominations. In addition, 
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one would predict that the denominations themselves would also become 
more secular with time, accommodating to the larger culture. On the 
other hand, if one accepts the cyclic model, then the issue which 
needs to be addressed is why the shifts in religious influence occur, 
what the factors are that lead to the "ebbs and flows." The next 
chapter examines the literature regarding denominational switching, 
that is, the factors which may lead individuals to change their 
denominational preference. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was threefold. First, the social 
sources of denominational ism were discussed (Niebuhr, 1957[1929]). 
The second section dealt with the recent research on denominational 
mergers and foundings. The possibility was raised that secularization 
may be developmental or cyclical. Finally, theoretical arguments were 
presented on the dynamics of developmental versus cyclical 
secularization. What remains to be determined is which of these two 
models more accurately reflects the actual pattern of secularization 
in American society. 
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RECENT TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 
In the first chapter the focus was on the denominational 
structure of religion in the United States. Social factors that led 
to this denominational ism were discussed, making extensive use of the 
works of Niebuhr (1957[1929]). In addition, recent mergers of 
denominations were discussed as evidence of growing unity among 
churches. This evidence was then contrasted with studies in which 
foundings of new denominations were presented as evidence of 
continuing disunity (Liebman et al., 1988; Sutton et al., 1988). These 
two trends may represent a need to maintain a "critical number" of 
denominations to meet the diverse social, psychological, and spiritual 
needs of a pluralistic society. 
If this is true, then it is important to examine what these needs 
are and how they might lead individuals to change denominational 
preference. The models presented at the end of chapter one suggest 
two ways in which large shifts of individuals from denomination to 
denomination may alter the overall structure of the American religious 
scene. If the developmental model holds true, then one would expect 
large and consistent shifts toward liberal churches (and possibly out 
of religion altogether). If the cyclic model is supported, then the 
shifts of denominational growth and decline should reflect 
individuals' changing needs. In either case, it is necessary to 
examine how individual needs lead to denominational switching, to 
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clarify factors leading to changes in denominational membership. This 
chapter focuses on these individual needs. 
Stability vs. Change in Denominational Preference 
While some research has indicated a general trend of shifting 
from conservative to liberal denominations (Stark and Clock, 1968), 
other research has found a shift from "major mainline" to liberal and 
fringe denominations (Roof and Hadaway, 1979), still other research 
provides evidence of a shift towards conservative churches (Kelley, 
1977), and still other research indicates that there is no trend in 
denominational switching (Mueller, 1971). These inconsistent 
conclusions are largely due to a lack of clarify in defining why 
certain denominations are classified into each researcher's schema of 
"family groups," and a subsequent lack of uniformity between research 
efforts. An examination of the literature on denominational switching 
follows, focusing initially on studies that indicate stability in 
religious preference, then on those that indicate switching to be 
occurring and that offer reasons why this switching may be happening. 
While there is little uniformity between research efforts in how 
denominations are classified, most of the literature on switching 
among Protestant groups depicts religions as falling along a single 
liberal-conservative dimension. There does appear to be considerable 
consensus on the nature of ideal-typical religions that would fall at 
each pole of this dimension. Stark and Glock (1968), Kelley (1977), 
and Stark and Bainbridge (1985) all use theological or doctrinal 
orthodoxy as their measuring stick. For instance. Stark and Glock 
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(1968) define a conservative denomination as one that places a great 
deal of emphasis on belief in "the existence of a personal God, the 
divinity of Jesus Christ, the authenticity of biblical miracles, and 
the existence of the Devil" (1968:58). Liberal denominations are less 
emphatic about these issues, and their members are subsequently less 
orthodox. Kelley (1977) notes that conservative churches are also 
less tolerant of different teachings, ordinations, and sacraments, 
while liberal churches are much more open regarding religious beliefs. 
In a sense, one can also say that these denominations differ in that 
liberal churches espouse conditional ethics (i.e., ethics that are 
dependent on the situation encountered) whereas conservative churches 
support unconditional ethics (i.e., ethics that apply within all 
situations). In the sections to follow, any reference to "liberal" or 
"conservative" will differentiate religions according to these general 
characteristics. 
Evidence of stability 
Carroll et al. (1979) examined data on American's religious 
preferences and found that there was a great deal of stability in 
religious affiliation from.1947 to 1975 (see Table 1). During this 
time the percentage of Americans who expressed some religious 
preference was between 94% and 98%. The majority of respondents were 
Protestant, with their percentage fluctuating between 61% and 69%. 
The data also indicated growth for the Catholic Church, with 20% of 
Americans expressing a preference for the Catholic Church in 1947 and 
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Table 1. Percentage of Americans expressing given religious 
preferences from 1947 to 1975 
Total Expressing 
Year Some Preference Protestant Catholic Jewish Others None 
1947 94% 69% 20% 5% 1% 6% 
1952 98 67 25 4 1 2 
1957 97 66 26 3 1 3 
1962 98 70 23 3 2 2 
1967 98 67 25 3 3 2 
1972 95 63 26 2 4 5 
1975 94 61 27 2 4 6 
^Source: Carroll et al., 1979. 
27% in 1975. During the same time, preference for the Jewish faith 
declined from 5% to 2%. Other religious groups accounted for 1% to 4% 
of Americans throughout the years, while those expressing no religious 
preference ranged from 2% to 6% of the total population. According to 
the authors, these data indicate "a population with a continuing 
willingness, whatever the reason, to identify itself in terms of one 
of the major religious communities" (Carroll et al., 1979:9). 
However, these large categories may mask changes occurring within 
the groups, especially when one looks at the variety of Protestant 
denominations present in our society. In addition, these numbers may 
mask significant switching into and out of denominations, resulting in 
a general pattern of stability in membership. 
Bahr (1982) looked at the individual level in his study of 
denominational preferences in Middletown. Specifically, he compared a 
person's present preference to that of the person's father or mother. 
The percentage of "stayers" was generally higher than 50 percent. 
44 
regardless of whether father's or mother's preference is used. There 
were only two exceptions: those whose parents were of an unspecified 
Protestant faith tended to switch to other faiths or no preference (at 
least 67% switched), and those whose father had no religious 
preference tended to switch to some faith (66%). Interestingly, this 
second relationship was not true if the mother had no religious 
preference (63% stayed no preference). This may point to a greater 
influence of the mother than the father on their child's choice of 
religious affiliation. Bahr found further evidence of this in that 
52% of adults had the same preference as their father, whereas 58% 
maintained the same preference as their mother. 
Using the NORC GSS surveys of 1973-1976, Roof and Hadaway (1977) 
note that 83.4% of those who were raised Catholic retained that 
preference, while the percentage for all Protestant groups combined 
was 89.6 percent. While this would appear to indicate a strong 
tendency for stability, the grouping together of the Protestant 
denominations hides some of the switching that is occurring. When the 
Protestants are divided into liberal, moderate, and conservative 
family groups, the percentage of stayers declines considerably. 
Conservative Protestants showed the highest percentage of stayers 
(74.3%), followed by moderate Protestants (68%), and liberal 
Protestants (64.2%). These percentages were relatively unaffected 
after controlling for sex, age, and region (Roof and Hadaway, 1977). 
Roof and McKinney (1987) confirmed this order in their study. 
They include also data on Jews, black Protestants (as a separate 
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group), and those with no religious preference. The order they came 
up with, with percentage remaining in parentheses, was: Jews (87%), 
black Protestants (87%), Catholics (85%), conservative Protestants 
(78%), moderate Protestants (74%), liberal Protestants (67%), and no 
religious preference (45%). They justified their choice of these 
categories with an appeal to these groups' strength of quasi-ethnic 
bonds (or group identities). They believe that it is because of 
strength of these "gemeinschaft-like group attachments" that Jews, 
black Protestants, and Catholics are able to show such a high level of 
retention of members. The greater the level of communal belonging 
exhibited by a religious group, the better they are able to retain 
members. 
While this may be a part of the explanation for stability, the 
role of socialization should not be ignored. Social learning theory 
proponents believe that the level of church involvement exhibited is 
dependent on one's socialization as a youngster. Thus, the degree to 
which a religious group actively socializes children of members should 
have an effect on that group's ability to keep those children as 
future members. Having a quasi-ethnic bond may be important for 
stability, but it must also be backed up by a strong commitment to the 
values and beliefs of the group. 
Despite considerable evidence of stability in religious 
affiliation, individuals do switch denominations, and religious groups 
experience growth and decline as a result of this switching. The 
following section discusses trends that have been observed in 
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switching behavior and in the growth/decline of religious groups. 
This is followed by a discussion of some of the reasons behind 
denominational switching. 
Evidence of change 
The study of denominational switching can be done at three 
levels of analysis. The use of national data sets over a period of 
time, such as is used in this study, limits the researcher if 
"parents' religious affiliation" or "denomination raised in" is not 
asked. With this kind of data, the analysis must be done at a 
societal level, with the focus being the shifts in denominational 
demography during the time period. A pronounced rise in the mean age 
of members in a given denomination or religious family may be 
indicative of a number of young people leaving for other groups, or of 
a decline in fertility within the group, an influx of older persons 
from other groups, etc. 
A second way to study denominational switching is to look at 
intergenerational shifts, that is, incidences where the individual 
respondent expresses a different denominational preference than that 
of his/her parents. This approach has the advantage over the previous 
method in that it is much easier to determine what shifts are 
occurring and who is doing the shifting. A disadvantage is that the 
approach does not incorporate data on the reasons why individuals 
changed from the denominations of their parents--leaving the reasons 
to researchers' speculations. 
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The third method is to analyze data on reasons for denominational 
switching that are given by respondents who were previously members 
of, or had a preference for, a religious group other than that of 
their parents. The advantage of this approach is that one's analysis 
is of actual (instead of speculative) shifts in preference. As a 
result, conclusions can be drawn directly from the analysis on the 
reasons for denominational shifts. 
Much of the research to date has used the second approach, with 
some use of the third method. The findings of these various studies 
have indicated a potpourri of patterns: a shift from conservative to 
liberal churches in the mid-1960s (Stark and Clock, 1968); a shift to 
peripheral groups from the mainline in the mid-1970s (Roof and 
Hadaway, 1979); a shift toward conservative in churches in the early 
1970s (Kelley, 1977); a shift away from all church groups in the early 
1970s (Roof and Hadaway, 1977); or no shifts prior to the mid-1960s 
(Mueller, 1971), 
Shift from conservative to liberal Stark and Glock (1968) 
present the strongest case for a liberal shift in denominational 
preference. Using data from their own study of California, they 
compared respondents' preference to that of their parents, and also 
respondents' present denominational affiliation to their previous 
affiliation, using a liberal-moderate-conservative religious family 
group trichotomy. Denominations were grouped based on the orthodoxy 
of their theology. When compared to parents' affiliation, the shifts 
indicated a strong move away from conservative churches, which lost 
48 
27%, while moderate and liberal churches both showed net gains from 
switching (15% and 3% respectively). When compared to respondent's 
previous denominational affiliation, the same pattern emerges. 
Conservative churches had a net loss of 18%, while moderate and 
liberal churches gained 5% and 4% respectively. 
Realizing that their data from California were probably not 
representative of the entire U.S., Stark and Glock (1968) also used a 
1964 national data set collected by the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC). The analysis of the NORC data set only looked at the 
respondent's religious preference in comparison to that of the 
respondent's father. While the data indicated a similar trend, the 
percentages are much smaller. In the national sample, conservative 
churches lost 5%, moderate churches gained 1%, and liberal churches 
gained 4%. Stark and Glock (1968) conclude that "it is easy to infer 
from these data that an important general trend underlies these 
interdenominational changes: people who change their church tend to 
move from more conservative bodies to theologically more liberal ones" 
(p. 187). Subsequent research suggests this is an overgeneralization. 
This research is discussed below. 
Shift from mainline to liberal and periphery Roof and Hadaway 
(1979) argued against the idea that people are moving from 
conservative to more liberal denominations. Using data from the 
1973-1976 General Social Surveys, they found no evidence for a change 
in denominational preference among Protestants based on a 
liberal-moderate-conservative typology. They present an alternative 
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typology consisting of three categories: 1) major mainline-
Methodists, Presbyterians, Disciples of Christ, Lutherans, and 
Baptists; 2) liberal mainline-Episcopalians and Congregationalists; 
and 3) fringe-Mormons, sectarians, other Protestants, and 
non-Christian, non-Jewish groups. 
Using this typology, they found that many are switching from the 
major mainline churches to "no preference" and to the liberal mainline 
and fringe groups. Excluding those in the "none" category, they found 
that liberal mainline churches showed a net gain of 35%, the fringe 
churches gained 22.8%, while the major mainline churches lost 7.2 
percent. This apparently reflects a rejection of the 
middle-of-the-road stance of the major mainline churches. 
Shift from 1iberal to conservative The case for a shift 
toward conservative churches was presented by Kelley (1977). In his 
book. Why Conservative Churches are Growing. Kelley presents data and 
figures that indicate that at some point during the mid-1960s most 
moderate (e.g., Lutheran) and liberal (e.g., Episcopal) churches in 
the U.S. began to experience a plateau in growth and a subsequent 
decline. This followed a period in which these churches had been 
experiencing relatively steady (though not spectacular) rates of 
growth (Kelley, 1977). 
Kelley (1977) also notes that during this time period 
conservative churches (including such denominations as the Southern 
Baptist Convention, Assemblies of God, Seventh Day Adventist, and 
others) continued to show good rates of growth through the early 
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1970s. He concluded that people were leaving the more liberal 
churches to go to the conservative denominations. 
Kelley has since come under a great deal of fire for his views. 
Several studies have noted other possible reasons for conservative 
growth, including higher birthrates, better retention of members, 
quasi-proselytes (transfers from other conservative church groups), 
religious intermarriage, etc. (Bibby and Brinkerhoff, 1972; Bibby, 
1978; Bouma, 1979). Thus, these authors argue that the growth that 
these churches have experienced is not because they have attracted 
members away from more liberal religious affiliations. 
Secular shift from all church groups Unlike the previous 
studies, some research has indicated that the major shift is from 
having a religious preference to having no preference. In their study 
of the NORC General Social Surveys, Roof and Hadaway (1977) found that 
all of the family groups had shown a net loss of members from 1973 to 
1976. Had switching between groups been the only action occurring, 
then at least one group should have grown. A look at where the 
switchers went reveals that the Catholic church lost the greatest 
percentage to the "none" category (7.3%), followed by moderate 
Protestants (6.4%), liberal Protestants (6.2%), and conservative 
Protestants (4.1%). 
Data presented by Roof and McKinney (1987) lend some credence to 
this trend. For all groups examined, there is a greater percentage 
lost to nonaffiliation than is gained from nonaffiliation. The "no 
religious preference group," (having gained 209% from other religious 
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families while losing only 53.5% to them) experienced a net gain of 
155.5%. 
The argument of Stark and Clock (1968) for a liberal shift is of 
some use in explaining this trend. Stark and Glock (1968) found that 
though liberal and moderate churches were supposed to be gaining at 
the expense of conservative churches, they were not showing increases 
in membership of the magnitude of loss by the conservative churches. 
They hypothesized that this was because these groups would lose 
members to nonaffiliation, another liberal alternative. Roof and 
McKinney's (1987) data lend some support to this hypothesis, at least 
among Protestants. Liberal Protestants showed the greatest loss to 
nonaffiliation (8.0%), followed by moderate Protestants (5.8%) and 
conservative Protestants (3.9%). Thus, the evidence suggests a 
liberal shift toward nonaffiliation--arguably the most liberal of 
"religious families." 
No shift In contrast to all of the previous studies on 
switching, Mueller (1971), in his re-examination of the data of Stark 
and Glock (1968), indicates that there is no general trend in 
denominational shifting. He converted a table of intergenerational 
mobility presented in Stark and Glock (1968:195) into an 
"interdenominational distances" matrix, the values of which would 
indicate the relative social distance between each pair of 
denominations. To do this he used the following formula which he 
borrowed from Parkman and Sawyer (1967): 
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n , 1 oQ (Stayers in A) x (Stayers in B) 
^ (1/2 movers from A to B + 1/2 movers from B to A) 
With this as his new data set, he performed a principle component 
analysis. Four factors were revealed: 1) Protestant vs. Catholic, 2) 
accessibility (social and physical, including regional issues), 3) 
liturgical factor, and 4) a liberal/conservative dimension. Mueller 
(1971) concluded, after examining these four principal components, 
that there was no evidence of trends toward or away from any 
particular type of church. 
While these results might at first appear to be contradictory, it 
must be noted that the studies occur at different points in time and 
may represent shifts in trends. The trends indicated are a liberal 
increase during the early 1960s (with a concurrent decline in 
conservatism), a conservative rebound in the early to mid-1970s (with 
a concurrent decline in liberalism), and a period of relative 
stability since that point (Stark and Glock, 1968; Kelley, 1977; Roof 
and McKinney, 1987). Studies by Roof and Hadaway (1979) and Mueller 
(1971) use other criteria to classify denominations, and come to 
different conclusions regarding denominational shifts. What is needed 
is a study that crosses over all these time periods and employs a 
consistent definition of religious groups. This thesis is an attempt 
to do this. But first, to more clearly understand the motivational 
origins of changes in denominational preference, a theoretical 
discussion is needed of what motivates people to choose among 
denominations, and what factors might cause them to change their 
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preferences. The next two sections of this chapter address these 
issues. 
Theories Regarding Denominational Preference 
Roof and Hoge (1980) present several theoretical explanations for 
why people would choose to be involved in a church: deprivation 
theory, child-rearing theory, social learning theory, and value 
structure theory. 
Deprivation theory 
According to this orientation, those persons who suffer from 
deprivation are more likely to look to religion as a form of 
compensation (Roof and Hoge, 1980). In applying this argument to 
participation, it was believed that certain groups had higher church 
involvement because of being socially and/or economically deprived. 
Among the groups to which this was applied were women, the elderly, 
and those of lower socioeconomic status. While it is true that women 
generally tend to participate more than men in church activities, as 
do elderly more than young people, other explanations tend to have 
more support in clarifying these differences. 
Rather than explain the more active participation of women as 
being due to their deprivation relative to men, one may point to sex 
role socialization, which places more of the burden for the religious 
activity of the family on women than on men. Elderly individuals may 
be more active in church (and other voluntary organizations) because 
they have more time, since they are no longer in the work force. 
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Furthermore, the relationship between socioeconomic status and church 
involvement tends to be positive, rather than negative as the theory 
would predict. Higher socioeconomic status is related to greater 
involvement among those who are members of religious groups (cf., 
e.g., Roof and Hoge, 1980). 
One form of deprivation theory, "family surrogate theory" (Glock, 
Ringer, and Babbie, 1967), posits that those individuals who are 
without family ties (e.g., single adults and married adults without 
children) are more inclined to participate in churches. For these 
individuals the church is supposed to take the place of a family, be a 
"family surrogate." However, this theory has received little 
empirical support (Roof and Hoge, 1980). 
The usefulness of deprivation theory may not be in explaining 
differences in religious activity across denominations, but rather may 
be in understanding why individuals are attracted to one denomination 
more than another. If, for instance, it was determined that 
fundamentalist Protestant churches tend to attract people of lower 
socioeconomic status, then deprivation theory could be used to explain 
this attraction. In this example, one could argue that fundamentalist 
churches have an "other-world" orientation and therefore appeal to 
those who feel they have little chance of receiving a reward in this 
world. Individuals' motivations for religious participation is a 
topic to be taken up at a later point in this chapter. 
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Child-rearing theory 
This theory is inconsistent with "family surrogate theory" (Roof 
and Hoge, 1980). Its premise is that many people join a church or 
become more active in a church when they have children. This is 
particularly true when the children are of school age. According to 
its proponents, parents look to the church for help in child-rearing. 
Nash and Berger (1962), who developed the theory, felt that it helped 
to explain the "religious revival" experienced in this country during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. They hold that it was because of the "baby 
boom" generation, who were in their school-age years during this time, 
that many parents joined a church. 
The theory has been expanded into a model of lifetime religious 
behavior, called the family-cycle model (Bahr, 1970). According to 
this theory, the presence of school-age children not only increases 
participation, but also a subsequent drop occurs in participation when 
this incentive no longer exists. This too is inconsistent with 
deprivation theory, which holds that the elderly have increased 
participation. 
While this theory has found some support, it is generally 
considered to have little explanatory power. Indeed, Roof and Hoge 
(1980). indicate that neither deprivation theory (including family 
surrogate theory) nor child-rearing theory offer an explanation for 
why there are differences in the extent of individuals' church 
activity. As before, however, the theory may have some use in 
explaining denominational preference, to the extent that it can be 
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assumed that certain denominations may provide better support for 
parents of school-age children. 
Social learning theory 
Social learning theory looks to the socialization process as the 
primary factor in determining church participation (Roof and Hoge, 
1980; Roof, 1978a). According to this perspective, church 
participation is a learned behavior that differs in content depending 
on the religious group or family. One illustration can be found with 
the more frequent attendance of Catholics than Protestants at church 
activities. Catholics presumably are more socialized toward such 
attendance than are Protestants. In addition, conservative 
Protestants show a stronger commitment to their churches than do 
liberal Protestants--again a difference presumably due to differences 
of emphasis in religious socialization. 
This theory has also been used to explain both regional and 
gender differences in commitment. In general, research has shown that 
those who live in the South have a greater church commitment than 
those in other regions (Roof and Hoge, 1980). There is some dispute 
to this claim, however, as evidenced by the work of Stark and 
Bainbridge (1985). In their examination of regional differences in 
church members per 1000 population, they note that of the 25 U.S. 
metropolitan areas (SMSA's) with the highest rates of church members 
per 1000, 11 are located in the South. They continue by arguing 
unconvincingly (given that 44% of the top 25 SMSA's are in the South) 
that the existence of a "Bible Belt" is exaggerated. In addition, 
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looking at regional church membership rates they note that the three 
regions making up the southern tier of states, the West South Central 
(650 church members per 1000 population, first place), the East South 
Central (620, third place), and the South Atlantic (560, tied for 
sixth place) have very disparate membership rates. If anything, Stark 
and Bainbridge (1985) believe that their data indicate the presence of 
an "Unchurched Belt" in the Western region. Of the 25 metropolitan 
areas with the lowest church membership rates, 21 were located in the 
Far West or Pacific region. The bottom six states (with membership 
rates in parentheses) were: Nevada (394), Hawaii (380), Alaska (376), 
California (364), Oregon (332), and Washington (331). The Pacific 
region, with 360 members per 1000 population was well below its next 
nearest competitor (Mountain region: 530). Whether these rates 
reflect a different culture and, therefore, different socialization 
(as social learning theory would suggest) is debatable. Stark and 
Bainbridge (1985) suggest that the unchurched West is an artifact of 
the population instability in the region, since membership requires a 
time commitment that mobile individuals may be unable to make. 
Findings on gender differences have consistently shown a higher 
rate of participation by women than by men (Roof and Hoge, 1980). 
This pattern is unique to Western societies, particularly the United 
States. Social learning theory explains this difference in terms of 
socialization toward normative expectations about sex roles in our 
society. That is, women more frequently attend and participate in 
church activities because they have been taught to regard this as part 
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of their role (not because of social or economic deprivation, as 
suggested in deprivation theory). 
In relation to denominational preference, social learning theory 
implies that individuals will tend to express a preference for the 
denomination in which they were raised. As was seen in an earlier 
section, this tendency toward stability from generation to generation 
is evident in most denominations and family groups. 
Value structure theory 
The main premise of this theoretical orientation is that persons 
who become members of churches tend to hold traditional values 
regarding sex roles and family roles, use of drugs, definite moral 
codes, and an emphasis on private concerns (Roof and Hoge, 1980). 
There is, however, a question regarding direction of causation. 
Proponents posit that holding to a set of traditional values makes one 
more likely to become a church member, and conversely, that those who 
accept non-traditional values subsequently will leave their church or 
will not join (Carroll and Roozen, 1975; Wuthnow, 1978). While the 
studies performed by Wuthnow (1978) and Roof and Hoge (1980) support 
this direction of causation, little other evidence is available to 
disprove the other direction, that religious activity leads to greater 
strength of traditional values. 
Application of value structure theory to the issue of 
denominational preference is less tenuous, although it requires a 
broadening of the theory to include the concept of churches 
sanctioning nontraditional as well as traditional values. On the one 
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hand, persons who hold traditional values may be attracted to 
denominations that support such values. On the other hand, if a 
person is inclined to accept less traditional values (e.g., equal 
rights for women, loosening of drug laws, etc.), then they may choose 
a liberal denomination as an alternative to opting for no religious 
affiliation. 
While these theoretical orientations offer a variety of 
explanations for why people might choose a given denomination or 
family group, they do not address the central issue of this thesis, 
the question of how age, period, and cohort changes in denominational 
preferences occur. To do this one must determine the motivations for 
switching from the denominational affiliation of one's parents. In 
the next section this question of why people change denominational 
affiliation is discussed. 
Why People Switch 
Robert Wuthnow (1978), in his book on new American religions, 
presents four conditions which he believes are necessary for a 
cultural innovation (such as a new religion) to take root and grow. 
These four conditions are: (1) exposure (knowledge of the innovation), 
(2) legitimacy (the innovation is reasonable--it "fits" with the 
larger culture), (3) opportunity (people have access to the 
innovation), and (4) motivation (the innovation must offer a potential 
solution to an experienced problem). While this set of conditions was 
originally conceived in relation to new religious groups, it could 
just as easily be applied to switching among established groups. 
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This thesis analyzes denominational switching among a small set 
of denominational categories. These categories are fixed, and it is 
assumed that they will vary little over the two-decade period of this 
study in terms of exposure, legitimacy and opportunity. Given 
Wuthnow's (1978) perspective, this leaves individual motivations as 
the deciding factor in denominational switching. 
The primary focus of the remainder of this chapter is on this 
fourth condition, that of motivation to solve a social, psychological, 
or spiritual need or problem. In particular, the literature on the 
kinds of needs that motivate individuals toward or away from 
particular religious groups will be examined. This is not meant to 
imply that the other three conditions are not important, but that they 
deal more with the opportunity to switch, rather than with the 
motivation for switching. Types of religious motivation will be 
organized according to a functionalist perspective developed by 
Wallace (1975). This perspective will be used to provide a 
theoretical foundation for distinguishing among the spiritual needs 
met by church organizations, and as the means for categorizing 
denominations on the basis of the needs they meet. 
Like Wuthnow, Wallace (1975) sees religious affiliation as 
filling a deficiency—as a way of integrating people into society who 
are less rewarded by nonreligious roles and statuses. She tests four 
major hypotheses, each based upon a distinct motivational need. 
One hypothesis states that persons who did not experience a 
strong religious life in their family of orientation will be confused 
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about or lack knowledge of religious values. She believes that these 
individuals are going to look to religion to provide a "kind of 
meaning in life." Thus, this hypothesis reflects a need for meaning, 
and is closely related to the socialization aspect of the social 
learning argument discussed previously. 
A second hypothesis posits that an individual who has an 
affective bond with another person for whom religion is important will 
be more likely to switch denominational affiliation to share 
membership with that significant other. Wallace (1975) focuses on 
such significant others as a spouse or fiance, parents, or intimate 
friends. More generally, this hypothesis indicates the use of 
religion as a way of meeting the need for social support. 
A third hypothesis deals with reward deficits of those who have 
less highly esteemed positions in society. She believes that those 
who experience these deficits will join a church whose teachings focus 
on other-worldly rewards that everyone receives. This indicates a 
need for goal attainment. Note that this follows directly out of 
deprivation theory, since the focus is on those who are economically 
deprived. 
A fourth hypothesis is that individuals who are experiencing 
strain or tension because of a role change or a crisis situation will 
join a church that is capable of relieving this strain. What this 
indicates is a need for escape from a negative life situation. 
Although not discussed by Wallace (1975), some religious groups may 
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also offer a means to help individuals escape from the boredom of 
everyday existence. 
The next sections deal with these four needs and also with some 
demographic factors that influence choice of religious affiliation. 
The last section of this chapter presents the hypotheses to be tested 
in this study. 
The need for meaning 
The portrayal of religion as meeting a need for meaning--the 
objective of individuals' searches for answers to ultimate questions 
about their experiences--may have originated with William James 
(1985[1902]). James claimed that all religions have a certain degree 
of uniformity in that they consist of two parts: 1) an uneasiness and 
2) a solution to this uneasiness. For James, "uneasiness" resulted 
from peoples' absolute dependency on the universe for their survival. 
Because of this dependency, people are forced to make sacrifices and 
surrenders to the natural order of things. The role of religion is to 
make these sacrifices palatable. "Now in those states of mind which 
fall short of religion, the surrender is submitted to as an imposition 
of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at the very best without 
complaint. In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and 
sacrifice are positively espoused: even unnecessary givings-up are 
added in order that the happiness may increase. Religion thus makes 
easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary..." (James, 
1985[1902]:49). That is, religion legitimates the mundane. Rather 
than something to be avoided or (at best) grudgingly accepted, work 
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becomes a means whereby the religious express praise and honor of a 
higher being. As a consequence, the individual is able to find joy in 
something that others find intolerable. 
This view is not unlike that of Marx, according to whom religion 
is "the opium of the people" (Marx and Engels, 1964:42). The main 
difference between the two is that James sees religion as actively 
sought by the people, while Marx and Engels see religion as being 
imposed on passively indoctrinated masses. Christianity "became more 
and more the exclusive possession of the ruling classes and these 
apply it as a mere means of government, to keep the lower classes 
within bounds" (Marx and Engels, 1964:256). 
The Marxist approach finds parallels in Weber's (1963[1922]) 
"theodicy of the disprivileged." Weber noted that unlike the 
disprivileged, the privileged members of society do not need a 
religion with an other-worldly orientation. Yet the disprivileged 
classes require more than a simple substitution of other-worldly goals 
for this-worldly goals. They also typically adopt a theodicy "that 
the unequal distribution of mundane goods is caused by the sinfulness 
and the illegality of the privileged, and that sooner or later God's 
wrath will overtake them" (Weber, 1968[1922]:110). The injustice of 
the system of reward distribution is thus made meaningful and is 
understood in terms of compensation in the future for present 
suffering. (Also see Stark and Bainbridge (1980a) for a similar 
argument.) Drawing a final parallel with James (1985[1902]), the 
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argument here is that religion acts to make suffering into a religious 
experience, a spiritual means,to achieve a secular end. 
Lefever (1977) argues that this view of "religion for the poor" 
is incomplete. He believes that while the religion of the poor does 
reflect the social order, it also acts as an influence on the social 
order. He posits three functions of religion and religious behavior 
for the poor. First, religion provides a source for a more positive 
self-evaluation, since those who cannot achieve this world's rewards 
can get them in the next world. In the religious community they are 
never seen as "failures." Second, a religion of the poor offers a 
challenge to the general status structure. In the religious community 
all are equal. And third, a religion of the poor acts to correct an 
over-optimistic view of man that exists in the dominant culture. In 
all of these, religion is still providing for the poor a way to 
understand and make sense of their lot in life. 
Others have taken a broader view of religion's role in helping 
human beings to understand their existence (Glock and Stark, 1965; 
Yinger, 1970). These authors have focused more on "questions of 
ultimate meaning," only one of which addresses the injustice of reward 
distribution. Religion also helps people find meaning in evil, pain, 
death, etc. For Yinger, religion "can be defined as a system of 
beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles 
with these ultimate problems of human life" (1970:7). 
Glock and Stark (1965) agree with Yinger, although they would 
further argue that religion is not the only means by which human 
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beings answer questions of ultimate meaning. They look at two 
different value orientations (or sets of beliefs, values, symbols and 
practices) that fulfill this need: 1) religious perspectives, which 
have a supernatural referent, and 2) humanist perspectives, which do 
not have this referent. They believe these two are functionally 
equivalent. Yinger's (1970) only departure from this view is in 
treating both perspectives as religion in his scheme. 
Attribution theory In an article relating attribution theory 
to the study of religion, Spilka, Shaver, and Kirkpatrick (1985) state 
that "systems of religious concepts offer individuals a variety of 
meaning-enhancing explanations of events--in terms of God, sin, 
salvation, etc.--as well as a range of concepts and procedures for 
enhancing feelings of control and self-esteem (e.g., personal faith, 
prayer, rituals, etc.)" (Spilka et al., 1985:7). They continue from 
this premise to argue that events will be attributed to supernatural 
causes as a function of various attributor factors and event factors. 
Other articles have dealt with empirical research on people's 
attributing the cause of specific events. Proudfoot and Shaver 
(1975), for instance, attempt to relate three versions of attribution 
theory to the conversion experience: 1) According to Schachter's 
theory of emotion, religious conversion results as a person 
experiences some type of physiological arousal and then attributes 
this emotional reaction to the power of the Holy Spirit. 2) Bern's 
self-perception theory extends this argument to include behavioral 
arousal: A person involves himself/herself in the rituals, chants. 
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etc. of a particular religious group and eventually justifies this 
behavior by increasing the significance of the rituals. 3) Weiner's 
concepts of internal and external locus of control can also be used to 
determine motivation, with those having an external locus of control 
(those who feel that they are not in control of their own life) being 
more likely to attribute causality to the supernatural. 
Other researchers have examined how social groups differ in how 
much supernatural attribution they do (Gorsuch and Smith, 1983), or in 
how they attribute based on different types of events (Ritzema, 1979; 
Spilka and Schmidt, 1983). The study by Gorsuch and Smith (1983) 
looked at 164 undergraduate students at a small evangelical college. 
Respondents were asked to read four vignettes and to answer a series 
of questions about each. All vignettes were positive in outcome, 
although some had more positive outcomes. Extremity of the outcome 
was measured on an 11 point scale, with the respondent answering the 
question: "How good was the outcome?" The respondents were also 
asked to rate (on an 11 point scale) the likelihood that the described 
outcome might occur. The findings suggest that those who felt "near 
to God" attributed more to God under extreme outcomes than mild ones, 
while "fundamentalists" attribute more to God regardless of the 
extremity or the probability of the outcome. "Thus, it would appear 
that differences in religious experience and training provide 
distinctive causal schemes useful for understanding one's interaction 
with others and the environment" (Gorsuch and Smith, 1983:350). What 
this seems to indicate is a difference between religious family groups 
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in how much they satisfy the need for understanding and, as a 
consequence, a motivation for individuals to seek out that group or 
denomination that best fulfills their need. 
Ritzema (1979) and Spilka and Schmidt (1983) presented their 
respondents several types of hypothetical events. They include events 
which are medical, financial, emotional, or interpersonal. In 
addition, the events could have either a positive or a negative 
outcome. They both found that subjects were more willing to attribute 
causality to God for positive outcomes. Their findings are 
contradictory on the attribution to God in medical situations, with 
Ritzema (1979) finding less divine attributions and Spilka and Schmidt 
(1983) finding more divine attributions for medical events. 
All of the studies of attribution have in common the focus on how 
people use religion and religious beliefs to understand and provide 
meaning to the events that occur around them. And as the quote by 
Gorsuch and Smith (1983) above indicates, it is likely that different 
religious groups have different ways of dealing with this aspect of 
religious life. 
Intrinsic reliqion In his study of the relation between 
religion and prejudice, Allport (1966) uses the distinction between 
intrinsic religion and extrinsic religion. He describes the 
intrinsically religious as those who value religion as an end in 
itself, a supreme value in its own right. For these people, religion 
"is oriented toward a unification of being, takes seriously the 
commandment of brotherhood, and strives to transcend all self-centered 
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needs" (Allport, 1966:455). This type of religious motivation fills 
the whole life of the believer with meaning, and as a result all 
aspects of life are effected by it. The believer serves religion, 
rather than religion serving the believer (Evans, 1981). (Note: 
Extrinsic religion will be described in the section on the need for 
goal attainment.) 
Understanding and conservative growth As was noted earlier 
in this chapter, Kelley (1977) reported evidence of a trend toward 
religious conservatism in U.S. society. His explanation for this 
trend is that conservative churches continued growing while others 
stagnated and declined because they maintained a focus on ultimate 
questions of life (Kelley, 1977, 1978), such as the purpose of 
existence, the nature of reality, the fate of the world, etc. It is 
his contention that this is religion's main function in society. 
Furthermore, Kelley speculates, "If a religion should set out 
deliberately to benefit the whole society by patriotic preaching or 
welfare services or social action, but did not make life meaningful 
for its members, it would benefit the whole society less than if it 
had contented itself with ministering its unique function to those who 
looked to it for that ministry" (Kelley, 1977:45). 
In addition to Kelley (1977,1978), Johnson (1985) and Gaustad 
(1983) argue that liberal churches have stepped beyond the traditional 
role of religion. Liberal churches are not only focusing more on 
social issues, but they are losing their focus on the one unique 
commodity that religious organizations have to offer--salvation. 
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Johnson (1985) notes that liberal churches have downplayed man's need 
for redemption, and as a result liberals "could not threaten 
punishment in hell or divine judgment upon the nation, just as they 
could not offer the rosy hope of a world community of peace and 
happiness just around the corner. The best they could do was scold" 
(Johnson, 1985:50). Gaustad (1983), in looking at liberal 
Protestantism from the 1920s to the 1980s, states that liberal 
theologians surrendered a large number of doctrinal issues by saying 
they were not an important part of religious belief. Thus, although 
conservative churches may not have gained members at the expense of 
liberal churches, the liberal churches may have lost members because 
they have come to place less emphasis on projecting meaning into 
parishioners lives. 
Value systems and relioious preference It has been the 
primary contention throughout this section that people choose a 
religion because that religious group is able to provide the answers 
to questions of ultimate meaning. However, this is not always the 
order in which the relationship occurs. There is some support for the 
view that people choose religious groups that fit with their value 
systems. Hadaway and Roof (1979) found in a study of converts from no 
religious preference that the converts were more likely to hold 
traditional values regarding sex before marriage, communism, drinking 
at bars, and pornography than those in a control group of stable 
"nones." Roberts and Davidson (1984) come to a similar conclusion 
when looking at religious involvement. They find that "a person with 
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a traditional meaning system tends to see religion as being important 
and participates in religious activities with more regularity" 
(Roberts and Davidson, 1984:346). 
Hoge (1979) notes the strong relationship between trends in 
religious commitment and trends in social indicators. During the 
mid-1920s religious commitment rose, during the mid-1930s it fell, 
during the early 1950s it rose again, and during the 1960s it fell. 
Other indicators that exhibited this same rise-fall-rise-fall pattern 
were: fear of communism, conformity to college social norms, 
commitment to family life, and commitment to military duty and 
patriotic war. Showing the expected opposite pattern were political 
activism toward change and criticism of college education. Hoge 
(1979) argued that these associations reflect the presence of a 
"meaning-commitment" system. A change in one value commitment tends 
to effect them all. It is not clear, however, whether religious 
changes cause the social value changes, or vice versa. 
Using Mannheim's (1952) concept of the "generation unit," Wuthnow 
(1976) provided strong evidence that value systems influence religious 
commitment. Within this context, Wuthnow describes a generation unit 
to be "a social unit bound together by a common structural location, a 
common cultural system, self-consciousness as a social unit, and 
social interaction and solidarity among its members" (Wuthnow, 
1976:851). It is Wuthnow's thesis that the "counterculture" of the 
1960s is a generation unit, and that this group had a major negative 
impact on religious commitment during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
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Using several sources of data he found that in fact it was members of 
this group who were showing the greater decline in religious 
commitment than those in the older age group. This would seem to 
indicate that participation in a counter-culture movement may make an 
individual less likely to be religious. 
Summary The general theme presented in this section is that 
people may be driven to switch religions by a need to understand their 
existence—a need for answers to questions of ultimate meaning. It 
was noted that some churches (e.g., conservative Protestant churches) 
do a better job of fulfilling this need than others (e.g., liberal 
Protestant churches). In the light of research on attribution theory, 
fundamentalist Protestant churches help members meet their need for 
meaning by endowing events, outcomes, etc. with an aura of divine 
volition. Liberal Protestant churches are much less effective in 
promoting the "theification" of their members' experiences. 
The need for social support 
In his study of members of a Midwestern fundamentalist, 
nondenominational congregation, Monaghan (1967) found "social 
participators" to be one of the major groups in the church. According 
to Monaghan, this group valued religious participation 
intrinsically--enjoying the sense of involvement itself. The main 
reason social participators gave for attending their church was to 
"feel at home." 
Social support and social networks are instrumental in the 
recruitment of new converts. Stark and Bainbridge (1980b) found that 
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recruits into cults are generally acquaintances or friends of present 
members and that such interpersonal bonds between cult members and 
potential recruits are essential in the recruitment process. Snow and 
Machalek (1984) agree, presenting three components of social 
influences on conversion: 1) Social networks, which are involved in 
recruitment, but not necessarily in conversion; 2) affective and 
intensive bonds, which are positive ties with members; and 3) role 
learning, to help the new convert fit into the new religious 
situation. 
This should not be construed as meaning that only new converts to 
"deviant" religious groups are in need of social support. Members of 
mainstream religious groups also benefit from the support of their 
peers. Stark and Bainbridge (1980b) find "that even in such 
low-tension (i.e., mainstream) faiths as Episcopalianism and 
Methodism, belief is firmest among those whose social network and 
religious affiliation are coterminous" (p. 1390, parentheses mine). 
Thus, the importance of social support goes beyond shielding new 
recruits from nonbelievers' negative sanctions against believers' 
"deviant" behavior. 
Yet it is very likely that churches' social networks, and the 
support they afford parishioners, differ across denominations (and 
even within denominations), and that individuals' choices of 
affiliation may be influenced by the amount of social support they 
desire from a church. Bainbridge and Stark (1981) argued that people 
with salient religious beliefs will associate more with other people 
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who agree with them. For example, they found that those who were 
"born again" tended to have friends who were "born again." None of 
the other groups in their study displayed as many intragroup 
friendships. 
The social support that is characteristic of "born again" 
Christians may be due to their unique cognitive style. Allen and 
Spilka (1967) discuss two cognitive orientations to religion: 
committed and consensual. One aspect on which these two orientations 
differ is in their flexibility, or in their ability to adapt to or 
accommodate new ideas, beliefs, or attitudes. Individuals who have a 
committed orientation are more willing to discuss opposing viewpoints 
and more open to incorporate them into their belief system. Those 
with a consensual orientation, on the other hand, tend to avoid any 
discussion that would challenge their beliefs—possibly because such 
challenges threaten their confidence in the beliefs being challenged. 
To the extent that these cognitive orientations are characteristic of 
members of a church or denomination, one would expect the "consensual 
individual" to place a great deal of importance on the need for social 
support. Because they are not threatened by alternative viewpoints, 
those with a committed orientation will be more comfortable dealing 
with people with other beliefs. In contrast, those with a consensual 
orientation are more likely to seek support for their beliefs among 
people of similar beliefs. 
The homogenous unit principle While social support is 
important in maintaining beliefs, it also plays a latent role in 
74 
shaping the demographic make-up of churches. McGavran (1970) and 
Wagner (1979) argue that people feel more comfortable in (and thus are 
more likely to attend) a church whose members are the same as they are 
in certain traits. This "homogenous unit principle" is problematic 
for those who believe that "to be an effective witness for 
reconciliation to the world . . . the church must demonstrate to those 
around it that internally it has done the job of reconciling like and 
unlike" (Wagner, 1979:19). However, if church leaders use a 
homogenous unit approach in recruiting new members, their success will 
leave them more effective in achieving church growth than in 
integrating their congregations. In this regard, Wagner cites the 
success of the Southern Baptist Convention, that's philosophy is to 
reach all people on their own terms and to provide them with a 
(culturally segregated) church home that suits their cultural 
heritage. He and Caldwell (1974) argue that to do otherwise (e.g., to 
integrate blacks and other minorities into predominantly white 
churches) could have the "unfortunate" consequence of destroying part 
of the black culture. 
The available evidence would seem to indicate that the homogenous 
unit principle of church growth is widely accepted by church 
practitioners. Many denominations stimulate growth by starting ethnic 
churches, especially among the Hispanic and Asian populations. And 
despite an indication that 38% of whites attend church with blacks 
(Hadaway, Hackett, and Miller, 1984), the segregation of congregations 
persists (Niebuhr, 1957 [1929]; Roof and McKinney, 1987). 
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Local ySj. cosmopolItan types Roof (1978b) applies a 
local-cosmopolitan typology of individuals to the concept of religious 
commitment. He defines the two types of individuals as follows: 
Locals are more attached to their immediate social locale 
and are quite sensitive to the primary groups in which they 
interact, such as the family, neighborhood cliques, and 
community organizations. In contrast, cosmopolitans have 
their commitments centered outside the residential community 
and tend to identify more with abstract, generalized groups 
that may be spatially remote, such as their profession or 
the corporation in which they work" (Roof, 1978b:41). 
Locals are generally lower in socioeconomic status, live in smaller 
places, are members of local organizations, and have lived in the 
community a long time. Cosmopolitans have the opposite 
characteristics and are also more inclined to read national news 
magazines. 
Roof (1978b) also sees locals as being much more likely to be 
involved in religious activities than cosmopolitans. He argues that 
as people become more integrated into a community, they accept the 
norms and values of the community, and as part of this integration 
process they make religious commitments. Martinson, Wilkening, and 
Buttel (1982) argue that the direction of causality is the opposite, 
namely that local norms and values cause integration. Their argument 
closely parallels that of value structure theory, in that both focus 
on the role of norms and values in motivating individuals toward 
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religious commitments. While Martinson et al. (1982) do present some 
empirical findings showing that both church attendance and religious 
affiliation enhance community solidarity, their findings provide 
equally convincing evidence that religious participation plays a 
central role in providing social support to church members. 
Reliqious homoaamv A final aspect of social support and 
religious affiliation involves interreligious marriages. Glenn (1982) 
indicates that some denominations have a greater influence on marital 
choice, with their actual percentage of interreligious marriages being 
lower than the expected percentage. Included in this group are the 
Lutheran, Baptist, Pentecostal, and United Church of Christ 
denominations. 
In addition to the ability of a church to influence marital 
choice, the ability of a spouse in an interreligious marriage to 
influence a change in denominational preference is also important. 
Newport (1979) found in his study of the 1975-76 General Social 
Surveys that about 40% of married people who switched denominations 
changed to the religion of their spouse. And Glenn (1982) states that 
"it is apparent that a great deal of religious switching took place 
after childhood; and it is almost certain that much if not most of 
that switching, which resulted in homogamy in current denominational 
preference, occurred for the express purpose of achieving that 
homogamy" (p. 561). Thus, the need for social support engenders 
homogamy in two ways. First, it limits the pool of potential mates. 
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And second, it is the basis for one spouse to change to the religious 
affiliation of the other. 
Summary 
All of the studies cited in this section offer evidence that 
one's choice of a denominational preference is not made in a social 
vacuum, but rather is influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by 
one's need for social support. The individual's need for social 
support and his/her ability to get that support from the church or 
some other institution are factors that may lead some to choose a 
church that provides a great deal of support, others to choose a 
church that is less personal, and still others to forego religion 
completely. 
The need for goal attainment 
The relationship between socioeconomic status and religious 
preference is relevant not only to the need for understanding, but 
also to people's need for goal attainment. Previously the focus was 
on how religion aided the poor to understand and gain meaning for the 
injustices that they suffered. This discussion focuses on the 
church's role in helping believers to perceive themselves as 
approaching their goals. Religious goals are divided into two types 
in the literature: otherworldly and innerworldly. Innerworldly goals 
are ones that (given their greater access to financial resources) are 
generally more attainable by individuals of higher socioeconomic 
status (SES), whereas otherworldly goals have relatively greater 
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appeal to lower SES individuals, whose goals must be attainable even 
in the absence of financial means. Previous research indicates that 
churches differ in the degree to which they emphasize these goals 
(Thomas, 1985; Dredge, 1986). 
Sari Thomas (1985) did a study of a variety of nationally-
syndicated Christian television programs to determine how they 
differed in the presentation of their messages. From 1981 to 1983, a 
sample of 186 episodes of 23 Protestant religious programs was 
watched. Fourteen of these programs were classified as working-class 
oriented, six as having a working-middle-class orientation, and three 
as geared toward an upwardly-mobile class. Classifications were based 
on ratings by personnel and clergy who were in charge of the religious 
programs, on the income and occupational prestige of viewers, and on 
the denominational affiliation of the program's producers. The 
content of the message presented was analyzed for themes related to 
salvation, materialism and secularism. Those programs that were 
geared toward the working class tended to emphasize: 1) personal 
piety, 2) focus on heaven, 3) the nonimportance of material goods, 4) 
the evil of money, 5) being aloof to the outside world, and 6) prayer 
as being a spiritual venture. In contrast, those programs geared 
toward an upwardly-mobile class emphasized: 1) worldly 
accomplishment, 2) improving the present world, 3) the pursuit of 
material goods, 4) the good use of money, 5) involvement in the 
outside world, and 6) prayer for tangible goals. The focus of each 
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type of program was on the goals which their target audience would 
perceive as attainable. 
The study by Dredge (1986) also used content analysis. However, 
rather than look at television programs put on by different 
denominational organizations, he examined the sermon content of two 
Southern Baptist churches in South Carolina. One of these churches 
was classified as "blue-collar" and the other as "white-collar." His 
thesis was that "religion provides a consolatory service for the lower 
classes in that it promises an eternal salvation to those who despair 
of material salvation in this life. To the upper classes, religion 
provides, in the various forms of Christian charity and social 
concern, a justification for their current and future elevated social 
status" (Dredge, 1986:524). His content analysis of 20 sermons from 
each church focused on references to this world versus those to the 
next world. The sermons of the "blue-collar" church contained 89 
references to this world and 1803 references to the next world, while 
those of the "white-collar" church contained 1265 references to this 
world and 737 references to the next world. It should be noted that 
the sermons of the "white-collar" church show greater balance in 
referring to the two worlds (63.2% this world, 36.8% other world) than 
do the sermons of the "blue-collar" church (4.7% this world, 95.3% 
other world). The strength of the other-worldly orientation in the 
"blue-collar" church is clear, and reveals their focus on rewards or 
goals which they feel are attainable. 
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Using an economic approach, Redman (1980) emphasized two types of 
input (time and money) and two outputs (personal salvation and social 
welfare) which she argues are involved in religious shifts. 
Conservative churches focus on the first output, which is more 
time-intensive (since individuals must "work" on their own 
salvations), while liberal churches focus on the second, which is more 
money-intensive (since it is possible, and sometimes more efficient, 
to hire workers to accomplish social welfare tasks). She posits that 
when times are good (economically) there is a shift to denominations 
that support social welfare, since people are relatively well off 
financially and can afford this money-intensive product. On the other 
hand, when times are bad, the shift is toward the conservative 
churches and the time-intensive product of personal salvation. The 
logic of this argument can be extended to apply to differences in 
socioeconomic status, such that those who are well-off financially 
will choose liberal churches while the poor will choose conservative 
churches. Unfortunately, Redman (1980) does not test this 
relationship, since she examines changes in Sunday school membership 
and donations within liberal or conservative churches as per capita 
income rises, rather than looking at shifts between these two types of 
churches as economic factors vary. 
Conceptually, economic and exchange theories differ in name only. 
Both afford examination of the costs and rewards of behavior. 
However, the theories differ in their unit of analysis, with economic 
theory focusing on membership shifts at the denominational level and 
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with exchange theory focusing on the influence of costs/rewards for 
individuals' choices of denominational affiliation. 
Exchange theory perspectives do not place as much emphasis on 
monetary aspects of costs and benefits. In their study of the 
"reward-cost calculus of religious denominations," Mackie and 
Brinkerhoff (1985) emphasize three concepts: costs, rewards, and 
global consequences. Costs included such things as time, money, 
beliefs, anxiety (about salvation), guilt (over one's sinfulness), and 
marginality of religious minority groups. Rewards included the 
provision of meaning to life, social bonds, relationship with God, 
material rewards, immortality, etc. Global consequences dealt with 
measures of happiness, life satisfaction, and self-concept. Data were 
collected from students in two U.S. and two Canadian college/ 
universities. Their results indicate that "those denominations which 
cost their members dearly provide higher payoff. Mormons both invest 
and benefit the most, followed by Conservative Christians, Mainline 
Protestants, Catholics, and Religious Nones" (Mackie and Brinkerhoff, 
1986:157). 
Note that in the previous paragraph, there is an attempt to 
define all religious benefits as "rewards." For example, "meaning to 
life" and "social bonds," previously discussed as motivations, are 
here defined as rewards in the exchange theory perspective. These two 
are not contradictory. If one looks at the need for meaning as a 
motivation, then the focus is on the individual's need to find an 
explanation that endows previously meaningless experiences (e.g.. 
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suffering) with meaning. Meaning as a reward focuses on the end 
condition (where meaning is attained) that stands in stark contrast to 
a never-to-be-reexperienced state when the individual was once in need 
of meaning. 
The common denominator in all of these studies is a distinction 
between churches that emphasize otherworldly goals (such as personal 
salvation and going to heaven) versus those that emphasize 
innerworldly goals (such as improving the world). These two types of 
goals have an impact on denominational preference, and are discussed 
further in the next two subsections. 
Otherworldly goals From an exchange theoretical perspective, 
Stark and Bainbridge (1980a) have introduced the concept of 
"compensators," which is particularly cogent to a discussion of 
religion and exchange theory. "When humans cannot quickly and easily 
obtain strongly desired rewards they persist in their efforts and 
often may accept explanations that provide only 
compensators—empirically unsubstantiated faith that the rewards will 
be obtained--not the rewards themselves. Such faith is quite distinct 
from actually obtaining the reward" (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980a:121). 
They go on to distinguish between specific compensators, which 
substitute for single, specific rewards, and general compensators, 
which substitute for a cluster of rewards of great value. Religions 
are systems of general compensators that have a supernatural referent. 
Applying the concept of "compensators" to the choice of 
denomination affiliation, one might argue that the "disinherited" are 
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attracted to conservative churches because they offer personal 
salvation and eternal life in Heaven as goals. It was noted earlier 
that churches that minister to the poor tend to have an otherworldly 
emphasis to their messages (Thomas, 1985; Dredge, 1985). What they 
are offering is the general compensation of salvation to substitute 
for the rewards of material success, prestige, etc., that the poor 
have been unable to obtain. 
In offering salvation (or eternal life), these churches give 
their members a goal that is achievable. However, this goal still 
needs to be strived toward, and the individuals need to have some idea 
of how they are progressing toward the goal. Weber (1968) offers an 
explanation for how the "charisma" associated with a religious leader 
(e.g., Jesus Christ) can be institutionalized and routinized in such a 
way as to provide individuals with a measure of progress. 
Weber uses the term charisma to describe extraordinary powers 
which allow a person "to achieve the ecstatic states which are viewed, 
in accordance with primitive experience, as the preconditions for 
producing certain effects in meteorology, healing, divination, and 
telepathy ..." (I963[1922]:2). He (1968) notes that "in its pure 
form charismatic authority has a character specifically foreign to 
every-day routine structures" (p. 54). Because the followers of the 
charismatic leader live in an everyday routine, this authority has to 
be transformed. This transformation results in a set of moral rules 
or guidelines which the followers must obey. Thus, what began as a 
quality imputed to one individual (charismatic authority) is now 
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imputed to the social order (legitimacy). This legitimacy, like the 
charisma of the leader, is granted by followers. The norms and values 
of a church become legitimate once the members of the church accept 
them as valid expressions of an erstwhile charismatic leaders will. 
Once legitimate, religious norms afford members a means to gauge how 
well they are reaching their spiritual goals. The better they follow 
the norms, the closer to their goals they perceive themselves to be. 
The ability to reach the goal is dependent then on the norms of 
the denomination as understood by its members. For those who belong 
to more liberal denominations, that tend to have an innerworldly 
emphasis, there are relatively fewer norms associated with 
otherworldly achievement. Members of conservative denominations, on 
the other hand, may have many rules that govern their behavior--rules 
that must be obeyed if one wishes to be "saved." As a general rule, 
the more conservative a denomination is, the more the behaviors of 
members are proscribed. 
Innerworldly goals Returning to the concept of 
"compensation," it is important to note that the acceptance of the 
compensators offered by conservative churches may only be temporary. 
If at some later time an individual is able to obtain the desired 
rewards, then he/she will exchange the compensator for the rewards 
because humans prefer rewards over compensators (Stark and Bainbridge, 
1980a). Thus, if an individual has been attending a conservative 
church because it offers the message of personal salvation as a 
general compensator, and that person later is able to gain material 
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success, then he/she will no longer need the compensator. Under these 
circumstances, the person may switch to a church that is more in line 
with the new social status. For example, Newport (1979) has noted 
that those individuals who switched from one church or denomination to 
another generally move to a church that better reflects their 
socioeconomic status. Indeed, he argues that even switches attributed 
by some researchers to interreligious marriages may also be related to 
SES, because couples typically choose the religious group of the 
higher status partner. Thus, it appears that a change in 
socioeconomic status does impact the choice of denomination, whereby 
upward mobility often leads to a choice of a more liberal 
denomination. On the other hand, it is unclear whether downward 
mobility would result in a switch to a more conservative church (Stark 
and Bainbridge, 1980a). 
Gartrell and Shannon's (1985) rational choice approach combines 
the needs for social support and goal attainment into one approach to 
the conversion event. Through a series of axioms and propositions, the 
authors present a perspective on choosing a religious belief that 
emphasizes rationality in gaining social and cognitive rewards. The 
basic axiom is that "individuals act as if they maximize the expected 
utility of the outcome of their actions" (Gartrell and Shannon, 
1985:34). Thus, in the search for a religious group with which to 
associate, the individual tries to achieve a given outcome or fill a 
need for a given social or cognitive reward. 
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The theoretical counterpart to intrinsic religion--a term 
discussed in the section on the need for understanding--is extrinsic 
religion. Allport defines an extrinsic activity as "something that 
the person uses for his own purposes: to make friends, influence 
people, sell insurance, good times, prestige in the community, 
comfort, or wish fulfillment. He uses his religion in the same way 
that he uses his social groups and memberships" (Evans, 1981:71). 
Extrinsically religious people are associated with the church because 
of what it can do for them, rather than what they can do for it. An 
example of this may be found in Hadaway and Roof (1979), who found 
that converts from "no religious preference" were likely to have just 
moved into the community. Presumably, their affiliation was a means 
to integrate into the community, by making new contacts with important 
people. 
Other rewards or goals may motivate the individual toward a given 
denomination. Miller (1976) looks at the religious value system of 
Unitarian Universalists. He found that Unitarians exhibit a 
distinctive paradigm of values which "taken together, show an 
orientation towards competence rather than morality and stress 
personal realization, individual self-fulfillment, and 
self-actualization" (Miller, 1976:189). Thus, for this particular 
religious group, the appeal is to those whose goal is that of enhanced 
self-expression. 
The previous paragraphs may leave the impression that liberal 
Protestants are concerned only with self-serving innerworldly goals. 
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Studies by Thomas (1985) and Dredge (1986) are useful at this point 
for broadening this impression to include other types of innerworldly 
goals emphasized by liberal Protestantism. These studies provide 
evidence that Christian television programs and sermons geared toward 
those who are financially successful emphasize such things as 
"improving the present world," "the good use of money," "Christian 
charity," and "social concern." Thus, the focus is not just on self-
enrichment, but also on social action—on creating a just society. 
Summarv This section has focused on the need for goal 
attainment as a motivation toward choosing a denominational 
preference. The primary discussion dealt with the difference between 
churches of the poor, that offer salvation and eternal life 
(otherworldly goals) as compensators for unattained earthly goals, and 
churches of the middle and upper classes, that focus on 
emotional/psychological well-being and on social action (innerworldly 
goals). 
The need to escape 
This aspect of religious motivation has been less researched than 
the previous three. Wallace (1975) depicts escape as a motivation to 
"deal with" negative life situations: divorce, death of a loved one, 
single parenthood, economic distress, etc. People facing such 
problems may see the church as a haven where they can be distracted 
from a bad situation--a place for ecstatic experiences. 
As was noted in the previous section, religious institutions 
represent the expression of "routini zed charisma" in everyday life 
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(Weber, 1968). Yet, whereas some denominations deemphasize ecstatic 
experiences associated with a charismatic leader, other denominations 
emphasize just such emotional aspects of religious life. Such 
"charismatic" churches may encourage emotionality through experiences 
such as speaking in tongues, faith healing, etc. Examples of churches 
of this sort include the Pentecostal churches, as well as a number of 
smaller sects, denominations, and cults. All of these churches are 
conservative in doctrine and strictly proscribe the behavior of their 
members. Rather than simply giving their members a means of 
understanding their life situation, these churches provide occasions 
when individuals can escape through emotional religious experiences. 
Clock and Stark (1965) characterize such experiences as falling 
along the "experiential dimension" of religiosity. (Four other 
dimensions deal with beliefs [ideological], practices [ritualistic], 
knowledge of doctrine [intellectual], and interpersonal relations 
[consequential].) The experiential dimension "gives recognition to 
the fact that all religions have certain expectations, however 
imprecisely they may be stated, that the religious person will at one 
time or another achieve direct knowledge of ultimate reality or will 
experience religious emotion" (Glock and Stark, 1965:20). The various 
denominations differ a great deal in the extent to which this 
dimension is valued. "It should also be noted that there is a certain 
incompatibility between the knowledge and experience dimensions. 
Religious bodies which place great importance on one seem to give less 
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importance to the other, although both dimensions are given some value 
in all religions" (Stark and Clock, 1968:17). 
Snow and Machalek (1984) note this difference in the way that 
conversion is conceptualized. On the one hand is the expectation that 
conversion will involve a radical personal change, and that the 
convert must indicate this change through such emotional displays as 
speaking in tongues, hand raising toward heaven, etc. On the other 
hand, conversion is seen as a change in one's universe of discourse, 
an accepting of new views and beliefs, which may be indicated by such 
things as change in membership status or a change in speech and 
reasoning patterns. Churches differ in the extent to which they value 
either of these conceptualizations, or for that matter a middle point 
between the two, as the two really mark the ends of a continuum. 
Escape through emotionalism is not just a motive for finding the 
right church. It may be the only legitimate function of religion in 
the future, according to Fenn (1972). Fenn argues that religion no 
longer functions as a source of cultural integration for society to 
the extent it once did. He posits that society has developed to the 
point where changes in religious symbolization have no impact on other 
parts of society/culture. The opposite also holds true, that changes 
in the occupational, educational, and political systems have little 
impact on religion. As a result, Fenn argues that the only legitimate 
functions left for religion are the expressive ones. "Such 
nonrational aspects of individual behavior as play, or the exploration 
of human relationships, or activities intended to relieve boredom may 
90 
find expression in religious symbols" (Fenn, 1972:17). Note that the 
last part of the quote reveals another way in which religion may act 
as a means for escape, by providing activities that relieve 
individuals of the boredom of their everyday routines. 
Summary This section has dealt with the use of religion as an 
escape. That escape may be from boredom, from a negative situation or 
event, or from a more generally cruel world. The various 
denominations differ in the ways which they function to facilitate 
escape, with some providing an emotional outpouring which, in a 
spiritual sense, separates the individual from the secular world for a 
period of time. Other denominations help believers to escape by 
giving them a diversionary relief from boredom. 
Theory and reliaious motivation 
The preceding review of the literature on religious motivations 
presents a large variety of reasons why individuals may choose a 
particular denomination over against all the other possible choices. 
A number of theoretical perspectives were used to illustrate four main 
motivations for religious behavior. What is still lacking is an 
overall theoretical perspective to explain all religious motivation. 
Religions delineate both what sorts of goals are worthy of 
pursuit and the means whereby the pious may attain these goals. 
Figure 4 portrays religious goals and means with each along a distinct 
continuum. Goals are divided into two distinct types: the 
innerworldly goal of being a "doer of good works" versus the 
otherworldly goal of being a "doer of God's (ever-elusive) will." The 
Good works 
Goal attainment 
(Liberal 
Protestants) 
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Absolute Means 
(Catholics) 
Meaning 
God's will 
(Conservative Protestants) 
Social 
Support 
Relative Means 
Escape 
Figure 4. Dimensions of religious motivation 
first goal is one emphasized more by liberal Protestant denominations 
than by other denominations. Religious goals of this type focus more 
on issues of social justice in this world than on a concern for a 
better life in the next world. This is not to say that liberal 
Protestant denominations ignore otherworldly matters entirely, but 
only that relative to other religions in the U.S., liberal 
Protestantism emphasizes innerworldly goals more and otherworldly 
goals less. At the other end of the goal attainment continuum one 
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finds conservative Protestants denominations, that focus relatively 
more on otherworldly goals. In this case, doing God's will is not 
primarily oriented toward achieving social justice in the present 
world, but toward expressing demeanor appropriate for someone who is 
"saved" (i.e., whose behavior is consonant with the will of God). The 
key to understanding the goal dimension of religious motivation lies 
in understanding whi a goal is pursued. If good works are pursued to 
please God, the believer is motivated to do God's will; if good works 
(that may, incidentally, be valued by God) are pursued to better 
mankind, the believer is motivated to do good works. 
Religious means can be viewed along a continuum from absolute to 
relative. At the "absolute means" end of the continuum one finds 
Catholics, for whom the means to salvation are found in a set of 
proscribed rituals. At the "relative means" pole of the continuum are 
persons who are motivated to pursue religious goals by means that may 
fall outside those sanctioned by the primary religious institutions of 
U.S. society. For these people the means by which one attains 
religious goals are relative. One good illustration is with the 
Unitarians, who emphasize each individual's finding his or her own 
means of self-actualization, rather than a singular church doctrine of 
proscribed behaviors and beliefs. Atheists and agnostics (who are 
questioners of church dogma) also fall into this group. 
It should be noted that there is an inherent difficulty in the 
placement of specific denominational types along these two dimensions. 
Certain churches may have emphases that may not conform with their 
93 
placement in a larger denominational class. In addition, there are 
many differences that exist within denominations. The purpose here is 
to provide a theoretical framework for the denominational classes 
considered in this study. Placements are intended to reflect 
approximate positions of admittedly diverse groupings of 
denominations. 
Both the Catholic Church and the conservative Protestant 
denominations are involved in the provision of meaning. They do 
differ, however, in the kind of meaning provided. Catholics follow 
ritualistic means for attaining otherworldly salvation. The meaning 
provided is about how one secures one's place in heaven. Meaning 
provided to conservative Protestants also revolves around the promise 
of a future life without suffering, but differs from that provided to 
Catholics in its emphasis on why a heavenly afterlife is worthy of 
their pursuit. This meaning is typically in the form of a theodicy 
that explains why the faithful suffered before they began doing God's 
will and why they no longer suffer now. Catholicism endows rituals 
with meaning as the means to eternal life, whereas conservative 
Protestantism endows this-worldly suffering with meaning as the 
nemesis of the pursuit of secular goals. 
Social support is necessary for conservative Protestants, liberal 
Protestants, and those with peripheral affiliations, although the 
reasons for needing this social support differ. For the conservative 
Protestant, social support is needed to assure the believers that they 
(unlike those outside of these denominations) are doing God's will. 
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Persons who believe that religious goals may be attained by a variety 
of means are likely to need assurance (or social support) that the 
means they are using to achieve these goals are appropriate. To the 
extent that liberal Protestants are relativistic in their choice of 
means to pursue innerworldly goals, they may also need assurances of 
the propriety of the means they use. 
What emerges here is a perspective based on four needs. While 
denominations vary as to how much emphasis is placed on each of these 
needs, they also vary in the manner by which the needs for meaning and 
social support are met. This theoretical perspective will motivate 
classifications of denominations into need-related religious 
categories to be used in the forthcoming analysis. 
The demography of church growth 
Aside from the motivational reasons that may push the individual 
towards a church or denomination to fulfill his/her needs, there are 
numerous contextual influences on religious affiliation that may only 
have indirect relevance to individuals' religious needs. Roof and 
McKinney (1985) state that "of greater long-term importance in shaping 
the religious composition of the country are demographics: declining 
birthrates, migration, and birth-cohort changes over time. These 
factors virtually assure that trends now set in motion will continue 
throughout this century and into the next" (p. 36). 
Hadaway (1981) notes the large impact that the demographic 
environment can have on changes in church membership. The variable 
most highly correlated with membership change in his study is 
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population change. If a neighborhood is experiencing growth then the 
churches are also likely to be growing, while a neighborhood that is 
declining or stagnant offers many obstacles to church growth. "Even 
with other variables acting as statistical controls, it is the sheer 
increase of people in an area that is of primary importance in 
producing membership growth" (Hadaway, 1981:84). Racial change (white 
churches typically lose members when the neighborhood experiences an 
influx of nonwhite residents) also influences church membership rates. 
(See previous discussion of the "homogeneous unit principle.") 
Age and church growth Clements (1981) gives a striking 
portrayal of the changing age composition of church members in the 
U.S. He presents a breakdown of frequencies by age for a "typical 
congregation" (namely, one that reflected the age distribution of the 
U.S.) in two years: 1900 and 1976. He notes that there are shifts in 
both the youngest age group, which shows a significant decline, and 
the older age groups (55+ and 65+) which show a large increase from 
1900 to 1975. While his figures are hypothetical, it is reasonable to 
speculate that all denominations and congregations exhibit the aging 
of their memberships differently. If it is true, as Johnson et al. 
(1974) suggest, that older people are more conservative and that this 
is related to the aging process (and not to generational or historical 
influences), then either churches with aging constituencies tend to 
grow more conservative, or the elderly may be inclined to move from 
liberal to conservative churches that better represent their own 
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incresingly conservative views. However, the literature provides no 
evidence that either of these.two trends have occurred. 
Young people in their late teens and early 20s comprise the 
largest pool of potential new church members, so how they feel about 
religious and social values will influence which churches are likely 
to grow from their affiliations. Accordingly, the recent growth of 
conservative churches may be partially a consequence of a concomitant 
growth in conservative attitudes among these young people (c.f., e.g., 
Hastings and Hoge, 1976). 
Related to the issue of age and church growth is the concept of 
the family life cycle. Nash (1968) has argued that the increase in 
church membership during the 1950s and early 1960s was probably highly 
related to the percentage of families who had children under age 18. 
After controlling for total population and total number of families in 
the United States, Nash found a strong correlation (r=.74) between the 
percentage of families with children under age 18 and church growth. 
This relates directly to "childrearing theory," which suggests that 
parents are more likely to attend church than nonparents due to their 
desire to have the church help in the socialization of children 
(particularly regarding values). 
Region and church growth The effects of regionalism on 
schisms and mergers of denominations was discussed at length in the 
first chapter. Both Stump (1984) and Newman and Halvorson (1984) 
conclude that churches may be growing numerically, but that they are 
not gaining geographically. Stump (1984) uses a unique definition of 
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region which does not employ contiguous geographical area. Rather he 
defines regions in terms of clusters of states that were similar in a 
given proportion (e.g., the proportion of white Protestants) in the 
year 1905. Using these same "regions" for a 1971 data set, he found 
that there was little change during the 65-year span. There was no 
evidence that denominations were spreading beyond their traditional 
regions of strength. 
While this is interesting in and of itself, it is not the major 
issue in terms of church growth and denominational switching. Newman 
and Halvorson (1984) address the more important issue of the social 
significance of this regionalism. 
Given the fact that during the period in question, one in 
every five Americans change place of residence each year, 
what does the relative stability of the degree of 
concentration of religious groups really mean? One 
interpretation would be that Americans do not carry their 
denominational affiliations with them. Rather, they adopt 
the religious organizations of their new environment (Newman 
and Halvorson, 1984:313). 
This fits well with the need for goal attainment, since adopting the 
denomination of the new community should meet the innerworldly goal of 
integration into that community. 
If this interpretation is true, and the discussion of Hadaway and 
Roof (1979) regarding integration does support it, then a change in 
population of a given region through migration could result in a boom 
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or bust for church membership in that area. And this could have a 
profound effect on certain denominations and family groups. For 
example, a study of United Church of Christ congregations during the 
period 1970-1978 found that only the congregations in the South 
experienced growth (McKinney and Hoge, 1983). Historically this was a 
time in which industrial workers were moving to the South to find 
jobs, especially in oil-related industries. This caused an increase 
in the population of the South, and may also have caused membership 
increases for churches. 
Following this line of reasoning, the increase in membership of 
conservative churches (like the Southern Baptist Convention) may not 
have been due to their being more religiously relevant, as Kelley 
(1977) has suggested, but may have been due to a simple increase in 
population. By the same logic, the decline of the liberal churches 
may have been due, at least in part, to the Southward out-migration of 
their members. The fact that denominations are regional makes 
switching a necessity of life in a mobile society. 
Summary This section focused on demographic reasons for 
church growth and denominational switching. The emphasis was on three 
demographic factors: population growth, age structure (including 
family life cycle), and region. It was shown that population growth 
at the local level generally leads to church growth. Church growth is 
also positively associated with numbers of young people, since many of 
the members of this group have yet to make a commitment to a 
denomination and, thus, they provide the greatest number of potential 
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members. Finally, the regional nature of denominations in the U.S. 
leads to the possibility that regional migration will also impact 
denominational growth (or decline), since migrants can only choose 
from among churches that are available in their new region. 
Hypotheses 
The information presented in this chapter gives a variety of ways 
in which denominations differ in the needs that they satisfy for 
individuals. The primary purpose of the analysis performed in the 
following chapters is to determine how these needs may be used to 
explain age, period, and cohort (APC) shifts in denominational 
preference. This is a unique approach, since the vast majority of 
research in this area has been cross-sectional, and therefore has not 
dealt with APC issues. The balance of this section comprises a list 
of general hypotheses about the linkage of needs to APC effects. 
The first hypotheses relate to the ability of socioeconomic 
factors to explain APC differences, and is associated with the need 
for goal attainment. Since positive changes in socioeconomic status 
(SES) seem to be associated with a more goal-oriented approach to 
religion and a consequent preference for liberal denominational 
affiliations, it is expected that SES variables will explain age, 
period, and cohort differences in denominational preference. In 
particular, it is hypothesized that persons are incresingly more 
likely to prefer liberal denominations as their careers advance (and, 
presumably, as their economic statuses improve) prior to retirement. 
Affiliation with liberal denominations is hypothesized to increase 
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during periods of economic growth and to decrease during periods of 
economic decline. In addition, it is hypothesized that cohort groups 
that are high in income will be more likely to affiliate with liberal 
denominations. Similar relationships are expected for education and 
social class, such that as individuals advance in education or class 
(or if they are part of a period or cohort in which education or 
social class is higher), they become more likely to prefer liberal 
denominations. 
The second set of hypotheses deal with marital status. Since the 
literature indicates that those who find themselves in nonnormative 
family situations have a greater need for social support, it is 
expected that indicators of nonnormative situations (e.g., divorced 
and single adulthood) will explain period and cohort differences in 
denominational preference. In particular, it is hypothesized that the 
increasing divorce rate of the 1960s and 1970s would result in 
increased membership for nontraditional religions, since the 
perception of Christian churches as being "familistic" would drive 
away divorcees. Affiliation with nontraditional religions is 
hypothesized to be higher among those cohorts that exhibit a high 
divorce rate. Similar results are hypothesized for the relation 
between single marital status and religious affiliation. 
The presence (or absence) of children leads to the third 
hypothesis. Since it has been documented that parents are more likely 
to attend church services regularly (due to a need for support in the 
socialization of children), and that couples without children may be 
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seen as nonnormative, it is expected that the presence of children 
will explain period and cohort differences in denominational 
preference. In particular, it is hypothesized that the increase 
during the past two decades in the number of childless families should 
lead to an increase in liberal religious preferences. Liberal church 
affiliation is also hypothesized to be higher among cohorts in which 
there are fewer parents. This is presumably due to the liberal 
churches relatively greater acceptance of couples without children (in 
comparison to more conservative churches)--an acceptance that makes 
these couples feel more welcome in the church (see previous discussion 
of "family surrogate" theory). 
The concentration of certain denominations in geographic 
locations leads to the possibility that historical (or period-
specific) changes in the regional dispersion of the United States 
population should have an impact on the growth or decline of region-
based denominations. In particular, it is hypothesized that since the 
South is a "stronghold" of conservative Protestantism, an increase in 
southern population at the expense of other regions should result in 
an increase in conservative Protestant preference. Similarly, an 
increase in the population of the West--where the nontraditional 
religions have their "stronghold"--should result in an increase in 
affiliation with these religions. 
Finally, the last hypothesis deals with the developmental and 
cyclic models of secularization. Given the variety of factors that 
influence religious preference (each of which in turn reflect the 
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needs of a diverse population) it is hypothesized that the cyclic 
model best fits the religious situation of the United States. "Ebbs 
and flows" in the fortunes of denominational groups are hypothesized 
as due to changes in economic factors (national and personal), 
regional changes, etc. If religious groups are responsible for the 
provision of the variety of human needs depicted in Figure 4, then it 
would be difficult to replace them with relatively fewer secular 
alternatives. 
Conclusion 
Religious groups in American society satisfy a diversity of needs 
within the population. The research to follow looks at some long-term 
trends in denominational preference. Using a longitudinal data set, 
an analysis will be performed of age, period, and cohort changes in 
religious affiliation over a two decade period. It is expected that 
these APC changes can be explained, at least in part, by changes in 
the needs of the population. The chapter to follow describes the data 
set, the variables used, and methodological approaches for 
incorporating structural characteristics of the data into the 
analysis. 
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METHODS 
The data used in this study are from the American National 
Election Surveys (ANES) collected by the Institute for Social Research 
(ISR) at the University of Michigan.^ The ISR conducts a survey 
every two years during an election year to determine the opinions of 
the U.S. electorate on a variety of issues and candidates. In 
addition, information is gathered on the respondents' backgrounds 
(e.g., age/year of birth, gender, race, religious preference, etc.). 
It is this background data which will be used to analyze shifts in 
religious preference. Since the ANES are conducted every two years, 
they provide an opportunity to study shifts in religious preference 
over a number of years. 
The data analyzed are from the survey years 1964 to 1986, and 
include all respondents age 21 and over who responded to the religious 
preference question. Younger respondents (age 18-20) were excluded 
because they were not surveyed until 1972, when the age at which one 
was eligible to vote was changed to 18. The overall sample size for 
the 12 surveys is 21,852. These data offer an opportunity to examine 
age-, period-, and cohort-related changes which occurred in 
religious preference during the 22-year span of the surveys. They 
The data used in this dissertation were made available by the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear 
any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here. 
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also afford an analysis of the factors that may be behind these 
changes in religious preference. 
The Structure of the ANES Data 
The ANES data during the 1964-1986 surveys have several features 
which, if left unaddressed, would cause potential problems in the 
analysis and interpretation of the statistical procedures to be used 
in this study. These problematic features are Black oversampling in 
several survey years, differences in survey size for all years, and 
the multistage clustering technique for sampling. A detailed 
discussion of these three issues follows. 
Black oversampling 
In the 1964, 1968, and 1970 survey years Black respondents were 
oversampled, presumably due to an interest in civil rights issues. To 
prevent this oversampling from influencing the results of the data 
analysis, it was necessary to assign lighter weights to data on Black 
respondents from these surveys such that the data would more closely 
reflect a series of random samples. As a result the effective number 
of cases was reduced from 21,852 to 20,861. (See Appendix A for 
weight factors used to eliminate oversampling.) 
Sample sizes 
In addition to eliminating Black oversamples by weighting, it was 
also necessary to weight the survey years so that each survey has an 
equal number of respondents. In this analysis logistic regression is 
used to determine the log odds of being affiliated with one religious 
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group as opposed to not being in that group. Differences in sample 
sizes will result in distorted estimates of period effects on 
religious affiliation. Let me illustrate. 
If we let Pj represent the probability of being Catholic in 
survey year i, then: 
# of Catholics in year i 
"^i ° N 
where N is the total number of respondents across the 12 surveys. 
Note that variations in sample size will make the odds of being 
Catholic in 1972 (the largest survey with Nyg = 2508) appear greater 
than the odds of being Catholic in 1966 (the smallest survey with Ngg 
= 1269). This difference does not reflect a period effect, but rather 
the difference in sample size. Appendix A gives the weights used to 
balance sample sizes, in addition to the weights assigned to Black 
respondents in those survey years when they were oversampled. After 
weighting, the data set of 20,861 respondents is treated as having 
approximately 1738 weighted cases in each survey year. 
Multistage clustering 
p 
Throughout this analysis, reported values of L (likelihood-ratio 
chi-square) are two-thirds of the values that would be assigned to 
identical data from a simple random sample. This is to adjust for the 
inferior power of multistage cluster samples in comparison to SRS's 
(Simple Random Samples). Davis (1982) notes that in a multistage 
cluster sample such as those of the ANES, "the raw Ns overestimate its 
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power. The rule-of-thumb advice is to treat N as .667N, that is, to 
consider a sample of 1500 to have the power of an SRS sample of 1000" 
(Davis, 1982:575). Since values of L^, like those of chi-square in 
crosstabulation, are directly related to the number of cases, such 
that (all things equal) a doubling of sample size will double L^, the 
p 
values of L can be multiplied by .667 to adjust for the inferior 
power of the samples. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. The 
first section describes the dependent variables and their theoretical 
rationale. Next, the research strategy is presented, including a 
brief discussion of the statistical procedures and tests used to 
examine the hypotheses stated at the end of chapter two. (A more 
detailed discussion of these statistical procedures and tests can be 
found in Appendix B.) Third, the independent variables are described 
alone with their coding and recoding, and the purpose for their 
inclusion. The chapter continues with a description of the data, 
where a series of demographic variables are broken down by survey year 
and religious preference. An initial assessment of age, period, and 
cohort changes in religious preference is also made at this point. 
The final section gives an overview of how the elaboration model 
(described in the section on research strategy) is applied. 
Dependent Variables 
Chapter Two described four types of religious needs that are 
satisfied by specific religious groups. This section specifies how 
denominations are categorized into five groups according to the 
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religious needs they tend to meet. The first type of religious need 
is one for meaning. The Catholic Church offers a meaningful sanctuary 
compartmentalized from the rest of society, where rituals are 
meaningful as the means to eternal life. The meaning provided by 
conservative Protestant denominations regards the secular world, where 
deviations from God's will have brought suffering down upon the 
unfaithful. The need for social support is also met by conservative 
Protestant denominations as believers are assured of divine approval. 
When religious goals are this-worldly, social support is no longer 
required to assure believers that their goals have been attained. 
However, The liberal Protestant denominations that endorse the pursuit 
of such goals may function to provide believers with social support 
regarding the propriety of their choice among relative means toward 
these goals. Finally, groups with other relioious orientations often 
place less emphasis on this-worldly religious ends than liberal 
Protestants, but still are faced with choosing among various means to 
spiritual ends. These groups may thus provide their members with 
social support (regarding means selection), but have a much smaller 
emphasis on this-worldly (or other-worldly) goal attainment. A fifth 
religious group (namely moderate Protestant denominations) was 
targeted for analysis as a group occupying the theological "common 
ground" along the ends and means dimensions of religious motivation 
set forth in chapter 2. 
The religious preference variable (RELPREF) has been fairly 
consistently measured across the 1964-1986 survey span. In accordance 
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with the denominational delineations drawn in chapter 2 (and reviewed 
in the previous paragraph), the religious preference values were 
collapsed into five categories: 1 = Roman Catholic, 2 = liberal 
Protestant, 3 = moderate Protestant, 4 = conservative Protestant, and 
5 = other religious affiliations. This variable was used to create 
five dummy-coded dependent variables. The variable RCATH was coded as 
"1" for respondents in the first category of RELPREF; otherwise RCATH 
= 0. A similar coding scheme is used to code LPROT, MPROT, CPROT, and 
OTHER. (See Appendix C for a detailed listing of the denominations 
included in each of these categories.) 
While RELPREF was measured fairly consistently, there are two 
wording changes that need to be noted. The first occurs between 1968 
and 1970. From 1964 to 1968, the initial religious preference 
question asked: "Are you a Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish?" 
Follow-up questions were used to determine which Protestant 
denomination was involved. In 1970 the question was changed to read: 
"Is your religious preference Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or 
something else?" The addition of the "or something else" phrase was 
found to have increased the frequency of respondents in the OTHER 
category (as well as to have decreased the frequency of respondents in 
the other four categories). To take this word change into account, a 
dummy variable (WORD) was included in most logistic regression runs. 
WORD was coded "0" for the survey years 1964-1968, and "1" for all 
subsequent years. 
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The second wording change occurs in 1972. In this, and 
subsequent years, a follow-up question was asked that was not included 
in earlier surveys. This question, addressed only to Baptists, reads: 
"Is that Southern Baptist or something else?" The addition of this 
question increased the numbers of the conservative Southern Baptists 
at the expense of other more moderate Baptist denominations. To 
account for this wording change two steps were taken. First, all 
Baptists prior to 1972 were placed in the conservative Protestant 
group. This resulted in a misclassification of moderate Baptists 
(approximately 33% of all Baptists) as conservative Protestants. 
Second, a dummy variable (W0RD2) was used as an independent variable 
within logistic regressions with MPROT or CPROT as the dependent 
variable. The use of W0RD2 was restricted to these particular 
logistic regressions because the wording change only has consequences 
for the moderate and conservative Protestant groups. 
Research Strategy 
The research strategy employed in this study is based on the 
hypothesized relationship between age, period, and cohort changes, and 
religious affiliation shifts. It has already been noted that 
researchers have found shifts in religious affiliation over time. The 
research strategy employed attempts to explain why these changes are 
occurring. The specific strategy proposed at the end of this chapter 
is based on the concept of "explanation," so a brief discussion of 
explanation follows. 
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The elaboration paradigm 
Lazarsfeld's (1959) work on the elaboration paradigm emphasized 
"conditional relations"--relations between two variables that are 
conditional upon a third variable. In describing the paradigm Babbie 
(1979) noted that there are several ways that the overall relation can 
differ from the partial relations between the variables within levels 
of a third variable. If within categories of the third variable 
(e.g., gender) the relationships are unchanged from the overall 
relationship, "replication" exists--meaning that this third variable 
appears unrelated to the overall relationship. One may also find that 
one of the partial relationships is the same as the overall 
relationship, while the other partial relationship is near to zero. 
In the elaboration paradigm this is called "specification"--meaning 
that the third variable helps to specify the conditions under which 
the overall relationship holds. (E.g., the relationship is only 
present among females.) 
The other two possibilities both involve partial relationships 
which are less than the overall relationship. If one's theory 
suggests that the third variable (hereafter referred to as the "test 
variable") plays an intervening role between the independent and 
dependent variables (as in the model below) and the partial 
relationships are less than the overall relationship, then 
"interpretation" is occurring. That is, the test variable affords an 
interpretation of the mechanism through which the independent variable 
(IV) and dependent variable (DV) are related. The relation between 
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the IV and the DV is still considered to be genuine, but the means by 
which the IV effects a change, in the DV has been elaborated. 
Independent ^ Test Dependent 
Variable Variable ^ Variable 
When the overall relation is larger than the partial, and when 
one's theory suggests that the test variable is antecedent to both the 
independent and dependent variables, as in the model below, one speaks 
of the test variable as "explaining" the association between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable. Unlike the case of 
interpretation, the test variable "explains away" the relationship 
between the IV and the DV in that a relationship which appeared to 
exist between the IV and the DV is due only to their common 
association with the test variable. The relationship may also be said 
to be spurious (Babbie, 1979; Rosenberg, 1968). 
Dependent 
Variable 
The purpose of this study is to account for APC fluctuations in 
religious affiliation. That is, the independent variables here are 
age, period, and cohort. Theoretically, these variables are not 
really considered to be causal (in relation to religious affiliation), 
but are believed to be the spurious consequences of antecedent causes 
that are measured by a set of test variables. In brief, the test 
Independent 
Variable 
Test 
Variable 
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variables are used to account for APC variations in religious 
affiliation. When the overall APC variations are larger than partial 
APC variations within discrete levels of the test variables, then the 
test variables explain the association between APC and religious 
affiliation. Details on the procedures used in applying the 
elaboration model to the ANES data will be given in the final section 
of this chapter. 
Independent Variables 
Age, period, and cohort 
The coding of age and year of birth is erratic in the ANES during 
the 1964-1986 survey years. In 1968, ISR changed from coding the 
variable age (AGE), to coding the last two digits of the respondents' 
year of birth. In 1982, ISR began coding respondents' four digit year 
of birth. For the surveys that afforded data on age (but not year of 
birth), year of birth (YOB) was calculated by subtracting AGE from 
survey year .(YEAR). For surveys in which year of birth was provided, 
AGE was calculated by subtracting YOB from YEAR (YOB was recoded to 
four digits for 1968-1980). 
To assess the relative impact of age, period, and cohort shifts 
on religious preference, dummy variables were created to identify 
different age, period, and cohort groups. In the case of period, this 
involved the creation of eleven dummy variables (P66, P68, . . . , 
P86), with each dummy having a value of "1" if YEAR was equal to the 
associated survey year (e.g., when YEAR = 1966, P66 = 1) and "0" 
otherwise. The 1964 survey year is used as the baseline in the 
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analyses (unless otherwise noted). In the logistic regression of 
Catholic religious preference on period dummies, the value of the 
intercept is then equivalent to the log odds of being Catholic in 
1964. The values associated with each period dummy represent the 
increase (or decrease) in log odds from this intercept that the log 
odds of being Catholic were on the year identified by the dummy. 
Similarly, age dummies were created for 30 two-year age groups 
(e.g., when AGE = 21 or 22, A1 = 1; otherwise A1 =0). The result is 
30 age dummy variables (A1-A30), with the baseline group being those 
over 80 years of age. Finally, a cohort dummy variable was created 
for each two-year interval of year of birth. The baseline group is 
those born prior to 1906, with the first dummy (C2) equal to "1" when 
YOB was 1906 or 1907 and equal to "0" otherwise. The result is 30 
cohort dummy variables (C2-C31). 
Test variables 
A marital status measure will be used to test the hypothesis that 
a "deviant" family situation may explain age-period-cohort (APC) 
shifts toward liberal Protestant or "other" religious groups. This is 
expected since liberal Protestant denominations are presumably more 
tolerant of believers' "deviant" statuses, and will provide social 
support to the family in coping with their non-normative status. On 
the other hand, these people may leave religion altogether, to escape 
from the familism of most religions. Marital status was consistently 
measured in the ANES as follows: 1 = married and living with spouse 
(or spouse in military service), 2 = single (never married), 3 = 
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divorced, 4 = separated, 5 = widowed, and 7 = common law marriage. 
Since being single or divorced can be considered "non-normative," 
these two groups are focused on in the analysis. (Those who were 
separated are not included as "non-normative" because of the 
transitory nature of this marital status--some going on to divorce, 
others reconciling and remaining married.) Two effect variables were 
created (SINGLE and DIVORCE), with SINGLE coded as "I" if the 
respondent was single, "0" if the respondent was divorced,and "-1" if 
in another category. Similarly, DIVORCE was coded "I" if divorced, 
"0" if single, and "-1" for the other categories. 
A second family-situation variable is the presence or absence of 
children under age 18. As was noted in the previous chapter, there is 
a positive relationship between presence of children in the household 
and church activity. This variable allows one to investigate whether 
parents with children in the household are more likely to affiliate 
with conservative Protestant denominations, as well as whether this 
can be used to explain APC differences in this religious preference. 
This is because the conservative Protestant denominations are 
presumably better at supporting the socialization of children. The 
corresponding variable, KIDS, is dichotomous, with "0" indicating no 
children, and "1" indicating children under 18 in the respondent's 
household. 
Several measures of socioeconomic status are also included in 
this analysis. These variables will be used in evaluating hypotheses 
based on Redman's (1980) prediction that when there is an increase in 
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per capita income during a given period, liberal Protestant 
denominations will gain in membership (presumably due to an increased 
need for goal attainment of an innerworldly nature). On the other 
hand, when per capita income declines, people move toward conservative 
Protestant denominations that are better equipped to provide meaning 
for a downturn in fortunes. One measure of socioeconomic status is 
education. The measurement of respondent's education has become more 
refined over the twelve survey years. The variable, EDUC, was 
constructed for this analysis with "1" indicating respondents who have 
not finished high school, "2" those who have a high school diploma but 
no college degree, and "3" those who have a college or more advanced 
degree. 
Another measure of socioeconomic status is income. This variable 
also had alternative coding schemes between 1964 and 1986. Both the 
number of categories, as well as the income ranges in the categories, 
have changed. Two steps were taken to assure consistency in income 
measurement. The first step involved recoding each category to the 
dollar value of the midpoint of the income range it represented. A 
problem arose during this step. The last income category for each 
survey is "X dollars or more," where X is the lower bound of the 
category—a bound that also varies across survey years. Clearly, no 
midpoint exists for an interval that ranges from X to an infinite 
number of dollars. The problem was to find a method of estimating the 
median income of respondents who fall into this highest income 
category. A solution was found by creating a data set with the 
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following variables: YEAR (survey year), LOWHIGH (the lower bound of 
the highest income category), and FREQ (the frequency of the upper 
category). LOWHIGH was made consistent by multiplying each value by 
the consumer price index based on the purchasing power of the dollar 
in 1967 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1988). This converted variable 
was used as the dependent variable in a simple linear regression in 
which FREQ was the independent variable. The constant from the 
resulting equation can be interpreted as "the income (in 1967 dollars) 
one would estimate to be the lower bound of a highest income category 
that contained no respondents." Midpoints could be calculated once 
upper bounds for each survey's highest income category was estimated 
by adding the dollar value of the end points and dividing by two. The 
second step involved converting all the other category midpoints to 
constant 1967 dollars. The resulting variable (INC67) is thus 
comparable across survey years, and will be used to determine the 
effect of the economy on religious preference. 
The last measure of socioeconomic status is from a subjective 
question regarding social class. Respondents were asked to place 
themselves into one of the several categories of social class. These 
categories were collapsed into a dichotomous variable (CLASS), with 
"0" representing those in the lower or working class and "1" those in 
the middle or upper class. This subjective measure is included to 
determine if individuals' religious preference is based on perceived 
status, rather than on more objective criteria such as education and 
income. 
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The final test variable is an indicator of the area of the 
country in which the respondent lives (REGION). As noted in the 
previous chapter, certain denominations may be predominant in some 
regions, while being virtually nonexistent in others. It is 
important, therefore", to estimate regional effects on religious 
affiliation, since migration from one region to another may result in 
changes in affiliations, due to the unavailability of the preferred 
denomination, plus a desire for goal-oriented social contacts. The 
variable REGION was coded as follows: 1 = Northeast, 2 = North 
Central, 3 = South, and 4 = West (see Appendix D for a listing of 
states included in each region). Three dummy variables were created 
to estimate regional effects within logistic regressions. If an 
individual lived in the Northeast, the value of NEAST is "1"; if not 
NEAST =0. The same scheme is used for SOUTH and WEST. The North 
Central region is used as the baseline. Thus, in all logistic 
regressions, coefficients associated with NEAST, SOUTH, and WEST are 
relative to this region. 
Description of the Data Set 
Table 2 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for the data 
set. These statistics are broken down by survey year and are also 
given for the total data set. It should be noted that the statistics 
for 1964, 1968, and 1970 are based on the weighted samples 
(eliminating the Black oversamples), while statistics for the total 
data set are based on weighting for both the oversamples and the 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the American National Election 
Surveys, 1964-1986 
Variable 1964* 1966 1968* 1970* 1972 1974 
Age (mean) 46.0 46.4 46.8 46.6 46.0 48.4 
% Male 45.3 44.6 43.8 42.9 43.4 42.7 
% White 89.4 88.4 89.5 89.2 88.9 89.3 
Marital Status (%) 
Single 
Divorced 
Other 
6.4 
3.7 
89.9 
8.6 
4.4 
87.0 
8.7 
5.2 
86.1 
8.2 
5.3 
86.5 
9.2 
5.4 
85.4 
8.3 
5.7 
85.0 
% Having Children 
Under Age 18 53.5 48.5 48.3 48.1 38.8 41.3 
Education (%) 
Less Than HS 
HS+ 
College+ 
44.9 
44.1 
11.0 
44.4 
46.0 
9.6 
40.8 
46.0 
13.2 
40.4 
48.2 
11.4 
38.0 
48.2 
13.9 
38.4 
46.8 
14.8 
% Working Class 58.6 59.4 55.3 53.6 54.9 55.1 
Income (mean in 
1967 dollars) 7762 7252 8225 8172 8460 8562 
Region (%) 
Northeast 
North Central 
South 
West 
22.9 
31.8 
30.3 
15.0 
24.2 
30.1 
29.5 
16.1 
24.0 
28.9 
31.6 
15.5 
22.0 
28.7 
34.2 
15.1 
23.1 
28.6 
33.4 
14.9 
21.5 
27.9 
35.6 
14.9 
Sample Size 1524 1269 1493 1448 2508 1480 
^ Weighted to eliminate black oversample. 
^ Weighted for black oversamples and differential sample sizes. 
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1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 Total'' 
47.0 44.7 46.0 46.5 45.9 44.8 46.3 
42.2 44.1 43.1 44.9 44.3 43.5 43.8 
87.3 87.8 87.2 88.1 86.6 82.9 87.8 
9.9 10.8 11.6 13.4 12.8 15.5 10.3 
7.5 8.6 9.8 9.5 11.4 11.1 7.2 
82.6 80.6 78.6 77.1 75.8 73.4 82.5 
41.6 45.3 40.0 37.9 41.8 42.1 43.9 
32.3 28.5 26.3 22.1 25.1 20.2 33.5 
51.2 54.3 55.7 57.0 56.4 58.6 50.9 
16.5 17.3 17.9 20.8 18.5 21.3 15.6 
52.4 53.0 51.6 54.4 51.5 50.6 54.1 
8294 8825 8496 8044 7991 8673 8256 
21.9 21.7 21.7 20.0 18.5 16.6 21.7 
28.7 25.3 26.8 26.8 27.3 26.9 28.1 
32.8 35.0 34.5 36.0 33.5 35.6 33.5 
16.6 18.0 17.0 17.1 20.7 20.9 16.7 
2106 2125 1490 1315 2078 2025 20861 
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different sample sizes. (See discussion earlier in this chapter and 
Appendix A.) 
One of the first things that is noticeable is the relative 
consistency of mean age. Given the increasing longevity of the U.S. 
population, this does not seem valid. However, it must be remembered 
that the sample chosen is of voting age citizens age 21 and older. As 
a result, the mean age does not yet reflect the drop in U.S. fertility 
(the "baby bust") that began in the early 1950s. In addition, the 
large number of "baby boomers" flowing into the samples across the 
years have acted to maintain mean age. The mean age may increase in 
subsequent ANES surveys as the "baby boomers" age and as the "baby 
bust" generation reaches voting age. 
Gender and race ratios have remained fairly consistent over the 
22-year span. Female respondents are consistently in the majority, 
comprising from 54.7% to 57.8% of the total sample for any given year. 
The vast majority of respondents are white, with those of other races 
comprising only 12.2% of the total sample. There does appear to be a 
rise in representation of nonwhites over the last two surveys, a rise 
that may reflect a change in the racial makeup of the general 
population. 
Both of the "family situation" variables (marital status and 
children under 18) show definite trends. The percentage of 
respondents who are never-married or divorced has been rising in an 
almost linear fashion, while those in more "normative" situations 
(married, widowed) are decreasing in number. The increase in never-
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married respondents may represent a trend to postpone marriage until 
one has finished schooling and is established in a career track, while 
the increase in divorced respondents is likely related to more 
favorable attitudes regarding divorce. 
The percentage of respondents having children under age 18 has 
seen a general decline, bottoming out in 1982. Much of this decline 
occurs in the early 1970s--a time when the baby boomers had reached 
adulthood, leaving the subsequent "baby bust" more apparent. Again, 
the desire to complete the educational process and establish a career, 
which may delay marriage, results in children being born when parents 
are older. The increase in percentage from 1982 to 1986 may be 
indicative of a reversal in this trend, but it is too early to tell if 
this will last. 
The statistics for education show an increase in the number of 
respondents who have some postsecondary schooling, while those who 
have not completed high school have decreased from 44.9% to 20.2% over 
the 22-year span. This lends some support to the comments made 
earlier regarding later marriage and the postponing of child-bearing. 
Besides the changes in education, there has also been a change in 
subjective social class. Fewer respondents classify themselves as 
"working class" in 1986 as compared to 1964. This probably reflects 
the general decline in the number of available working class positions 
that has resulted with a general upgrading of the U.S. occupational 
structure over the two decade period of study. This may also account 
for educational shifts, since the "middle-class" jobs that were 
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created in the upgrade require greater preparation than those jobs 
being lost. 
Fluctuations in mean income appear to be at least in part due to 
variations in the choices of income categories given to the subjects. 
The largest changes occur during those survey years in which the 
categories were changed from previous years. If one looks at the 1978 
to 1982 surveys--a period when consistent income categories were used 
--there is a decline in mean income. Thus, the trend would appear to 
be one of loss of income when one looks at these years, while the 
changes across the 11 surveys show both increases and decreases. 
Given that education of respondents has improved, while the number who 
see themselves as working class has decreased, one would have expected 
to see an increase in income. 
Part of the problem lies in the conversion of income categories 
to real dollar figures, especially when some upper income categories 
encompass a range of $15,000, such as occurs from 1978 to 1986. Using 
the midpoint to represent these categories probably inflates the mean, 
since one would expect the distribution of respondents within the 
upper income categories to be skewed to the lower end of the range of 
incomes. Use of more precise income figures would have been 
preferable, but these were not available. 
There have also been some shifts evident in representation by 
region. The figures reported in Table 2 indicate a decline in the 
population of the Northeast and North Central regions, while the South 
and West regions have increased in population. This may be a result 
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of a decline in the number of working class positions available in the 
northern regions. It may be that the South and West are displacing 
workers to jobs that are available in these regions. The emphasis in 
the Northern regions on industry and agriculture has created problems 
when automation and technology reduces the need for laborers. These 
individuals may have been pulled to the South and West for jobs in the 
oil and computer industries. 
Descriptive statistics for religious affiliations 
In Table 3, the same descriptive statistics are presented as in 
Table 2, but this time broken down by religious affiliation. The 
members of liberal Protestant (LPROT) groups have the highest mean 
age, while those in OTHER religions are the youngest. These age 
differences will be discussed in more detail when APC effects are 
examined in the next section. 
The gender distributions of the religious groups are fairly 
similar with the exception of the OTHER category, which shows a 
considerably higher percentage of males than in the other groups. In 
fact, the OTHER group is the only one in which males outnumber 
females. This is consistent with women's tendency to be more 
religious than men, leaving males more open to reject traditional 
religion or to reject religion outright. 
Of the five religious groups, the CPROT group initially appears 
to be the most racially integrated, with nearly one-fourth of the 
respondents in this category being nonwhite. In contrast, three of 
the other four groups have less than 10% nonwhite membership, with the 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by religious affiliation 
Religious Affiliations 
Variable RCATH LPROT MPROT CPROT OTHER 
Age (mean) 44.44 49.00 47.62 46.75 43.53 
% Male 43.91 40.63 41.89 41.56 52.59 
% White 93.54 90.60 87.53 76.94 92.26 
Marital Status 
Single 
Divorced 
Others 
11.12 
6.16 
82.72 
8.76 
6.91 
84.33 
9.44 
7.15 
83.41 
7.99 
6.65 
85.35 
14.97 
10.03 
75.00 
% Having Children 
Under Age 18 48.66 39.69 42.51 45.44 41.19 
Education 
Less Than HS 
HS+ 
College+ 
30.25 
55.68 
14.07 
26.90 
53.74 
19.36 
31.16 
52.88 
15.96 
50.83 
42.22 
6.96 
23.80 
50.76 
25.45 
% Working Class 52.07 47.56 52.04 68.32 46.81 
Income (mean in 
1967 dollars) 8969 8718 8386 6367 9222 
Region 
Northeast 
North Central 
South 
West 
40.69 
27.03 
16.73 
15.55 
21.07 
30.33 
34,76 
13.84 
15.36 
40.06 
28.97 
15.61 
7.21 
20.28 
62.58 
9.93 
22.91 
23.36 
20.87 
32.86 
N 4920 3780 4084 4775 3302 
Note. See Appendix C for a breakdown of the religious affiliations. 
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MPROT group being 12.5% nonwhite. Studies cited in the second 
chapter, however, indicate that the largest number of Black 
respondents can be found in conservative Protestant denominations 
which are almost solely Black in membership. Thus, the integration 
that seems to exist at the aggregate level for the CPROT group masks 
segregation at the denomination and church levels. 
Given the traditional Christian emphasis on the sanctity of 
marriage, it is not surprising that the OTHER group of affiliations 
contains the largest percentage of both single and divorced 
respondents. Also expected is that the Catholic churches have the 
lowest number of divorced respondents (followed by the CPROT group), 
given the emphasis in Catholicism on lifelong marriage. It is curious 
that there are slightly more single and divorced respondents in the 
MPROT group than in the LPROT group, since one would expect that the 
more liberal attitudes of the LPROT group would be attractive to these 
individuals. However, it may be that those who are in liberal 
Protestant churches and who divorce (or remain single) are more likely 
to move away from religion altogether, and thus may be swelling the 
ranks of respondents in the OTHER category. 
The within-affiliation percentages of respondents with children 
under age 18 can also be easily accounted for. The RCATH group (with 
its conservative views on birth control, abortion, etc.) exhibits a 
relatively higher percentage of respondents with children under 18. A 
similar argument can be used to explain the higher-than-average 
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percentage in the CPROT group. In general, the more liberal the group 
is on family planning issues, the lower this percentage will be. 
In the case of the socioeconomic status variables, there is a 
great deal of consistency. For all three (namely EDUC, CLASS, and 
INC67) higher status respondents tend to be associated with OTHER 
affiliations, while lower status respondents are associated with the 
CPROT group. Respondents who indicated OTHER affiliations are 
characterized by the greatest percentage of college graduates, the 
lowest percentage of working class respondents, and have the highest 
mean income. The CPROT group not only has the lowest percentage of 
college graduates (and the greatest percentage of respondents with 
less than a high school diploma), they are also predominantly working 
class with low incomes. 
Finally, an examination of regional distribution shows that each 
religious group tends to be concentrated in one or two regions. The 
CPROT group, for example, is primarily located in the south. Nearly 
two-thirds of all conservative Protestants are in this region. The 
RCATH group is concentrated in the northeast, the MPROT group in the 
north central, and the OTHER group in the west. Liberal Protestants 
are most numerous in both the south and north central regions. 
APC differences in reliqious affiliation 
In this section graphic presentations of 22 years of changing 
religious preferences will be described and illustrated. The next two 
chapters explore the extent to which these changes are due to 
statistically significant period effects, cohort effects, age effects. 
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or some combination of these effects. The chapters will also examine 
the usefulness of test variables in explaining these APC effects--an 
examination to be "suspended" for the duration of this chapter. We 
begin with a consideration of the shifts in religious preference 
associated with period. 
Period shifts Figure 5 depicts the log odds of an American's 
affiliation with each of the five religious groups during each year of 
the surveys. It should be noted that these log odds (actually, 
logistic regression coefficients) have been adjusted for variations in 
reported religious affiliation that might be due to the wording 
changes discussed earlier. For four religious groups, the effects for 
two of the survey years were constrained to be equal to render the 
logistic regression model identified. The effects constrained to be 
equal were for 1964 and 1966 for the LPROT and OTHER groups and for 
1970 and 1972 for MPROT and CPROT. It was not necessary to do this 
for RCATH since this group was apparently not effected by either of 
the wording changes. 
Figure 5 reveals a nearly linear decline in the log odds of an 
American's affiliating with the liberal Protestant group. In 1964, 
the log odds of affiliating with liberal Protestantism was nearly the 
same as that of Catholicism, with the LPROT group being the third 
largest group in the survey. By 1986, the log odds of affiliation 
with the LPROT group had declined to the point that they had become 
the second smallest group. This is in contrast to the findings of 
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Stark and Clock (1968), who found liberal Protestantism to be gaining 
members at the expense of conservative Protestantism. 
There is also a decline in the log odds of American's affiliation 
with moderate Protestant denominations, although not as precipitous a 
decline as that of the liberal Protestants. However, this group does 
go from being the largest group in 1964 to being third largest in 
1985, behind the RCATH and CPROT groups. The largest portion of the 
MPROT decline occurs during the mid-1970s, after which a stabilization 
seems to occur. 
The conservative Protestant group is one of two groups showing an 
increase in log odds of affiliation over time. In comparison to the 
other groups, it goes from being the second smallest group in 1964 to 
being the second largest in 1986. Only the RCATH group is larger in 
the final survey year. This lends some support to Kelley's (1977) 
prediction that conservative Protestant denominations would grow 
because liberal Protestantism was unable to provide answers to the 
ultimate questions of life. 
The group showing the largest increase in log odds of affiliation 
is OTHER. While it does not increase in rank (except briefly in 
1980), the log odds of American's affiliating with this "group" 
increase from -1.98 to -1.77, with a peak of -1.59 in 1980. Note that 
the largest rise in numbers of this group corresponds in time to the 
decrease noted for the moderate Protestants. Also there 
is a decrease in the log odds of affiliation with the OTHER group in 
the 1980s. This lends some support to the work of Roof and Hadaway 
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(1979), who argued that people were switching from major mainline 
churches (moderate Protestantism) to liberal mainline churches and 
"fringe" groups (OTHER) in the mid-1970s. 
Of the five groups, the Catholics show the least change over 
time. There are, however, two points at which shifts occur. The 
first of these is the drop in log odds from 1968 to 1970. Note that 
the log odds rebound in 1972 to a higher point than 1968. Whatever 
the cause of this shift, it was apparently a temporary one. The 
second change is an increase in log odds from 1982 to 1984. Again the 
shift appears to be temporary, since the log odds drop in 1986. Other 
than these two shifts, the overall trend for the RCATH group is of 
consistency. The Catholic church has consistently maintained its 
membership levels. 
Cohort shifts A graphic representation of cohort differences 
in religious affiliation can be found in Figure 6. As with the 
previous graph, all the computer runs used to generate data points for 
this figure include the word change dummy variables as controls. 
Unlike the previous runs, there was no need to constrain two cohorts 
to be equal, since the logistic regression models are identified 
without doing so. 
Once again the most dramatic shifts occur within the LPROT and 
OTHER groups. The liberal Protestant numbers drop quickly beginning 
with cohorts in the early 1940s and ending in the late 1950s. A 
concurrent increase can be found in the OTHER group. It would appear 
that these cohorts, by dropping out of LPROT denominations in favor of 
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OTHER groups, may be responsible for the decline of liberal 
Protestantism. This possibility will be discussed further in upcoming 
chapters. 
The decline among recent cohorts also occurs within the moderate 
Protestant group, although to a lesser degree. The conservative 
Protestants appear to draw members from all cohorts equally, with the 
possible exception of an increase in log odds of affiliation among the 
most recent cohorts. 
The relationship of RCATH affiliation to cohort is unusual in 
that the log odds of American's affiliating with Catholic 
denominations increases as one moves from the "1905 and earlier" 
cohort to the mid-1920s cohorts, at which point the log odds plateau. 
It is the only group in which a steady pattern of increase, decline, 
or stability does not exist. 
It should be noted that the log odds for the most recent cohorts 
(as well as the older cohorts) are based on smaller numbers of 
respondents than those in the middle cohorts. In the case of the 
recent cohorts, this is because these cohorts reached age 21 only in 
recent survey years. The older cohorts are smaller due to attrition 
caused by death, disease, etc. Therefore, although large shifts seen 
for these cohorts may reveal trends, they may also be related to 
error. A similar problem exists for the older age categories in 
Figure 7. 
Age shifts  A graphic representation of  age differences in 
rel igious aff i l iation can be found in Figure 7.  As with the previous 
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Figure 7.  Roman Catholic (RC),  Liberal  Protestant (LP),  Moderate 
Protestant (MP),  Conservative Protestant (CP),  and 
Other (OT) Religious Affi l iation in the U.S.  by Age 
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graphs, word change dummy variables were used as controls in the 
generation of data points. 
The log odds of American's affiliating with liberal Protestant 
denominations increases with age, while the log odds of affiliation 
with the OTHER group decreases with age. This is to be expected, 
since the young people of recent cohorts have left the one group for 
the other. But these trends could also signify a change as people get 
older, a change whereby as people age they are more likely to leave 
the OTHER group and join the LPROT group. If this were true, then one 
would predict the decline in affiliations with liberal Protestant 
denominations to end, and an increase to occur as people from "other" 
religions age and return to liberal Protestant churches. 
The only other group to show shifts across age groups is the 
RCATH category. It, like the OTHER group, shows a decline in 
affiliation with increasing age. The MPROT and CPROT groups are 
relatively equally distributed across age groups. Whether the 
increases or decreases noted constitute age effects will be evaluated 
in the next chapter, where the relative impacts of the APC effects 
will be calculated. If they do remain, then the task will be to see 
if test variables can be used to explain why specific age, period, and 
cohort effects are occurring. The procedure used to make these 
determinations is described in the following section. 
Application of the Elaboration Model 
While Figures 5-7 afford a chance to see what might be happening 
with regard to APC shifts in religious affiliation, they do not help 
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in understanding why these shifts are occurring. The first step in 
making sense of the shifts involves logistic regressions in which the 
five religious preference dummies are regressed on the age (A), period 
(P), and cohort (C) dummies. The religious preference measures are 
first regressed on each of the three types of effects individually, 
then against the three possible two-effect combinations, yielding a 
total of 30 (5x[3+3]) regressions. Age, period, and cohort dummies 
were not all simultaneously estimated, since such a model would be 
overidentified. (Combinations of two of the effects include the third 
effect by default, since the value of the third variable can be 
calculated using values of the two variables that are included.) By 
subtracting likelihood-ratio chi-squares (L^) for the single-type-of-
effect models from those of the two-effects models, it is possible to 
determine the relative significance of one effect over and above 
another. For example, if the model of Catholic affiliation on 
p 
combined age and period yields an L that is statistically 
significantly higher than that for the model of Catholic affiliation 
on age, then it can be said that period accounts for a significant 
amount of Catholic affiliation beyond that accounted for by age. 
p 
Comparing the six models for each affiliation yields six changes in L 
for each of the five types of religious preference (30 changes in 
total): the effects of period over age, cohort over age, age over 
period, cohort over period, age over cohort, and period over cohort. 
The purpose of  this  f irst  step is  to f ind out whether there are 
significant APC effects,  what they are,  and whether they correspond to 
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those reported in the literature. The "rule of thumb" which was used 
to determine which effects are significant is that if (1) other 
effects do not add significantly given the effect and (2) if the 
effect does add significantly over and above the other two effects, 
then it is concluded that the effect corresponds to a real age, 
period, or cohort fluctuation in U.S. adults' religious affiliations. 
Only these effects are included in subsequent analyses. It should be 
noted that such a methodolgy yields APC differences that are 
atheoretical observations that call for theoretical explanations. The 
remaining steps provide the theoretical explanations for these 
differences. 
The second step involves the use of crosstabulation and analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) to determine whether any significant associations 
exist between the test variables and age, period, and cohort. The 
purpose of this step is to find those test variables that have the 
potential to explain APC effects on religious affiliation. The only 
way that a test variable can be useful in explaining APC effects is if 
that variable varies significantly across distinct ages, periods, 
and/or cohorts. (See earlier discussion on "explanation.") 
Step three again makes use of logistic regression with the 
religious affiliation dummies as dependent variables. In this step, 
however, independent variables consist of those significant APC 
effects found in the first step plus those individual test variables 
found to be significantly related to these APC effects in the second 
step. For example, if significant period effects in Catholic 
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affiliation (RCATH) are found, and if income (INC67) differs 
significantly by period, then a logistic regression would be performed 
with RCATH as the dependent variable, and with period dummies and 
INC67 as independent variables. The values of for these models are 
then compared to those of models without the test variables added. If 
the change in between the two models is statistically significant, 
then the test variable can be said to explain part of the ARC effect 
on religious affiliation. All possible combinations that meet the 
previous criteria are modeled. 
The purpose of step three is to determine which test variables 
are explanatory of ARC effects on religious affiliation. By combining 
the ARC effect with the test variable in a logistic regression on 
religious affiliation, it is possible to discover those test variables 
that are involved in forming ARC fluctuations in religious 
affiliation. It can thus be shown that the underlying relationship is 
between the test variables and religious affiliation, and that the ARC 
effects are (at least in part) artifacts of shifts in test variables. 
(See Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of the first three 
steps.) 
The next step is to model logistic regressions with the religious 
affiliation dummies as dependent variables, and with all test 
variables deemed statistically significant in the previous step as 
independent variables. Some test variables are. dropped at this stage 
due to collinearity among the test variables. While these models do 
indicate which test variables are important in explaining ARC-related 
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fluctuations in religious affiliation, they do not indicate whether 
these APC shifts are spurious consequences of changes in these test 
variables. 
To show that it is changes in the test variables that explain the 
APC-related shifts ih denominational preference, more analysis is 
required. First, each test variable is used as a dependent variable 
in a regression model, with the period and cohort dummies as 
independent variables. For each non-missing value of the test 
variable an estimated value (equal to the mean value on the test 
variable based on the variable's marginal APC distributions) is 
created based on the regression results. These estimated variables 
are then used in logistic regression models, with the religious 
affiliation dummies being regressed on those estimated variables 
associated with test variables that were found to have significant 
partial effects in the previous step. The logistic regression 
coefficients from these models may be said to be models that account 
for APC-related fluctuations in religious affiliation in the United 
States from 1964 to 1986. Graphic representations of the estimated 
log odds of religious affiliation by age, period, and cohort (such as 
those of Figures 5, 6, and 7) are presented to illustrate how well the 
estimated variables explain APC shifts in denominational preference. 
In addition, a comparison is made of logistic regression 
coefficients associated with the same test variables between the two 
sets of logistic regressions (of religious affiliation indicators on 
test and estimated test variables) outlined in the previous paragraph. 
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This comparison is necessary since some test variables, while being 
helpful in explaining individuals' motivations toward a religious 
group, may not be helpful in explaining differences in affiliation 
across ages, periods, or cohorts. It is also possible that the 
coefficients may differ in magnitude, such that a specific factor may 
be even better at explaining APC shifts in affiliation than individual 
motivations toward specific denominational groups. A third 
possibility is that the coefficients may differ in direction, so that 
what is a positive factor at the individual level becomes a negative 
factor at the APC level. A comparison of these coefficients will 
prove very useful in distinguishing those factors that are primarily 
related to individual motivations toward denominational preferences 
from those that explain APC shifts in denominational preference. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter the results of the data analysis are presented. 
Interpretation of the results will be reserved for the next chapter. 
Tables are presented in an order that corresponds to the sequence of 
statistical techniques described in the final section of the previous 
chapter as well as in Appendix B. The first part of the chapter deals 
with analyses of affiliations with the five religious groups described 
in the previous chapter and specified in Appendix C. The second part 
contains the results of an analysis conducted on two groupings within 
the OTHER category. This second analysis is motivated by issues 
raised among the findings of the first analysis. 
Initial Analysis 
Age, period, and cohort effects 
The first step in the data analysis is the examination of age, 
period, and cohort effects associated with the five religious groups. 
Table 4 presents the results of logistic regressions using the 
religious groups as dependent variables, and all possible single 
effect and two-effect combinations of age, period, and cohort as 
independent variables. 
For both the RCATH and LPROT groups, all of the models are 
statistically significant {p<.05) with the exception of when period 
variables alone constitute the independent variables. The MPROT 
models are different, since only those models which include period 
variables (either alone or in combination with age or cohort 
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Table 4. Likelihood-ratio chi-squares (L ) for logistic regressions 
of five types of religious affiliation on age (A), period 
(P), and cohort (C) 
Model Effects Estimated d.f. L^ P 
RCATH 
(1)  [A]  
(2)  [P]  
(3)  [C]  
(4)  [A] [P]  
(5)  [A] [C]  
(6)  [P] [C]  
LPROT 
(1)  [A]  
(2)  [P]  
(3)  [C]  
(4)  [A] [P]  
(5)  [A] [C]  
(6)  [P] [C]  
MPROT 
(1)  [A]  
(2)  [P]  
(3)  [C]  
(4)  [A] [P]  
(5)  [A] [C]  
(6)  [P] [C]  
CPROT 
(1)  [A]  
(2)  [P]  
(3)  [C]  
(4)  [A] [P]  
(5)  [A] [C]  
(6)  [P1[C]  
30 85.90 <.0001 
10 16.19 .0943 
30 88.40 <.0001 
40 101.62 <.0001 
60 112.94 <.0001 
40 100.49 <.0001 
30 96.96 <.0001 
10 13.43 .2006 
30 114.07 <.0001 
40 109.91 <.0001 
60 131.89 <.0001 
40 120.29 <.0001 
30 39.21 .1211 
9 24.23 .0040 
30 40.33 .0986 
39 62.38 .0101 
60 63.28 .3614 
39 57.48 .0285 
30 26.85 .6311 
9 14.95 .0923 
30 22.10 .8504 
39 42.30 .3305 
60 48.10 .8656 
39 36.44 .5872 
142 
Table 4. Continued 
Model Effects Estimated d.f. 
OTHER 
1 [A] 30 97.78 <.0001 [P] 10 43.65 <.0001 [C] 30 125.85 <.0001 [A][P] 40 138.81 <.0001 [A][C] 60 157.59 <.0001 [P][C] 40 148.17 <.0001 
Note. All statistics have been adjusted for a marginal period effect 
potentially due to a 1970 change in the wording of the 
religious affiliation item. Statistics for MPROT and CPROT 
have been adjusted for a marginal period effect potentially due 
to a 1972 change in wording which distinguished Southern 
Baptists from other Baptists. Values of L have been 
multiplied by .667 per argument presented by Davis (1982). See 
text for details. 
variables) are statistically significant. The CPROT and OTHER models 
are in complete contrast, since none of the CPROT models is 
significant, while all of the models for OTHER are significant. 
It should be noted that the degrees of freedom for the models 
which include period variables under MPROT and CPROT are less than 
those same models for the other three groups. This is due to the word 
change regarding Baptists begun in 1972 (discussed in the previous 
chapter). While the statistics for RCATH, LPROT, and OTHER are 
adjusted for the word change of 1970 only, the MPROT and CPROT 
statistics are adjusted for both word changes. .As a result, the 
degrees of freedom associated with the models using period in MPROT 
143 
and CPROT are one less than the equivalent models for the other three 
groups. 
While this first table provides some useful insight into what is 
happening, the second step attempts to reduce the number of age, 
period, or cohort models necessary in further analysis. This is not 
meant to be simply a time-saving measure. Rather, it is used to 
determine whether there is in reality an age effect (or period or 
cohort effect) associated with RCATH membership, or if this is just an 
artifact of the other effects. 
In Table 5 results are presented for the testing of the joint 
effects of age, period, and cohort on religious affiliation. By 
comparing the two-effect models with single effect models, one can 
ascertain the impact of one effect conditioned on the other. For 
example, a comparison of a model.including both age and cohort 
variables with one containing only age variables reveals the impact of 
p 
cohort conditioned on age. If the change in L is significant, then 
cohort effects may be real. If the change is not significant, then 
there is evidence that no real cohort effect exists. 
By examining Table 5, it is possible to determine which of the 
ARC effects merit further attention in subsequent analyses. The 
simplest case is that of the CPROT models. In this instance there are 
2 
no significant changes in L associated with the six comparisons. 
This is  consistent with the results  in Table 4,  and seems to indicate 
that there are no statist ically significant ARC effects on CPROT 
rel igious aff i l iation.  Since the purpose of  the research analysis  is  
Table 5. Test for the joint effects of age, period, and cohort on 
religious affiliation in the U.S., 1964-1986 
RCATH LPROT 
Models Compared df L2 P L2 P 
Effects Conditioned on Aae 
(1) vs. (4) 
(1) vs. (5) 
10 
30 
15.72 
27.04 
.108 
.621 
12.95 
34.93 
.227 
.245 
Effects Conditioned on Period 
(2) vs. (4) 
(2) vs. (6) 
30 
30 
85.43 
84.30 
<.001 
<.001 
96.48 
106.86 
<.001 
<.001 
Effects Conditioned on Cohort 
(3) vs. (5) 
(3) vs. (6) 
30 
10 
24.54 
12.09 
.747 
.279 
17.82 
6.22 
.961 
.797 
^Degrees of freedom are 9 due to 1972 wording change. See Table 4 
and text for details. 
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MPROT CPROT OTHER 
L2 P 
CV
J 
P L2 P 
23.17* .006 15.45* .079 41.03 <.001 
24.07 .769 21.25 .880 59.81 .001 
38.15 .146 27.35 .605 95.16 <.001 
33.25 .312 21.49 .872 104.52 <.001 
22.95, .817 26.00, .675 31.74 .380 
17.15* .046 14.34* .111 22.32 .014 
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to explain APC differences, the CPROT group was excluded from any 
subsequent analyses. 
Another simple case is that for MPROT affiliation. In this case, 
two of the comparisons yield significant changes in L^. The first 
assesses the impact of period conditioned on age, the second the 
impact of period conditioned on cohort. Since both indicate that 
period adds significantly to a model, it would appear safe to assume 
that period effects are indicated. Additional evidence can be found 
in the "effects conditioned on period" rows. Neither age nor cohort 
adds significantly to a model containing period variables. Again, 
this is consistent with the results in Table 4. Subsequent analysis 
will focus only on period effects associated with MPROT religious 
affiliation. 
In the remaining cases it was not possible to reduce to one (or 
no) effect. For both the RCATH and LPROT groups, the pattern is the 
same. Period effects can be assumed to be nonexistent, since both age 
and cohort add significantly to period, while period does not add 
significantly to either age or cohort. The remaining evidence seems 
to indicate that both age and cohort effects exist in association with 
RCATH and LPROT religious affiliation. 
The most difficult case is for OTHER religious affiliation. The 
p 
only comparison which yields an insignificant increase in L is when 
age is added to cohort. In all other comparisons the increase is 
statistically significant. Age effects are eliminated from 
consideration in subsequent analyses, because age has no impact when 
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conditioned by cohort whereas cohort has an impact when conditioned by 
age. Thus, it was felt that cohort was the better of the two in 
relation to OTHER affiliation. Period effects will also be analyzed, 
since they have an impact when conditioned on either age or cohort. 
As a result of the findings in Table 5, seven models of APC 
effects on religious affiliation will be examined (rather than the 15 
possible such models). These include: age effects on RCATH and 
LPROT, period effects on MPROT and OTHER, and cohort effects on RCATH, 
LPROT, and OTHER. The CPROT group will not be examined further, since 
no significant APC effects were found. 
Test variables and explanation 
The next step involves determining which of the test variables 
are potentially able to explain APC differences in religious 
affiliation. Table 6 presents the measures of association between the 
test variables and age, period, and cohort. It should be noted that 
in this table the original REGION variable was used instead of NEAST, 
SOUTH, and WEST. Also, instead of SINGLE and DIVORCE, MARITAL was 
used, after it was recoded into three categories—single, divorced, 
and others. 
All the significance tests reported in Table 6 are significant 
with the exception of the test for an association between CLASS and 
age. Thus, because they each covary with age (CLASS excepted), 
period, and cohort, the test variables show the potential to explain 
APC differences in religious affiliation. For example, cohort 
differences may be explained by differences between cohorts in level 
Table 6. Tests of significance for associations between test 
variables and age, period, or cohort 
Age Period 
Test n 0 
Variables F/X? df P F/X? df P 
EDUC 1844.75 60 <.0001 481.53 22 <.0001 
CLASS 25.82 30 .6843 38.79 11 <.0001 
MARITAL 1208.19 60 <.0001 246.10 22 <.0001 
KIDS 5902.72 30 <.0001 118.14 11 <.0001 
REGION 131.23 90 .0030 88.30 33 <.0001 
INC67 95.51* 30 <.0001 9.38* 11 .0001 
Note. Except where otherwise noted, all measures of association are 
chi-square. Cases were weighted by .667 per argument presented 
by Davis (1982). See text for details. 
^Value is that of F from ANOVA. 
Cohort 
X
 ro
 
df P 
2249.51 60 <.0001 
53.78 30 .0049 
1196.28 60 <.0001 
4090.31 30 <.0001 
163.32 90 <.0001 
76.76* 30 <.0001 
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of education, social class, marital status, etc. The same may be said 
for age and period differences. 
But the question that remains is whether all or only some of these 
test variables explain APC differences. To check this it was 
necessary to perform logistic regressions with the religious 
affiliation variables as dependent and the appropriate combination of 
APC with test variables as the independent variables. For example, 
since there are statistically significant age effects associated with 
RCATH affiliation, one logistic regression has RCATH as the dependent 
variable with the age dummy variables and EDUC as independent 
variables. 
The results of this series of logistic regressions is reported in 
Table 7. With the exception of REGION, which is a composite of the 
three region dummy variables (NEAST, SOUTH, and WEST), only one test 
variable is added into the model each time. All of the values of L 
in Table 7 are statistically significant. This does not mean that 
these variables all explain APC differences. To determine this, one 
must look at the change in L as a result of adding the test variables 
to the model. If there is a significant increase in L , then the 
variable is explaining APC difference(s). 
Table 8 indicates the increase in associated with each of the 
models from Table 7. These values may not equal the differences 
between values in Table 4 and Table 7, because the number of cases may 
differ due to missing values in the test variables. The most extreme 
illustration of this is that of INC67, where 1411 cases are 
Table 7. Likelihood-ratio chi-squares for logistic regressions of 
religious affiliations on age, period, and cohort plus test 
variables 
Age 
Test 
Variable(s) Added N df RCATH LPROT 
EDUC 20800 31 87. 37 255.27 
CLASS 20009 - -
KIDS 20825 31 94. 37 100.14 
REGION^ 20861 33 1123. 52 116.75 
INC67 19450 31 114. 40 125.83 
SINGLE 20861 31 87. 68 97.38 
DIVORCE 20861 31 97. 15 96.91 
Note. All values have been adjusted to account for a wording change in 
the religious affiliation question beginning in 1970. Values 
for MPROT are also adjusted-to account for a wording change 
begun in 1972. Values of L have been multiplied by .667 per 
argument presented by Davis (1982). See text for details. 
^Degrees of freedom are for MPROT models. Degrees of freedom for 
models in which OTHER is the dependent variable are one larger 
than those listed in this column, because only one word change 
dummy was included in these models. (See note above.) 
^REGION is added by using three dummy variables (NEAST, SOUTH, 
WEST) to distinguish the four regions. See text for details. 
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Period Cohort 
df^ MPROT OTHER df RCATH LPROT OTHER 
10 25.57 223.32 31 90.53 278.25 271.88 
10 28.59 88.52 31 89.98 168.62 170.21 
10 24.76 47.66 31 96.55 117.85 160.03 
12 283.72 542.04 33 1133.42 133.81 614.15 
10 22.22 97.43 31 113.44 140.36 179.43 
10 27.95 92.37 31 89.51 114.01 146.09 
10 24.60 63.69 31 99.62 114.03 146.92 
Table 8. Increase in due to the addition of test variable(s) 
Test 
Variable(s) Added N 
EDUC 20800 
CLASS 20009 
KIDS 20825 
REGION 20861 
INC67 19450 
SINGLE 20861 
DIVORCE 20861 
Age 
df RCATH LPROT 
1 0.72 158.82** 
1 
1 8.51** 2.98 
3 1037.62** 19.79** 
1 33.25** 37.56** 
1 1.83 0.47 
1 11.30** 0.00 
Note. See Appendix B for a discussion of the statistical testing 
procedure used to determine appropriate probability levels. 
Values of L listed in this table may not equal the differences 
between values in Table 4 and Table 7 due to a change in N 
caused by missing values. See text for details. 
*p < .05 jointly with significance tests performed in Table 6. 
**p < .01 jointly with significance tests performed in Table 6. 
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Period Cohort 
MPROT OTHER RCATH LPROT OTHER 
1.84 180.56** 0.99 164.60** 145.93** 
4.46 47.37** 5.97* 56.42** 50.40** 
0.51 5.03* 8.22** 4.24 35.81** 
259.49** 498.39** 1045.02** 19.74** 488.30** 
0.60 56.78** 31.27** 34.11** 62.79** 
3.74 48.74** 1.16 0.00 20.30** 
0.39 20.06** 11.27** 0.02 21.13** 
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lost to missing values. Because the value of is tied to the number 
of cases, it is not legitimate to compare the values for this variable 
in Table 7 to those in Table 4. To compensate, new baseline models 
were estimated in which all cases missing on the particular test 
variable were omitted. 
The results reported in Table 8 show that not all the test 
variables are useful in explaining APC differences in religious 
affiliation. There are differences in what variables effect 
affiliation with which religious groups. Catholic affiliation (RCATH) 
differences by age and cohort are explained by the following 
variables: KIDS, REGION, INC67, DIVORCE, and CLASS (the last only for 
differences by cohort). Age and cohort differences in LPROT 
affiliation are explained by EDUC, REGION, INC67, and CLASS (again, 
the last only for cohort differences). Period differences in MPROT 
affiliation are explained by only the three REGION variables, while 
period and cohort differences in OTHER affiliation are explained by 
all test variables. 
The next step of the initial analysis is to fit together the best 
logistic regression models of religious affiliation and test 
variables, since it is these models that clarify individual 
motivations for choosing a religious affiliation. Baseline models 
were derived by modeling the religious affiliation variables with the 
test variables that were found in Table 8 to vary across ages, 
periods, and cohorts. Test variables were added to and removed from 
the model until the most parsimonious model was achieved. 
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Significance tests for these models are found in Table 9. In 
p 
addition, the change in L and probability levels are given for each 
possible addition or subtraction from the baseline model. All of the 
significant test variables from Table 8 may not be in the baseline 
models due to problems of collinearity among variables. Table 10 
presents measures of association between the test variables and will 
be referred to in explaining the absence of previously significant 
test variables. (Note: No models are presented for MPROT, since only 
the REGION variables were useful in explaining ARC differences in 
MPROT affiliation.) 
The baseline model for RCATH includes the three REGION variables 
(NEAST, SOUTH, and WEST), KIDS, and INC67. Neither CLASS nor DIVORCE 
add significantly to this baseline model, despite the fact that they 
are indicated as significant in Table 8. In the case of CLASS, this 
is most likely due to the strong association between INC67 and CLASS 
(eta = .310, p<.001) resulting in their both not being needed in the 
RCATH baseline model. DIVORCE is also excluded, probably because of 
its associations with INC67, NEAST, and WEST. The collinearity with 
the regional variables is particularly notable, since divorce is 
negatively associated with living in the north east U.S. (where 
Catholicism is strongest), while it is positively associated with 
living in the western states (where there is a smaller proportion of 
Catholics). (See Table 10 for more detail on associations among test 
variables.) 
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Table 9. Tests of fit for logistic regression models of religious 
affiliations on test variables 
Model L2 df ILB - Idfg - df^l P 
RCATH 
1. Baseline: 
[R][K][I] 1009.27 5 - - .001 
2. Add [C] 1009.43 6 0.16 1 .689 
3. Add [D] 1011.40 6 2.13 1 .202 
4. Delete [R] 74.97 2 934.30 3 <.001 
5. Delete [K] 985.15 4 24.12 1 <.001 
6. Delete [I] 990.60 4 18.67 1 <.001 
LPROT 
1. Baseline: 
[E][R][C] 113.71 5 - <.001 
2. Add [I] 113.71 6 0.00 1 1.0 
3. Delete [E] 77.11 4 36.60 1 <.001 
4. Delete [R] 80.70 2 33.01 3 <.001 
5. Delete [C] 91.09 4 22.62 1 <.001 
OTHER 
1. Baseline: 
[R][E][I][S][D] 668.33 7 - <.001 
2. Add [C] 670.65 8 2.32 1 .129 
3. Add [K] 671.57 8 3.24 1 .072 
4. Delete [R] 283.09 4 385.24 3 <.001 
5. Delete [E] 598.57 6 69.76 1 <.001 
6. Delete [I] 656.29 6 12.04 1 <.001 
7. Delete [S] 623.17 6 45.23 1 <.001 
8. Delete [D] 645.44 6 28.98 1 <.001 
Note. R = Region dummies (NEAST, SOUTH, WEST), K = KIDS, I = INC67, 
C = CLASS, D = DIVORCE, E = EDUC, and S = SINGLE. DIVORCE and 
SINGLE were changed from effect-coded to dummy-coded variables 
for the tests performed in this table. Values of L are 
adjusted by a factor of .667 per argument presented by Davis 
(1982). See text for details. 
Table 10. Associations among the test variables 
REGION 
EDUC CLASS KIDS NEAST SOUTH WEST 
CLASS .352* 
(<.001) 
1.0 
KIDS .081* 
(<.001) 
-.042 
(.018) 
1,0 
NEAST .022* 
(.029) 
.072 
(.001) 
.015 
(.466) 
1.0 
SOUTH .106* 
(<.001) 
-.166 
(<.001) 
-.034 
(.062) 
-1.0 
(<.001) 
1.0 
WEST .105* 
(<.001) 
.126 
(<.001) 
-.037 
(.107) 
-1.0 
(<.001) 
-1.0 
(<.001) 
1.0 
INC67 .413^ 
(<.001) 
.307* 
(<.001) 
.173* 
(<.001) 
.031* 
(<.119) 
.125* 
(<.001) 
.070* 
(.002) 
SINGLE^ .135* 
(<.001) 
.084 
(.003) 
-.816 
(<.001) 
.147 
(<.001) 
-.065 
(.030) 
.058 
(.108) 
DIVORCE^ .022* 
(<.001) 
-.155 
(<.001) 
-.021 
(.522) 
-.139 
(.001) 
.030 
(.386) 
.201 
(<.001) 
Note. Except where otherwise noted, all association measures are 
gamma coefficients.. Probability levels are listed in 
parentheses below the coefficients. All cases were weighted by 
.667 per argument presented by Davis (1982). 
*Value given is that of eta from an ANOVA. 
''Value given is that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. 
^Elsewhere in this analysis SINGLE and DIVORCE are effect 
variables. Given the difficulty of interpreting bivariate 
associations between effect variables and dichotomous 
variables, these variables have been coded as dichotomous 
within this table. 
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MARITAL 
INC67 SINGLE DIVORCE 
1 . 0  
.102* 
(< .001)  
.108* 
(<.001)  
1 . 0  
-1 .0  
(<.001) 
1 . 0  
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The LPROT baseline model consists of EDUC, REGION, and CLASS. 
The addition of INC67 to this model does not change L^, suggesting 
that the collinearity of INC67 with EDUC and CLASS precludes the use 
of all three in a single logistic regression model. Deleting any of 
the variables from the baseline yields a significant drop in L^. 
The baseline model for OTHER religious affiliation includes 
REGION, EDUC, INC67, SINGLE, and DIVORCE. Adding CLASS or KIDS does 
2 
not make a significant change in L (presumably because of the strong 
association of CLASS with EDUC and INC67, and that of KIDS with 
SINGLE), while deleting any of the baseline variables does 
p 
significantly reduce the value of L . 
Table 11 presents the logistic regression coefficients for these 
models. These coefficients are expressed in log odds. Thus, they 
represent the increase or decrease in log odds of being in the 
specified religious affiliation for each one-unit increment in a test 
variable (adjusted for the effects of the other test variables). The 
word change variables (WORD, W0RD2) have been added at this point. 
W0RD2 is included only for MPROT, since this word change effected only 
this group and CPROT. The values of the coefficients for these 
variables are as expected. The addition of WORD has a strong negative 
impact on LPROT membership and a positive impact on OTHER, since this 
word change introduced "other religions" as an option. The impact of 
W0RD2 on MPROT membership is also as expected, since the addition of a 
Southern Baptist option would negatively effect moderate Baptist 
affiliation. 
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Table 11. Logistic regression coefficients for religious affiliation 
on test variables 
Test 
Variable(s) Added RCATH LPROT MPROT OTHER 
Intercept -1.389 -1.238 -1.216 -2.070 
(.036) (.034) (.083) (.045) 
EDUC - - - - - .258 - - - - - .327 
(.029) (.034) 
CLASS .228 — — — — — 
(.039) 
KIDS .229 - - - - -
(.036) 
NEAST .998 -.142 -.887 .243 
(.045) (.052) (.052) (.059) 
SOUTH -.787 .006 -.673 -.280 
(.050) (.046) (.043) (.058) 
WEST -.061 -.364 -.579 1.033 
INC67I 
(.053) (.059) (.053) (.056) 
.160 — — — — — — — — — — .153 
(.030) (.037) 
SINGLE .423 
(.055) 
DIVORCE .404 
(.066) 
WORD .147 -.383 -.070 .342 
(.041) (.041) (.080) (.051) 
W0RD2 NA NA -.588 NA 
(.073) 
N 19418 19957 20861 19405 
L2 1042.57 175.78 376.61 717.03 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients. 
^Coefficients and standard errors for INC67 are in log odds 
units per ten thousand dollars of income. 
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The intercept for the RCATH model is -1.389. However, if the 
respondent has children (KIDS=1), then the log odds are higher, since 
the presence of children increases the log odds by .229. The 
coefficient for INC67 indicates that the log odds also increase as 
income increases. The log odds of RCATH affiliation also increase if 
the respondent lives in the northeastern United States (NEAST), 
reflecting the heavier concentration of Catholics in this region. On 
the other hand, living in the southern (SOUTH) or western (WEST) U.S. 
causes the log odds to decrease, though the decrease is largest for 
SOUTH. 
The intercept for the LPROT model is -1.238. The log odds of 
LPROT affiliation increase with increased education (EDUC) and with 
higher social class (CLASS). They decrease if the respondent lives in 
the northeastern or western region of the United States, while the 
effect of southern residence is negligible, indicating that liberal 
Protestants are concentrated in the north central and southern states. 
The model for MPROT is simpler, since only the REGION variables 
were statistically significant in explaining the period differences in 
moderate Protestant affiliation. The coefficients for NEAST, SOUTH, 
and WEST are all negative, indicating the concentration of moderate 
Protestants in the north central United States. 
Finally, the model for OTHER has the lowest intercept (-2.07) of 
the four models in Table 11. The log odds of OTHER affiliation 
increase with higher education, increased income, and single or 
divorced marital status. Respondents in the western United States are 
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most likely to be in this group, followed by northeastern residents. 
Southern respondents are least likely to indicate an OTHER religious 
affiliation. 
The final step involves relating these individual motivations to 
the APC differences in religious affiliation. First, each of the test 
variables was regressed on the combined period and cohort dummies, 
with the estimated values for the test variables saved as new 
variables in the data set. Next, logistic regressions were performed 
with the religious affiliation dummies as dependent variables, while 
the estimated variables just created were used as independent 
variables. In each case, the only estimated variables included in the 
models are ones that correspond to test variables that have nonzero 
p 
slopes in the logistic regressions presented in Table 11, Table 12 
presents the results of these logistic regressions. 
By comparing the results from Table 11 with those in Table 12, it 
is possible to determine which variables are most useful in explaining 
the appropriate age, period, or cohort shifts in each religious group. 
In the discussion to follow the primary focus will be on those factors 
that are significant at the APC level. 
This strategy precludes the possibility of finding significant 
aggregate-level effects that do not have corresponding effects at the 
individual level. Checks for this possibility were explored and were 
found only regarding the log odds of liberal Protestant religious 
affiliation. In particular, when SINGLEHAT, INC67HAT, and KIDSHAT are 
added into the model each has a significant nonzero slope. (Betas are 
-1.453, -0.599, and 0.477 respectively.) However, when this is done 
the slope associated with CLASSHAT drops to nonsignificance. 
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Table 12. Coefficients from logistic regressions of religious 
affiliation on estimated test variables 
Estimated Test 
Variable(s) Added RCATH LPROT MPROT OTHER 
Intercept -1.172 -1.366 -1.164 -1.928 
(.046) (.051) (.083) (.058) 
EDUCHAT — -1.051 — — — — — .551 
(.121) (.270) 
CLASSHAT 2.384 — — — — — 
(.604) 
KIDSHAT .180 
(.115) 
NEASTHAT .951 .527 - .668 .507 
(.787) (.821) (.802) (.931) 
SOUTHHAT .971 -.787 -.834 -.906 
(.813) (.838) (.759) (1.004) 
WESTHAT 2.008 .590 -3.886 1.281 
INC67HAT^ 
(.896) (1.154) (.894) (1.385) 
.579 — — — — — -.588 
(.165) (.208) 
SINGLEHAT — — — — — 1.077 
(.382) 
DIVORCEHAT 1.449 
(1.335) 
WORD -.006 -.196 -.063 .284 
(.056) (.064) (.081) (.070) 
W0RD2 NA NA -.650 NA 
(.075) 
N 19418 19957 20861 19405 
L2 60.07 124.53 134.32 162.94 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients. 
^Coefficients and standard errors for INC67HAT are in log odds 
units per ten thousand dollars of income. 
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Looking first at the RCATH group, we find that being in the 
western U.S. has no significant effect on the log odds of an 
individual choosing Catholic affiliation, when compared to north 
central U.S. residence (Table 11). However, in Table 12 the 
coefficient associated with western residence (WESTHAT) is significant 
and is positive. Thus, at the individual level, it is unimportant 
whether a person lives in the west or north central U.S., as far asthe 
probability of Catholic affiliation is concerned. But (net of other 
effects in the model) individuals from age or cohort groups with a 
higher ratio of western to north central members are more likely to be 
affiliated with Catholic churches than individuals from age or cohort 
groups with a lower ratio of western to north central members. (Note: 
Interpretation of these results—and subsequent results--will be 
suspended until the next chapter.) 
In addition to the change regarding western regional residence, 
the coefficient for the estimated value of income (INC67HAT) remains 
significant and becomes larger in magnitude than the coefficient for 
INC67. This suggests that (holding constant all characteristics 
measured by other variables in the model) individuals from age or 
cohort groups that are higher in income are more likely to be 
affiliated with Catholic churches than individuals from age or cohort 
groups that are lower in income. 
An examination of the LPROT models in Tables 11 and 12 shows two 
major changes occurring. While the value of the coefficient 
associated with education (EDUC) is significantly positive at the 
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individual level, at the age or cohort level the coefficient for 
EDUCHAT is significantly negative. Thus, after controlling for other 
effects in the model, individuals with higher educations are more 
likely to be affiliated with liberal Protestant churches than 
individuals with lower educations. However, given parallel group-
level controls, individuals who are members of highly-educated age or 
cohort groups are less likely to be affiliated with liberal Protestant 
churches than individuals from less educated age or cohort groups. 
The second change involves the social class variables. In this 
case, the magnitude of the coefficient associated with the estimated 
variable (CLASSHAT) is considerably larger than that of the test 
variable (CLASS). This suggests that while upper-middle class 
individuals are more likely than lower-class respondents to affiliate 
with a liberal Protestant church, individuals from age or cohort 
groups with a higher ratio of upper-middle class to lower-class 
members are even more likely to affiliate with LPROT denominations 
than individuals from age or cohort groups with a lower ratio of 
upper-middle to lower-class members. 
There is only one major change between the MPROT models presented 
in Tables 11 and 12. Here the coefficient for the predicted western 
region variable (WESTHAT) is considerably greater in absolute 
magnitude (more negative) than the coefficient for WEST. Thus, 
individuals are more likely to be members of a moderate Protestant 
denomination if they live in the north central U.S. than if they live 
in the western U.S. This relationship is even stronger at the 
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aggregate level, suggesting that individuals are even more likely to 
affiliate with MPROT churches during times when there is a higher 
ratio of north central to western residents than during times when the 
ratio of north central to western residents is lower. 
The OTHER model's in Tables 11 and 12 show several changes. The 
biggest change involves the income variables. The coefficient for 
INC67 is significantly positive, while the coefficient for INC67HAT is 
significantly negative. At the individual level, people (holding 
other independent variables constant) are more likely to affiliate 
with the OTHER group with increasing income. However, at the 
aggregate level the relationship is negative. Thus, net of the other 
modeled effects, individuals are more likely to be affiliated with 
OTHER "churches" during times when incomes are low than during times 
when incomes are high. In addition, given the same controls, 
individuals from lower income cohorts are more likely to be affiliated 
with OTHER "churches" than individuals from higher income cohorts. 
The second change between the OTHER models is associated with 
education. The coefficient for EDUCHAT is greater in magnitude (more 
positive) than that for EDUC. This suggests that individuals are more 
likely to affiliate with OTHER "churches" during times when 
educational levels are higher (or if they belong to a highly educated 
cohort), than during times when educational levels are lower (or if 
they belong to a less educated cohort). 
The last change between the OTHER models in Tables 11 and 12 is 
associated with the marital status variable measuring the number of 
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single respondents. The coefficient for SINGLEHAT is greater in 
magnitude (more positive) than the coefficient for SINGLE. This 
suggests that individuals are more likely to affiliate with OTHER 
"churches" during times when the proportion of single adults in the 
population is higher (or if they belong to a cohort that has a higher 
proportion of single members) than during times when the proportion of 
single adults in the population is lower (or if they belong to a 
cohort that has a lower proportion of single members). 
The last thing to be addressed in this section is how well these 
models can predict the age, period, and cohort effects associated with 
religious affiliation. Figures 8, 9, and 10 present graphic evidence 
to answer this question. In each case, only those APC/religious 
affiliation combinations deemed significant from Table 5 are included 
in these figures (e.g., period effects were only evident for the MPROT 
and OTHER groups). Both the observed log odds (from logistic 
regressions of the religious affiliation dummies on the age, period, 
and cohort dummies) and the estimated log odds (calculated using the 
coefficients and variables from Table 12) are plotted. 
Figure 8 presents the observed and estimated log odds of MPROT 
and OTHER affiliation by survey year (period). Both estimated plots 
follow the general trends of the observed plots--a decline for MPROT, 
an increase for OTHER. However, they both tend to underestimate the 
magnitude of these trends, especially the estimated model for MPROT. 
Figure 9 presents the observed and estimated log odds of RCATH, 
LPROT, and OTHER affiliation by birth cohort. All three estimated 
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plots follow the general trends of the observed plots. Here the 
estimated models fare much better than they did across survey years. 
With the exception of the latter cohorts for LPROT and OTHER, the 
plots associated with the estimated models remain relatively close to 
the observed plots. These latter cohorts are the smallest in number, 
since they were only included in the last few survey years. 
Therefore, the log odds associated with these cohorts are more prone 
to problems with error than the earlier cohorts. 
Observed and estimated log odds of RCATH and LPROT affiliation by 
age are presented in Figure 10. As with the plots for cohort, the 
estimated models do a credible job of predicting the observed log 
odds. The only difference is that both estimated models tend to 
slightly underestimated the trends across age groups. Thus, the 
slopes across the estimated log odds of RCATH and LPROT affiliations 
tend to be flatter in comparison to the respective slpoes across the 
observed log odds of these affiliations. 
In conclusion, the estimated models presented in Table 12 and 
plotted in Figures 8-10 do a reasonable job of predicting the observed 
age, period, and cohort shifts in religious affiliation. The models 
appear especially good at predicting cohort shifts, with age and 
period shifts less well predicted. 
Analysis of OTHER Affiliations 
Unlike the first four religious groups (RCATH, LPROT, MPROT, and 
CPROT), the OTHER group of affiliations consists of a great diversity 
of beliefs. Included in this group are nontraditional Judeo-Christian 
172 
0 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4  
5  
6 
7 
20  2S 30  35  40  45  SO 55  60  65  70  75  80  85  
A G E  
Figure 10. Observed and Estimated Log Odds of Roman Catholic (RC) 
and Liberal Protestant (LP) Religious Affiliation in 
the U.S. by Age 
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religions (e.g..Christian Science), cult groups (e.g., Spiritualism), 
Eastern religions (e.g., Buddhism), as well as atheism and 
agnosticism. It was this OTHER category that showed the greatest 
growth during the 1960's and 1970's. But it remains difficult to 
interpret its growth, given the group's diversity of affiliations. 
Because of this problem, a second set of analyses will be 
performed that focus on these OTHER affiliations. The OTHER group was 
divided into two smaller groups: SECULAR (N=1282) and ESCAPE 
(N=2021). The SECULAR subgroup consists of those respondents who 
indicated they were atheist/agnostic or who had no religious 
preference. The ESCAPE subgroup consists of all the affiliations from 
OTHER not found in the SECULAR category. It is felt that these two 
subgroups differ substantively since the SECULAR group represent those 
escaping from religion, while the ESCAPE group are escaping to 
alternative religious traditions. An examination of these groups may 
provide greater understanding of what caused the growth of the OTHER 
category. 
Age, period, and cohort effects 
As in the initial analysis, the first step involves determining 
which of the APC effects is evident in relationship to the SECULAR and 
ESCAPE groups. Table 13 presents the results of logistic regression 
models with SECULAR and ESCAPE as the dependent variables, and the 
various single and two-effect combinations of age, period, and cohort 
as independent variables. All of the models for the SECULAR group are 
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Table 13. Likelihood-ratio chi-squares (L ) for logistic regressions 
of secular and escape religious affiliations on age (A), 
period (P), and cohort (C) 
Model Effects Estimated d.f. p 
Secular 
(1) [A] 30 177.09 <.001 
(2) [P] 10 49.13 <.001 
(3) [C] 30 215.59 <.001 
(4) [A][P] 40 221.70 <.001 
(5) [A][C] 60 235.52 <.001 
(6) [P][C] 40 236.29 <.001 
Escaoe 
(1) [A] 30 26.72 .638 
(2) [P] 10 20.33 .026 
(3) [C] 30 14.86 .991 
(4) [A][P] 40 47.82 .185 
(5) [A][C] 60 44.78 .929 
(6) [P][C] 40 34.20 .728 
Note. All statistics have been adjusted for a marginal period effect 
potentially due to a 1970 change in the wording of the 
religious affiliation item. Values of L have been multiplied 
by .667 per discussion of Davis (1982). See text for details. 
statistically significant, while only the model which includes period 
effects alone is significant for the ESCAPE group. 
By comparing the models in Table 13, it is again possible to 
determine the relative impact of APC effects, thus reducing subsequent 
analysis to one or two of these effects. Results of these comparisons 
can be found in Table 14. In the case of the ESCAPE group, it is 
possible to limit further analysis to period effects alone. This is 
because period effects add significantly to a model with either age 
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Table 14. Test for the joint effects of age, period, 
secular and escape religious affiliation in 
1986 
and cohort 
the U.S., 
on 
1964-
Secular Escaoe 
Models Compared df L2 P L2 P 
Effects Conditioned on Aae 
(1) vs (4) 
(1) vs (5) 
10 
30 
44.61 
58.43 
<.001 
.001 
21.10 
18.06 
.020 
.958 
Effects Conditioned on Period 
(2) vs (4) 
(2) vs (6) 
30 
30 
172.57 
187.16 
<.001 
<.001 
27.49 
13.87 
.597 
.995 
Effects Conditioned on Cohort 
(3) vs (5) 
(3) vs (6) 
30 
10 
19.93 
20.70 
.918 
.023 
29.92 
19.34 
.470 
.036 
or cohort effects already included, while neither age nor cohort 
effects add significantly to the model with period effects. 
The results for the SECULAR group are more difficult to 
interpret. The pattern is similar to that of the OTHER group in 
Table 5 in that the only nonsignificant change in L is when age 
effects are conditioned on cohort effects. As in the earlier case, 
age effects are dropped from further consideration, because period 
effects add significantly to models with age or cohort effects 
included and cohort effects add significantly to models with age or 
period effects included, but age effects do not add significantly to a 
model with cohort effects included. The similarity of results between 
OTHER and SECULAR suggests that the SECULAR group has a strong 
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influence on the results within the OTHER group, despite its smaller 
size compared to the ESCAPE group. 
Test variables and explanation 
Table 15 presents the results of a series of logistic regressions 
in which SECULAR or ESCAPE is the dependent variable. Independent 
variables include period dummies (and/or cohort for SECULAR) plus a 
single test variable (e.g., EDUC). As in Tables 7 and 8, the models 
Table 15. Likelihood-ratio chi-squares for logistic regressions of 
SECULAR and ESCAPE religious affiliations on period and 
cohort plus test variables 
Period Cohort 
Test 
Variable(s) 
Added N df SECULAR ESCAPE df SECULAR 
EDUC 20800 11 85.70 153.09 31 225.54 
CLASS 20009 11 47.94 107.59 31 210.61 
KIDS 20825 11 55.73 20.18 31 264.87 
REGION* 20861 13 176.33 383.67 33 333.65 
INC67 19450 11 45.72 92.14 31 207.44 
SINGLE 20861 11 122.92 21.81 31 239.71 
DIVORCE 20861 11 69.23 23.29 31 237.43 
Note. All values have been adjusted to account for a marginal period 
effect potentially due to a 1970 change in the wording of the 
religious affiliation item. Values of L were multiplied by 
.667 per discussion of Davis (1982). See text for details. 
^REGION effects were estimated using three dummy variables to 
distinguish the four regions. See text for details. 
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exclude any cases missing a value for the test variable. Thus, for 
some variables, the number of cases (N) drops below the total of 
20,861. All of the models have statistically significant values of 
l2. 
The next step is to compare these models to models without the 
test variables (while ignoring in the latter models data that were 
missing in estimating the former models). The resulting rise (or lack 
p 
of rise) in the value of L caused by adding the test variable 
indicates whether the variable is useful in explaining the period 
and/or cohort effects. The results may be found in Table 16. 
For the SECULAR group there are a number of explanatory factors, 
including the following: EDUC, KIDS, REGION, SINGLE, and DIVORCE. 
For the ESCAPE group the explanatory variables are primarily measures 
of socioeconomic status (EDUC, CLASS, INC67), along with region. The 
distinct differences in SECULAR'S versus ESCAPE'S types of explanatory 
variables suggests that the affiliation process differs greatly 
between these two subgroups of the OTHER category. Thus, the results 
in Table 16 further commend the decision to analyze affiliation with 
each of these subgroups separately. 
Like before, the next step is to determine the best model for 
SECULAR and ESCAPE using only jointly significant test variables from 
Table 16. When this is done, the only variable with significant 
effects in Table 16, but excluded from the model for SECULAR 
affiliation, is KIDS (see Table 17). Adding KIDS to the baseline 
model only increases the value of L^ by 0.75 (p=.386). The other 
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Table 16. Increase in L^ due to the addition of test variable(s) 
Test 
Variable(s) 
Added N df 
Period 
SECULAR ESCAPE 
Cohort 
SECULAR 
EDUC 20800 1 37.33** 133.85** 11.83** 
CLASS 20009 1 1.47 89.14** 0.79 
KIDS 20825 1 7.21* 0.35 51.68** 
REGION 20861 3 127.20** 363.34** 118.06** 
INC67 19450 1 1.02 69.71** 1.38 
SINGLE 20861 1 73.82** 1.49 24.23** 
DIVORCE 20861 1 20.13** 2.97 21.95** 
Note. See Appendix D for a discussion of the statistical testing 
procedure used to determine appropriate probability levels. 
Values of L listed in this table may not equal the differences 
between values in Table 13 and Table 15 due to a change in N 
caused by missing values. See text for details. 
* p < .05 jointly with significance tests performed in Table 6. 
** p < .01 jointly with significance tests performed in Table 6. 
variables are retained because removing them from the baseline model 
2 
causes a statistically significant decrease in L . 
The best model for ESCAPE affiliation includes all of the 
variables indicated as significant in Table 16. None may be removed 
from the model without causing to drop significantly. This is the 
only model in which all three measures of socioeconomic status (SES) 
appear together. This suggests that ESCAPE religions have a broad 
appeal to those who are "well-off," perhaps as an escape from the 
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Table 17. Tests of fit for logistic regression models of SECULAR and 
ESCAPE religious affiliations on test variables 
Model L^ df |L^ - L^| |dfg - df^| P 
SECULAR 
1. Baseline: 
[R][E][S][D] 277.50 6 - - -
2. Add [K] 278.25 7 0.75 1 .386 
3. Delete [R] 166.07 3 111.43 3 .000 
4. Delete [E] 253.07 5 24.43 1 .000 
5. Delete [S] 196.11 5 81.39 1 .000 
6. Delete [D] 243.37 5 34.13 1 .000 
ESCAPE 
1. Baseline: 
[R][E][C][I] 457.66 6 - - - - - - -
2. Delete [R] 168.04 3 289.62 3 .000 
3. Delete [E] 426.72 5 30.94 1 .000 
4. Delete [C] 435.34 5 22.32 1 .000 
5. Delete [I] 451.64 5 6.02 1 .014 
Note. R = Region dummies (NEAST, SOUTH, WEST), E = EDUC, S = SINGLE, 
D = DIVORCE, K = KIDS, C = CLASS, and I = INC67. DIVORCE and 
SINGLE were changed from effect-coded to dummy-coded variables 
for the tests performed in this table. Values of L are 
multiplied by .667 per discussion of Davis (1982). See text 
for details. 
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"boredom" of other more traditional religions. (More on this in the 
next chapter.) 
Finally, Table 18 presents logistic regression coefficients for 
the baseline models. Once again the initial word change variable 
(WORD) has been included in these models to control for the effects of 
this word change on SECULAR and ESCAPE affiliation. Net of other 
effects in the model, the log odds of being in the SECULAR group 
increase with higher education and with single or divorced marital 
status. In addition, while holding all other modeled effects 
constant, being a resident of the WEST also greatly increases the log 
odds of SECULAR "affiliation." Controlling for other modeled effects, 
residents of the north central U.S. are much less likely to be 
atheists or agnostics, followed even more distantly by residents of 
the northeast and south. 
Like the SECULAR group, respondents with ESCAPE affiliations 
(among persons with identical characteristics on the other independent 
variables) were much more likely to reside in the west than in the 
north central U.S. and were very unlikely to reside in the south. 
However, allowing for similar controls, the log odds of ESCAPE 
affiliations in the northeastern U.S. fall roughly in the middle 
between those of western and of north central residents. There are 
also positive partial associations between ESCAPE affiliation and the 
SES variables. Holding other independent variables constant, the log 
odds of being in the ESCAPE group increase with higher education, 
higher income, and higher perceived social class. 
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Table 18. Logistic regression coefficients for SECULAR and ESCAPE 
religious affiliations on test variables 
Test Variables Added SECULAR ESCAPE 
Intercept -3.450 -2.525 
(.080) (.055) 
EDUC .221 .277 
(.044) (.043) 
CLASS « .324 
(.056) 
NEAST -.189 .485 
(.091) (.072) 
SOUTH -.187 -.369 
(.081) (.079) 
WEST .735 1.047 
(.079) (.070) 
INC67I .134 
(.045) 
SINGLE .740 
(.068) 
DIVORCE .513 « s » 
(.085) 
WORD .731 .134 
(.086) (.061) 
N 20800 18697 
L2 334.35 460.69 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses below.coefficients. 
^The coefficient and standard error for INC67 are in log odds 
units per ten thousand dollars of income. 
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As with the previous analysis, the final steps involve relating 
these individual motivations to the period and cohort shifts inSECULAR 
and ESCAPE affiliation. Using the estimated variables created earlier 
as the independent variables in logistic regressions with SECULAR and 
ESCAPE as the dependent variables, it is possible to determine those 
variables that are useful in explaining the period and cohort shifts 
in affiliation of these two groups. As before, only the estimated 
variables associated with test variables examined in Table 18 are used 
O 
in these models. Table 19 presents the results of these 
regressions. 
A comparison of the results in Table 19 with those in Table 18 
helps to identify factors involved in the period and cohort shifts. 
Several changes are noteworthy with regard to SECULAR "affiliation". 
One of these is the increase in.the magnitude of the coefficient for 
EDUCHAT (Table 19) compared to the coefficient for EDUC (Table 18). 
This suggests that individuals from cohorts with higher levels of 
education are more likely to "affiliate" with the SECULAR group than 
individuals from cohorts with lower levels of education. Also, 
individuals appear more likely to "affiliate" with the SECULAR group 
Once again, this strategy precludes the possibility of finding 
significant aggregate-level effects that do not have corresponding 
effects at the individual level. Checks for this possibility revealed 
this only to occur regarding the log odds of secular "affiliation". 
In particular, when INC67HAT is added into the model it has a 
significant nonzero slope (b = -1.143). The significances of other 
variables in the equation remain unchanged from the results presented 
in Table 19. 
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Table 19. Coefficients from logistic regressions of SECULAR and 
ESCAPE religious affiliations on estimated test variables 
Estimated Test Variables Added SECULAR ESCAPE 
Intercept 
EDUCHAT 
CLASSHAT 
NEASTHAT 
SOUTHHAT 
WESTHAT 
INC67HAT^ 
SINGLEHAT 
DIVORCEHAT 
WORD 
-3.205 
(.096) 
.921 
(.312) 
-.156 
(1.422) 
-.520 
(1.498) 
.082 
(1.957) 
2.565 
(.437) 
1.510 
(1.856) 
.445 
(.114) 
-2.379 
(.073) 
.078 
(.191) 
1 .021  
(.848) 
1.125 
(1.150) 
.065 
(1.207) 
1.929 
(1.595) 
-.158 
(.230) 
.162 
(.089) 
20800 
263.17 
18697 
14.66 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients. 
^The coefficient and standard error for INC67HAT are in log odds 
units per ten thousand dollars of income. 
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during times when education levels are high than during times when 
education levels are low. 
The second change involves the marital status measure of 
singleness. As with education, the estimated variable's (SINGLEHAT) 
coefficient is greater in magnitude (more positive) than the 
coefficient for the corresponding test variable (SINGLE). Thus, net 
of other modeled effects, individuals from cohorts with a higher ratio 
of single to non-single members (or who live during a time when this 
ratio is high) are more likely to "affiliate" with the SECULAR group 
than are individuals from cohorts with a lower ratio of singles to 
non-singles (or who live in a time when this ratio is low). 
The other difference between the two models of SECULAR 
"affiliation" in Tables 18 and 19 is that the coefficient for the 
estimated variable of western residence (WESTHAT) is nonsignificant, 
while the corresponding test variable's coefficient is significantly 
positive. Thus, at the individual level, living in the western region 
of the U.S. makes it more likely that a person will "affiliate" with 
the SECULAR group than if they live in the north central U.S. 
However, at the aggregate level, living in the western U.S. has no 
significant effect on SECULAR "affiliation" (after controlling for the 
effects measured by the other independent variables). 
The models for ESCAPE show numerous differences. However, in the 
logistic regression of ESCAPE on the estimated variables, none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant. What this suggests is 
that, while factors associated with the test variables may be useful 
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in predicting individual motivations toward ESCAPE affiliation, they 
do not explain why a significant period shift for this group took 
place. 
This is even more evident upon examining Figure 11, in which the 
observed and estimated log odds of SECULAR and ESCAPE membership are 
plotted by survey year (period). The estimated model for ESCAPE 
yields a nearly horizontal line that is almost always below the 
plotted line of observed values. This is a clear indication that the 
estimated model does a poor job of predicting the period shifts in 
ESCAPE affiliation. 
In comparison to the ESCAPE plots, the estimated log odds of 
SECULAR "affiliation" more closely approximate the observed log odds 
for this group. At the very least, the estimated model does predict 
the increase in size of this group across the survey years. However, 
the estimated plot is quite often separate from the observed line 
(usually above), so the ability of the estimated model to explain 
period shifts in SECULAR "affiliation" is also quite weak. 
As with RCATH, LPROT, and OTHER, the estimated model for SECULAR 
does much better at predicting the cohort shifts occurring with this 
group. Figure 12 presents the observed and estimated log odds of 
SECULAR "affiliation" across birth cohorts. Most of the time the 
estimated odds fall in close proximity to the observed values (the 
main exceptions again are with the latest [and least numerous] 
cohorts). 
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Figure 11. Observed and Estimated Log Odds of "Other" Religious 
Affiliations in the U.S. Broken Down into Secular (SE) 
and Escape (ES) Subgroups, 1964-1986 
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Figure 12. Observed and Estimated Log Odds of Affiliation with the 
Secular (SE) Subgroup of "Other" Religious Affiliation 
In the U.S. by Birth Year 
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As with the estimated models in the previous section, the 
estimated models for SECULAR and ESCAPE fall short in predicting 
period shifts in "affiliation" with these groups. The estimated model 
for SECULAR, however, does a good job of predicting the cohort shifts 
in "affiliation" with this group. 
Conclusion 
The analyses in this chapter demonstrate that the factors 
explaining age, period, and cohort shifts in religious affiliation 
vary depending on the affiliations being examined. An examination of 
the implications of these results for the hypotheses posited in 
Chapter 2, as well as some other potential explanations for ARC 
differences in denominational affiliation, are presented in the next 
chapter. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the statistical results of the previous chapter 
will be examined in light of the results of other research. The first 
section will evaluate the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 2 in light 
of the analysis in Chapter 4. The second section offers some 
alternative theoretical explanations for the age-period-cohort effects 
on religious preference that were revealed in the analysis. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with a return to the two major models 
(developmental and cyclical) of secularization introduced in the first 
chapter. Each model is evaluated in view of the statistical results 
of this study. 
Examination of the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one 
The first hypothesis deals with the relationship of socioeconomic 
status (SES) variables to age, period, and cohort shifts in 
denominational affiliation. It was hypothesized that positive changes 
in SES would be associated with liberal religious preference, and 
that, therefore, differences between age and cohort groups (or across 
time periods) in religious preference would be partially explained by 
differences in socioeconomic status. 
The results found in Tables 12 and 19 are mixed. Three variables 
measuring income (INC67HAT), social class (CLASSHAT), and education 
(EDUCHAT) were included as measures of socioeconomic status. Income 
differences were related to two of the religious groups: Catholics and 
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"other" religions. It was found that individuals from age or cohort 
groups with higher income levels were more likely to choose Catholic 
affiliation than those from age or cohort groups with lower income 
levels. In addition, individuals from lower income cohort groups (or 
who live in periods of lower income levels) are more likely to 
affiliate with "other" religious groups than individuals from higher 
income cohort groups (or who live in periods of higher income levels), 
although this relation does not exist when the "other" group is broken 
down. Neither of these outcomes follows from the hypothesis. 
The results for education, on the other hand, lend some support 
for the first hypothesis. The relationship between "other" religions 
(in particular, secular "affiliations") and education is positive, 
such that individuals from cohorts with higher levels of education are 
more likely to choose to leave religion (as well as individuals living 
during periods when education levels are high) than individuals from 
cohorts with lower levels of education (or who are living during 
periods when education levels are low). The relationship between 
liberal Protestantism and aggregate-level education is negative, 
suggesting that individuals from highly-educated age or cohort groups 
are less likely to affiliate with a liberal Protestant denomination 
than individuals from less educated age or cohort groups. This second 
outcome seems to be in conflict with the hypothesized relationship, 
unless one considers the possibility that the educated individuals who 
are leaving the liberal Protestant churches are choosing not to 
affiliate with any religious organization. Considering that the 
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decline of liberal Protestantism and the increase in secular 
"affiliation" are most evident among the "baby boom" cohorts, it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that, at least between these two groups, 
highly educated individuals of the baby boom cohorts have moved to the 
more "liberal" alternative of disaffiliation. 
The third measure of socioeconomic status deals with social 
class. Social class was a significant factor in explaining age and 
cohort shifts in liberal Protestantism. In particular, it was found 
that individuals from age or cohort groups with a higher ratio of 
upper-middle to working class members were more likely to choose a 
liberal Protestant denomination than individuals from age or cohort 
groups for which this ratio was lower. This suggests that those who 
have remained in the liberal Protestant traditions (primarily cohorts 
before the baby boom or older aged individuals) are generally high in 
social class. Again, there appears to be a strong effect of "baby 
boom" membership on liberal Protestant affiliation, perhaps due to the 
rejection of traditional values found among baby boomers who were 
raised in the liberal Protestant churches (Demerath et al., 1971). 
The relationship between social class and preference for liberal 
Protestantism is as hypothesized. 
It appears from the data analyzed that there is a reasonable 
amount of support for the first hypothesis. It is also apparent that 
income is not a good predictor of age-and cohort-specific fluctuations 
in liberal Protestant (or the "more liberal" secular) affiliation. 
The results for education and social class do support the overall 
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contention that higher socioeconomic status across ages, periods, and 
cohorts does contribute to a more liberal religious preference, if one 
considers nonaffiliation as the most liberal choice. 
Hypothesis two 
The second set of hypotheses deal with the effect of non-
normative marital status on religious preference. In particular, it 
was hypothesized that, considering the emphasis of most religions on 
those who are married, period and cohort shifts toward secular 
"affiliation" should be explained by an increasing proportion of 
never-marrieds and divorcees in the population. 
Two effect-coded variables were included to test these 
hypotheses. One of them measured the proportion of never-marrieds in 
the survey (SINGLEHAT), while the other measured the number of 
individuals who were divorced (DIVORCEHAT). The divorce variable was 
not significantly related to movement toward or away from any 
religious affiliation. The single variable, however, did have a 
significant positive relationship with religious disaffiliation. This 
suggests that individuals who live during times when the proportion of 
never-marrieds is higher (or who are members of cohorts with a higher 
proportion of never-marrieds) are more likely to disaffiliate than 
individuals who live during times when there are fewer never-marrieds 
(or who are members of cohorts with fewer never-marrieds). Thus, the 
second set of hypotheses are partially supported. 
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Hypothesis three 
The third hypothesis deals with the relationship between the 
presence of children under 18 in the family (KIDSHAT) and religious 
affiliation. Since previous research indicated that parents with 
children under 18 are more likely to be church-goers, it was felt that 
couples without children might gravitate toward more liberal 
denominations, since they might feel uncomfortable in the more 
familistic conservative denominations. Since it is the more recent 
cohorts who have fewer children, and who delay having children, and 
since the drop in the proportion of couples with children is evident 
across survey years (see Table 2), it was hypothesized that period and 
cohort shifts toward liberal preference would be indicated in the data 
analysis. 
Only Catholic affiliation (RCATH) is associated with the presence 
of children under 18 in the home. This association is at the 
individual level only (with the variable KIDS), rather than at the 
period or cohort level as was hypothesized. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is not supported. 
Hypothesis four 
The fourth hypothesis considers the regional nature of 
denominational ism in the United States. This hypothesis states that 
period shifts in religious preference are, in part, the result of 
regional migration. In particular, it was felt that migration to the 
southern U.S. would result in an increase in conservative Protestant 
affiliation, since this is the region where these denominations are 
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most prevalent. In addition, migration to the western U.S. should 
result in more people choosing an "other" affiliation, since such 
affiliations are most prevalent in this region. 
The results of the data analysis lend tentative support to the 
second part of this hypothesis, but no support is found for the first 
part. The variable measuring western regional residence at the 
aggregate level (WESTHAT) is negatively associated with moderate 
Protestant affiliation. This suggests that individuals living during 
times when the ratio of western residents to north central residents 
is lower are more likely to affiliate with moderate Protestant 
churches than individuals living during times when this ratio is 
higher. It is apparent, therefore, that a shift of population to the 
west has a negative impact on moderate Protestant membership. But, 
contrary to what was hypothesized, there is no significant association 
between western residence and "other" affiliation. 
This is inconsistent with the fourth hypothesis. One potential 
explanation for this is that the decline in liberal Protestant 
affiliation and the concurrent increase in "other" affiliations may 
have a moderating effect on the association of western residence to 
"other" affiliation. Since liberal Protestant churches have their 
stronghold in the northeast and southern regions of the United States, 
and since there is a documented decline in membership of these 
churches, it is possible that those who "drop out" of religion (if 
they remain in their region) change the regional nature of the "other" 
affiliations. Thus, the increase in "other" affiliates in these 
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regions makes the increase in the western region appear less 
significant. 
In addition to the negative association of western residence and 
moderate Protestant affiliation, there was one other significant 
relationship between region and religious preference. There is a 
positive association between western residence and Catholic 
affiliation. Thus, individuals from age or cohort groups that have a 
higher ratio of western to north central residents are more likely to 
choose a Catholic church than individuals from age or cohort groups 
for which this ratio is lower. This suggests that those who are 
Catholic maintain that affiliation even when they migrate, while 
moderate Protestants are likely to switch denominational preference. 
Overall, the results of the data analysis give partial support for the 
hypothesis that regional migration to the west will lead to an 
increase in "other" affiliations. 
Conclusions 
The results are mixed regarding the first four hypotheses, 
although there is some support for all but one of them. The only 
hypothesis that can be rejected outright is the third hypothesis 
regarding the presence of children under 18 in the home. The next 
section considers how these results explain the significant age, 
period, and cohort trends in religious preference. This will be 
followed by an examination of the last hypothesis regarding whether 
shifting denominational preferences in the United States indicate a 
pattern of developmental or cyclic secularization. 
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Alternate Explanations for APC Differences 
In this section potential explanations for age, period, or cohort 
differences in religious preference are noted. Only those effects 
which were deemed significant will be examined. Period differences 
will be addressed first, followed by cohort and age differences. 
Period differences 
The research findings indicate significant period differences for 
three groups: moderate Protestants, and secular and escaping 
"others". If one looks at Figure 5 (Chapter 3), it is apparent that 
the largest portion of the decline in moderate Protestant membership 
occurs during the mid-1970s, after which the log odds seem to 
stabilize. This may be due to the impact of migration out of the 
North Central region during this period of hard economic times. It 
was during this time that many in the automotive and steel industries 
were experiencing layoffs as a result of the oil embargo and other 
economic problems. Many of these unemployed people moved to the 
southern and western states, where more jobs were available, most 
notably in oil exploration and production and in the growing computer 
industry. It is also possible that this regional migration is 
responsible for the decline in moderate Protestant membership, since 
moderate Protestants who moved out of the north central U.S. were 
invariably moving to a region where fewer moderate Protestant churches 
were available. The data analysis indicates a negative impact of 
western region residence on moderate Protestant affiliation over time. 
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Individuals moving from the north central to the southern or 
western region of the U.S. would find they had to choose a new 
affiliation, the most conservative Protestant in the South and other 
religious affiliations to be prevalent in the West. While the 
conservative Protestants do not show any corresponding fluctuations in 
affiliation, "other" affiliations show an increase concurrent with the 
moderate Protestant decline in membership. Thus, one may speculate 
that the loss of members by moderate Protestant churches during this 
time is a direct result of out-migration from the north central region 
in which these churches are most prevalent. The large jump in 
affiliation with "other" churches during the same time period is very 
likely also a result of this migration. This would seem to be due to 
a need on the part of individuals to integrate into their new 
communities by adopting the religious identity most accepted in the 
community. Thus, a need for social support on the part of recent 
migrants may explain why a moderate Protestant would switch to an 
"other" religious affiliation when moving from the north central U.S. 
to the west. 
Cohort differences 
There are several religious groups for which statistically 
significant cohort differences in preference were indicated. These 
include the Catholic, liberal Protestant, and secular "other" groups. 
If we reexamine Figure 6 (Chapter 3), it is possible to see definite 
patterns, with Catholics and secular "other" affiliations increasing 
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and liberal Protestant affiliation declining among the more recent 
cohorts. 
The log odds of being Catholic increase as one moves from the 
1905 and earlier cohorts to the mid-1920s cohorts, at which point the 
log odds plateau. This pattern correspond to the pattern of Roman 
Catholic immigration since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Table 20). At the end of the first decade (1901-1910), Catholics 
comprised 15.6% of the total U.S. population. Immigrants from 
"Catholic" regions (namely, from Italy, Poland, and Latin America) 
comprised 2.42% of the total population. If one assumes that these 
immigrants were all Catholic, then it is possible to compute the log 
odds of being Catholic for the total population, as well as these same 
log odds adjusted for the impact of immigration. This information is 
found in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 20. The fifth column 
shows the increase in log odds due to "Catholic" immigration. The 
largest increases are associated with the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, after which the influence of immigration drops 
substantially. The overall pattern, even during the first three 
decades, is of a decline in immigration from the "Catholic" regions. 
The final important piece of information is supplied in the last 
column, where the proportion of immigrants under age 45 is reported. 
During the first three decades of the 1900s, over 90 percent of the 
immigrants to the United States were under age 45. Those of these 
relatively young immigrants who were of child-bearing age, were thus 
Table 20. Age of immigrants and immigration of Catholics into the 
United States by decade 
Proportion of U.S. Population Log Odds of 
Immigrants from Overall 
Decade 
Ending 
All 
Catholics 
(PA) 
Italy, Poland 
or Latin America 
(Pi) 
In 
f PA U - P A  
1910 .1560 .0242 -1.688 
1920 .1678 .0143 -1.601 
1930 .1646 .0104 -1.624 
1940 .1626 .0010 -1.639 
1950 .1843 .0016 -1.487 
1960 .2279 .0045 -1.220 
1970 .2355 .0077 -1.178 
1980 .2219 .0088 -1.255 
1986* .2189 .0055 -1.272 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976,1988); U.S. Department of 
Justice (1987). 
*1981-1986 only. 
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Catholic Affiliation 
Adjusted for Immigration 
In 
Pa - P I 
1 - (Pa - PI) Increase in log odds due to immigration 
Proportion of 
Immigrants 
Under Age 45 
-1.885 0.197 .9505 
-1.707 0.106 .9304 
CN
J 
O
 0.078 .9085 
-1.646 0.007 .8288 
-1.498 0.011 .8161 
-1.246 0.026 .8635 
-1.221 0.043 .8625 
-1.306 0.051 .8524 
-1.305 0.033 .8490 
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born during the years 1855 to about 1915. The increase in log odds of 
being Catholic from the 1905 to 1925 cohorts (Figure 5) may be a 
direct consequence of the immigration of the parents of these cohorts, 
as well as (to a lesser degree) of the immigration of some of the 
members of these cohorts. In brief, the cohort differences in Roman 
Catholic religious affiliation may not reflect a common generational 
experience that made Americans more likely to have a Catholic 
religious preference. Rather, this seeming evidence of a 
historically-determined generational mentality may instead be an 
artifact of period-specific immigration that surfaces in the data as a 
cohort effect. 
The positive association of western residence with age and cohort 
changes in Catholic affiliation may be a reflection of the trend for 
recent "Catholic" immigrants from Latin American countries to settle 
(primarily) in the western region of the United States. LeMay (1987) 
notes that the peak decade for immigration from Mexico, Central 
America, and South America was the 1960s. If these people were 
relatively young when they arrived, they might also swell the log odds 
of Catholic affiliation for more recent cohorts. 
Cohort differences for the liberal Protestant and secular 
"affiliations" show a different pattern. The log odds of liberal 
Protestant religious preference drop quickly beginning with cohorts in 
the early 1940s and ending with the 1959 cohort. This coincides with 
the major increase in log odds of choosing a secular "affiliation". 
These are the cohorts for which the experiences of the 1960s and early 
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1970s were most cogent, since they were (for the most part) in their 
teens and twenties during that decade. 
The data indicate that there is a shift from the liberal 
Protestant churches to the secular "other" group. The implication is 
that the 1960s social movements--movements that primarily involved 
members of these cohorts—had a negative impact on liberal Protestant 
denominations, particularly among those members who were highly 
educated. This is due to a rejection of traditional institutions in 
general, and of the church as a traditional institution specifically 
(cf., i.e.. Flacks, 1970; Neuhaus, 1970; Demerath et al., 1971; Lewis, 
1975; Hall, 1990). 
Age differences 
The subject of age effects is a more difficult one to tackle. 
The RCATH group shows a decrease in log odds with increasing age, 
while the LPROT group shows a definite rise in log odds with age. 
Strictly interpreted, this suggests that liberal Protestants are older 
than the overall sample, while Catholics are younger than the overall 
sample. Part of the aging of liberal Protestantism may be related to 
the "dropping out" of baby boomers just discussed. Yet this age 
effect is significant over and above the effects of cohort. The aging 
effect is likely due to the inner-worldly emphasis of liberal 
Protestant churches. Since, generally speaking, one's financial 
situation improves with age, it is possible that those who are 
successful might leave other denominations to join a liberal 
Protestant denomination, where they meet others of similar status. 
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The positive relationship of social class to age and cohort difference 
in liberal Protestant affiliation found in the data analysis (Table 
12) is consistent with this conclusion. 
That Catholics are younger than the overall sample is not 
difficult to explain, given their higher birth rate. In comparison to 
non-Catholics, Catholics have more children. There is, therefore, a 
greater likelihood of finding Catholics in the younger age groups. 
Developmental vs. Cyclical Secularization 
We now return to the last hypothesis, which postulated that the 
overall pattern of religious preference would favor a cyclical model, 
with periods of secularization followed by periods of revival, rather 
than a pattern of continuous (developmental) secularization. 
The results of this study are mixed, although they do appear to 
support a cyclic model of secularization and revival. This model may 
be based on what Peter Berger (1967) calls the "religious market 
place." He notes that 
religion has always been susceptible to highly mundane 
influences, extending even to its most rarified theoretical 
constructions. The pluralistic situation, however, 
introduces a novel form of mundane influences, probably more 
potent in modifying religious contents than such older forms 
as the wishes of kings or the vested interests of classes --
the dynamics of consumer preference . . . religion can no 
longer be imposed but must be marketed (Berger, 1967:145). 
Unlike the situation in many European countries, where there are 
comparatively few religious alternatives, the situation in the United 
States represents more of a "religious market place" in which the 
"consumer" may choose the "product" according to his/her needs. In 
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contrast, the European religious scene has a more monopolized 
religious market place, where the secular world provides most 
alternative means for meeting people's social, psychological, and 
spiritual needs (Berger, 1967). As we shall see in the following 
discussion, the trends in each religious group of this study vary, 
although the evidence primarily favors a cyclic model of 
secularization. 
Catholics 
Catholics show a stable pattern across the survey years. While 
there were age and cohort effects associated with this group, an 
examination of period effects shows little is happening. The cohort 
pattern has been examined earlier, with an emphasis on how migration 
during the early 1900s and the 1960s may have impacted Catholic 
affiliation. The relative youth of the Catholics may be explained by 
their higher birthrate, a sort of "reproductive evangelism" which has 
contributed to their maintenance of a fairly constant share of the 
"consumers." Thus, there is no evidence of developmental 
secularization within the Catholic denominations. 
Why the Catholic Church shows such great stability is a matter of 
conjecture. In terms of the "religious market place," one potential 
explanation is that "religious institutions can still count on 
traditional ties holding back certain groups of the population from 
too drastic liberty in religious choice. . . . (T)here still is strong 
'product loyalty' among certain groups of 'old customers'" (Berger, 
1967:145). The Roman Catholic Church is a very tradition-bound 
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church, evoking a great deal of loyalty, especially in the Irish, 
Italian, and Polish ethnic communities. For some of these people 
being Catholic is an important part of their ethnic heritage; to leave 
the church would be to lose part of their identity. In addition, the 
local parish may be a focal point in maintaining the community. The 
loss of the church in an area, as has occurred in recent years as a 
cost-cutting measure, is met with strong resistance in the community. 
The Catholic churches probably reflect best Berger's concept of 
"product loyalty." 
Moderate Protestants 
This group showed significant changes in membership over the 
survey years (a period effect), while no age nor cohort effects were 
found. The analysis of this period effect indicated that the only 
variables which were useful in explaining the effect were those 
associated with region, in particular the negative influence of 
western residence. (See Tables 11, 12). 
In this case we are dealing with a religious "supply and demand" 
issue. That is, in the market place of religions some religious 
groups have established a strong "market share" in some areas of the 
country, while they have very little influence in other areas. It is 
evident in Table 11 that such is the case for the moderate Protestant 
denominations, which have a strong market share in the North Central 
region of the United States, but are "weak" in the rest of the 
country. 
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Unfortunately for these denominations, there has been a decline 
in the population of the north central states, due primarily to 
migration to southern and western states. As these people move to 
these other regions, they may find there is no local church from their 
denomination nearby. But the supply of alternatives is plentiful 
(conservative Protestant denominations in the South, other religious 
groups in the West), so they are more likely to choose an alternate 
denomination. While the result is a loss of membership by moderate 
Protestant denominations, it does not indicate evidence of 
developmental secularization. 
Conservative Protestants 
The conservative Protestants showed the greatest degree of 
membership stability of all the religious groups in this study. There 
were no age, period, or cohort effects evident for this group. Once 
again, we may have an example of "product loyalty" (Berger, 1967). 
These denominations appear to be able to appeal to certain people 
consistently. 
The consistent need that is addressed by these churches is the 
need for other-worldly goal attainment. The capitalist economy of the 
United States, while offering a potential to gain great wealth, 
creates a lower class of individuals who will likely never succeed 
financially. As was noted in Chapter Two, the conservative Protestant 
churches focus their message on the afterlife, on gaining entrance 
into heaven (an other-worldly goal). For those who are poor there is 
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comfort in knowing that they will someday able to attain a goal, one 
that is not dependent on their present financial or social standing. 
That religions that focus on other-worldly goal attainment are 
needed in the U.S. distinguishes American society from those countries 
in Europe which have experienced developmental secularization. Many 
of the European societies have more socialistic economies. As a 
result there may be fewer people suffering in these countries than in 
the United States. The appeals of other-worldly oriented churches may 
be less relevant to citizens of these countries because they have less 
need for other-worldly goal attainment, making developmental 
secularization more likely. Because the need for a goal that is 
other-worldly is relatively constant in American society, conservative 
Protestant denominations remain in demand. This provides further 
evidence against developmental secularization in the United States. 
Liberal Protestants 
The liberal Protestant denominations constitute one of two groups 
in this study in which membership trends indicate developmental 
secularization is occurring. It has been noted that the decline in 
affiliation of this group is strongly associated with the departure of 
members of recent cohorts from these denominations. It was argued 
that this is due (at least in part) to the experiences of these 
individuals during the 1960s. Another way of looking at this decline 
is the classic modernization argument, in this case using Berger's 
(1967) concept of the religious market place to facilitate the 
discussion. 
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In the religious market place, it is the consumers who dictate 
the kind of product they are willing to buy. Various denominational 
groups have targeted particular groups in society by modifying their 
"product." The liberal Protestant traditions have typically oriented 
themselves toward an upper-middle-class market. In order to appeal to 
this target market, these denominations are "under pressure to 
secularize and psychologize their products - otherwise, the chances of 
these being 'bought' diminish drastically" (Berger, 1967:148). This 
approach to the upper-middle-class has been of the form of a means to 
an end; these churches offer a way to achieve, as well as legitimate, 
inner-worldly goals. But there are many secular institutions that 
offer this same "product," without the theological baggage. Thus, 
part of the problem lies in the issue of whether theology meets a need 
for this segment of society. 
In addition, however, it must be noted that the upgrading of the 
U.S. occupational structure, along with an overall increase in 
people's education, has exacerbated this situation. The liberal 
Protestant focus on "inner-worldly" concerns is redundant, since there 
are a multitude of secular institutions that also work for social 
justice. What is occurring then, is not just that liberal Protestant 
denominations must compete in the religious market place, but that 
they must also compete with secular institutions outside of that 
market place. By targeting the upper-middle-class market, and by 
modifying strategies to meet the needs of this group, the liberal 
Protestant churches may have become irrelevant for these people. 
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While the present study indicates a developmental secularization 
pattern for liberal Protestant affiliation, recent evidence in the 
popular media suggest a possible turnaround (Woodward et al., 1990; 
Simbro, 1991). Woodward et al. (1990) note that in recent years more 
than one third of the baby boom religious dropouts have returned to 
organized religion. Most of these returnees are married with 
children. Simbro (1991) notes a similar trend in Iowa, where churches 
are being started by liberal and moderate Protestant denominations. A 
common feature of these accounts is the concept of marketing. 
Woodward et al. (1990) describe younger baby boomers as people seeking 
to satisfy a longing; "they inspect congregations as if they were 
restaurants and leave if they find nothing to their taste. . . . They 
don't convert-'they choose" (p. 52). Both articles focus on how 
churches have adapted by means of polling, marketing, and advertising. 
The overall effort is to discover what people want and need from a 
church, and then to supply the programs to meet those wants and needs. 
(It should be noted that the data analysis in this study does not 
provide evidence for this turnaround.) 
Whether this signals a long-term trend in liberal Protestant 
affiliation remains to be seen. The difficulty will be in offering 
something which is both needed by the consumer and is unique to these 
churches. If it is a product that can be bought elsewhere, then the 
liberal Protestant denominations will continue to be in competition 
with a secular market. If the "longing" of the baby boomers turns out 
to be for spiritual "food," then the programs currently being touted 
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will provide only a temporary growth, unless these churches also deal 
with spiritual matters in the. future. 
Secular "others" 
The second category of religious affiliations which exhibits a 
pattern of developmental secularization is the secular "others". This 
group contains those who have no religious preference, are atheists, 
or are agnostics. It is this group which showed a concurrent increase 
among the baby-boomers associated with the decrease in membership of 
liberal Protestantism. Those who "dropped out" of liberal 
Protestantism left organized religion altogether. 
The profile of the nonaffiliates group suggests that those who do 
not belong to an organized religious group could be typified as 
"unattached" or "self-reliant." Membership in this group is more 
likely with greater education. It is also the only group for which 
being single is a statistically significant factor, suggesting that 
singles are uncomfortable with the family emphasis of most religions. 
In addition, the likelihood of being a nonaffiliate is highest in the 
western region of the United States. 
The nonaffiliated people are escaping from religious affiliation. 
They are the baby boomers who left liberal Protestantism during the 
1960s and 1970s, disillusioned that the church was part of the 
establishment. They rejected religious organizations outright, 
choosing to "drop out" rather than change affiliations. Given the 
recent evidence regarding a return to liberal Protestantism noted in 
the previous section, one might speculate that these individuals may 
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be slow in "going back", since they have delayed making family 
commitments. Indeed, the research noted by Woodward et al. (1990) 
suggests that most of the returnees are married and have children. 
Whether many of these nonaffiliates will return after they marry (if 
they marry) and have children requires further investigation. For the 
time being the indication is that this group will remain larger than 
during the early 1960s, as long as the trends of higher education and 
postponement of family commitments continue. 
Escaping "others" 
This group of religious affiliations also grew during the 1960s 
and 1970s at the expense of liberal Protestantism, although the 
factors behind this increase are not clear in the data analysis. This 
group, consisting primarily of non-Judeo-Christian religions, is the 
only one in this study in which all three socioeconomic factors 
(education, social class, and income) were factors related to 
individuals affiliation. Members of the "escape" religions have high 
educational attainment, high income, and perceive of themselves as 
upper-middle class. As with the nonaffiliates, they are concentrated 
in the western U.S., although they are also found in the northeast in 
higher numbers than in other regions. 
Unlike the nonaffiliates, which are described above as people 
escaping from organized religion, "escape" religion members appear to 
be escaping to a more positive religious experience. Their primary 
motivation may be to find something new and exciting to replace the 
boredom of their previous religion. That these people are upper-
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middle class suggests that they have the resources to find excitement 
in the secular market, and that they would probably demand the same of 
the church they attend. 
Woodward et al. (1990) speak briefly about this group as well, 
noting that they too are returning to traditional religious 
organizations. This return is "tempered by their experiences in the 
counterculture. Writer Beth Clements has made the journey from 
childhood Presbyterian to postgraduate Buddhist to middle-aged 
Episcopalian. Because she had learned spiritual discipline through 
meditation, Clements found that she could translate 'the rituals that 
I'd listened to as a bored teenager, that had been stale and 
infuriating, and give them new meaning'" (Woodward et al., 1990:51). 
Just how much this typifies people in this group has implications for 
its membership in the future. Again, further investigation is 
necessary. 
The Future of the U.S. Religious Market Place 
If the findings of this study hold true, then a number of 
predictions can be made about the shape of the religious scene in the 
future. First, it would appear that developmental secularization of 
the type experienced in European countries is unlikely to occur in the 
United States. The results of the data analysis indicate a great 
degree of stability among Catholics and conservative Protestants, and 
that the loss of membership by moderate Protestant denominations is 
primarily due to regional migration. On the other hand, the results 
for liberal Protestants and secular others do suggest developmental 
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secularization is occurring for these two groups. Thus, developmental 
secularization appears to be limited to these two groups in the United 
States, although it is possible that the stable denominations may be 
more successful in adjusting their appeals to meet people's changing 
needs. 
Second, Catholic affiliation is likely to remain stable, given 
the great degree of product loyalty exhibited by its adherents. 
Catholics will continue as the largest religious group in the United 
States because the birth rate of Catholics is higher than that of the 
other religious categories. 
Third, conservative Protestantism will likely maintain a steady 
share of the market. The present study offers no evidence of an 
upsurge in conservative Protestant affiliation that Kelley (1977, 
1978) believed was taking place. On the other hand, there is also no 
evidence of a decline in membership among these denominations across 
time. In addition, there is no evidence for shifts related to cohort 
or aging effects. 
Fourth, moderate Protestant denominations appear to have leveled 
off in membership after a sharp decline during the mid-1970s. This 
plateau will probably continue, since there does not appear to be any 
evidence that people are migrating in large numbers back to the North 
Central states, where these denominations are primarily located. 
Fifth, the fate of liberal Protestantism lies in its ability to 
meet the needs of its market while not being totally redundant with 
programs provided outside the religious market place. Again, the 
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information provided by Woodward et al. (1990) and Sitnbro (1991) 
indicate that these denominations are indeed attempting to be relevant 
to the needs of those around them. If they are able to tie some 
spiritual training to the programs provided, then liberal 
Protestantism could rebound from its membership decline. The present 
study, however, offers no evidence that there is a turnaround in the 
membership declines experienced by these denominations. 
Sixth, the fate of nonaffiliates seems to be tied up with that of 
liberal Protestantism. If the liberal Protestant denominations are 
successful in regaining their market share, then it will likely be at 
the expense of this "group". 
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is the impact 
that the 1960s had on religion in America. This is not just a period 
effect, but manifests itself in the attitudes of recent cohorts 
regarding religion, especially those who are highly educated. The 
future shape of the religious market place in the United States is 
closely tied to this group and its needs. Researchers in religion 
will need to pay particular attention to this group, as it will 
reflect to a large extent which religious organizations grow in 
membership and which ones lose. 
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APPENDIX A: 
WEIGHT FACTORS USED TO ELIMINATE BLACK OVERSAHPLES 
AND TO OVERCOME EFFECTS OF DIFFERENTIAL SAMPLE SIZES 
Weights 
Black Differential 
Survey Year N Oversample Sample Sizes 
1964 1825 0.377 1.141 
1966 1269 1.0 1.370 
1968 1663 0.562 1.164 
1970 1600 0.581 1.201 
1972 2508 1.0 0.693 
1974 1480 1.0 1.175 
1976 2106 1.0 0.825 
1978 2125 1.0 0.818 
1980 1490 1.0 1.157 
1982 1315 1.0 1.322 
1984 2078 1.0 0.837 
1986 2025 1.0 0.858 
Mean 1738^ 0.876% 1.047 
^Mean of N after eliminating black oversamples from 1964, 1968, 
and 1970. 
^Unlike the mean for differential sample sizes, this mean does 
not need to be equal to one, since the purpose of the weight 
factors are to reduce the effective number of black respondents. 
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APPENDIX B: EXPLANATION OF STATISTICAL TESTING PROCEDURE 
This thesis uses a test for the statistical significance of a 
spurious effect between two variables (or sets of variables). Data on 
religious affiliations are found to vary across age groups, historical 
periods, and/or birth cohorts. However, these age, period, and cohort 
differences are not theoretically informative in and of themselves, 
but must be thought of as artifacts of the underlying sociobiological 
dynamics of maturity, experience, and generation-formation. The 
approach used here is to consider test variables (gender, geographic 
region, ...) as causally prior to delineations of respondents' age, 
period, and cohort. If (when these test variables are included in a 
regression model) differences in religious affiliation by age, period, 
and/or cohort are significantly less (in absolute value) than when the 
test variables are not included in the model, one can conclude that 
the age, period, and/or cohort differences are the spurious 
consequences of the effects of the test variables on religious 
affiliation. 
Paul Lazarsfeld (1959) is usually credited for having suggested 
that a difference in the magnitudes of a zero-order versus a 
corresponding partial association may indicate that the control 
variable from the partial association plays an intervening or 
explanatory role in the causal relation evaluated in both 
associations. He and others (esp. Rosenberg [1968]) have written 
extensively on how this idea applies within the context of contingency 
tables. To my knowledge only work by Sobel (1982, 1986) has extended 
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this idea within the context of regression analysis. Using Rao's 
(1973) delta-method, Sobel has developed a significance test for 
indirect effects in systems of regression equations. 
The relevance of Sobel's work becomes apparent when it is 
acknowledged that both indirect and spurious effects,lend themselves 
to the same test of significance. In brief, consider the causal 
relations among three standardized variables, Zj, Zg, and Zg, where 
the paths among the variables are pgj (the effect of Zj on Zg), pgg 
(the effect of Zg on Zg), and Pg^ (the effect of Zj on Z3). The test 
for the indirect effect of Z^ on Zg through Zg would be a test of the 
following hypotheses: 
"o- P21P32 " ® 
^a" P21P32 * ® 
If however, the causal priority of Zj and Zg is reversed (yielding Pjg 
instead of Pgj), the test for the spurious effect of Zj on Zg due to 
Zg would be a test of the same hypotheses. This becomes clear once 
one realizes that pgj = pjg. In this context, the spurious effect of 
age, period, and/or cohort (Zj) on religious affiliation (Zg) due to 
test variables (Zg) will be tested. 
An alternative to Sobel's approach was suggested during personal 
correspondence with Wayne A. Fuller of the Statistics Department at 
Iowa State University. Fuller's suggestion is to reject p^gpgg = 
0 if one rejects either Hj.* Pjg = 0 at Oj and/or Hg: Pgg = 0 at 
Qtg. (Clearly if either multiplier equals zero, their product also 
equals zero.) To test the two subhypotheses (Hj and Hg) at an overall 
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significance level, a, where = Og = ®s' follows that a = Oj + 
(1 - = 2(7g - (Kg . Setting a = .05, this yields a = .02532. 
In the absence of information on the relative power of Sobel's and 
Fuller's significance tests, but given the simplicity and elegance of 
the latter, Fuller's test (with a = .02532) will be the one employed 
in this thesis. 
Age, period, and cohort effects are not estimated by single 
variables, but by sets of dummy variables that respectively identify 
discrete age groups, historical periods, and birth cohorts. With this 
modification, the first subhypothesis is altered as follows: 
Hi': /il = /i2 = • • • = Pm+i , where ;t. represents the mean value 
on a test variable within the i^^ age-, period-, or cohort-level 
from which "m" dummy variables were constructed. 
Because tests for spurious effects are performed separately for each 
test variable, the second subhypothesis (Hg) remains as is. One 
consequence of performing so many significance tests at an overall .05 
significance level is that one should expect 5% of them to yield 
erroneous rejections of null hypotheses. This fact should be kept in 
mind as significant test effects are reported. 
Finally, two points regarding suppression effects: 
(1) One has suppression effects (not spurious ones) whenever P12P32P31 
< 0 and Hg: P12P32 ^  ® is rejected. Thus, the significance test 
described above is not solely a test for spurious effects. Although 
no suppression effects were found in the data examined here, if they 
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had been, they would certainly have been reported and submitted to 
theoretical speculation. 
(2) On the other hand, P12P32 ^  ® was only tested when 
significant age, period, or cohort differences in religious 
affiliation were found. This precludes the possibility of having 
discovered suppression effects, where the effect of the suppression 
relegated age, period, or cohort differences to nonsignificant. The 
realm of these tests should therefore be limited to the exploration of 
how test variables may serve to clarify "existing" (i.e., 
statistically significant at a = .05) age, period, or cohort 
differences in religious affiliation. 
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APPENDIX C: 
BREAKDOWN OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS 
BY DENOMINATIONS 
Religious Weighted 
Affiliation Denominations Percent 
RCATH Roman Catholic 23.12 
Greek Rite Catholic 0.07 
Greek Orthodox 0.24 
Russian Orthodox 0.05 
Romanian Orthodox 0.00 
Serbian Orthodox 0.02 
Other Orthodox 0.08 
Total 23.58 
LPROT United Church of Christ 0.75 
Congregational 1.24 
Episcopal, Anglican 2.70 
Methodist 13.03 
African Methodist Episcopal 0.14 
United Brethren 0.26 
Total 18.12 
MPROT Presbyterian 4.78 
Lutheran (excluding Missouri Synod) 7.41 
Evangelical and Reformed 0.23 
Reformed, Dutch Reformed, 
Christian Reformed 0.44 
Baptist (excluding Southern Baptist) 13.57 
Disciples of Christ/Christian Church 0.46 
Total 26.89 
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CPROT Mennonite, Amish , 0.08 
Church of the Brethren 0.09 
United Missionary/Protestant Missionary 0.06 
Church of God (Holiness) 0.99 
Nazarene/Free Methodist 0.49 
Church of God in Christ 0.14 
Plymouth Brethren 0.01 
Pentecostal/Assembly of God 1.53 
Church of Christ 2.22 
Salvation Army 0.08 
Primitive/Free Will Baptist 1.49 
Seventh Day Adventist 0.37 
Southern Baptist , 6.69 
Missouri Synod Lutheran 0.17 
Other Fundamentalist 0.67 
Jehovah's Witness 0.48 
Total 15.56 
OTHER [ESCAPE] Protestant, no specific denomination 2.57 
Non-denominational Protestant 0.79 
Community Church 0.14 
Other Protestant 0.76 
Christian Scientist 0.27 
Spiritualist 0.04 
Latter Day Saints, Mormon 1.29 
Unitarian, Universalist 0.35 
Quakers 0.15 
Unity 0.06 
Jewish 2.59 
Mohammedans 0.10 
Buddhist 0.09 
Hindu, 0.01 
Bahai^ 0.02 
Other non-Judeo-Christian 0.06 
Other religions 0.38 
[SECULAR] Atheist, Agnostic - 0.40 
No preference/Don't know 5.74 
Total 15.83 
^1966-1986 surveys only. 
^Includes those coded "000" (no preference) from 1964-1970, as 
well as those coded "998" (don't know) from 1964-1986. 
232 
APPENDIX D: BREAKDOWN OF REGIONS BY STATES 
NORTHEAST NORTH CENTRAL SOUTH WEST 
Connecticut Illinois Alabama Alaska 
Delaware Indiana Arkansas Arizona 
Maine Iowa District of California 
Massachusetts Kansas Columbia Colorado 
New Hampshire Michigan Florida Hawaii 
New Jersey Minnesota Georgia Idaho 
New York Missouri Kentucky Montana 
Pennsylvania Nebraska Louisiana Nevada 
Rhode Island North Dakota Maryland New Mexico 
Vermont Ohio Mississippi Oregon 
South Dakota North Carolina Utah 
Wisconsin Oklahoma Washington 
South Carolina Wyoming 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
